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ABSTRACT  
   
The economic crisis in 2008 triggered a global financial shockwave that left many 
wondering about the origins of the crisis. Similarly, in the early twentieth century, Wall 
Street faced catastrophic losses that set the stage for the Great Depression, which resulted 
in a decade of economic depression, leaving millions of people out of work. Using 
discourse analysis to understand how economic crisis is framed through the mainstream 
press, this research project analyzed the stock market crash of 1929-1932 and the 
mortgage-backed financial crisis of 2007-2009 through the lens of two mainstream 
publications, The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal. Comparative analysis 
focused on explanations for the causes of the crises, attributions of blame, culprits, and 
proposed solutions emerging in news coverage of the 1929 panic and the 2007-2009 
financial crises. Mainstream media accounts of the 2007-2009 crisis are then compared 
with ‘alternative media’ accounts of crisis causes, culprits, and solutions. These 
comparative analyses are contextualized historically within economic paradigms of 
thought, beginning with the classical economists led by Adam Smith and transitioning to 
the Chicago School. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
OVERVIEW OF THE PROJECT 
 
 
 The financial crises of 1929 and 2008 shook the entire global economy. Yet, the 
causes of these crises, the agents involved, and the solutions remain contested in 
academic scholarship and public discourse. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to 
analyze mainstream media framing of the two financial crises’ causes, culprits, and 
solutions by analyzing and comparing news coverage of each crisis provided by The New 
York Times and The Wall Street Journal. The limits of mainstream news media frames of 
the 2007-2009 crisis are revealed by comparison with alternative problem-solution 
frames for the crisis found in alternative media. Through these comparative analyses, this 
thesis extends knowledge of how media help set public and government agendas and 
policy orientations by shaping public interpretations of critical issues.  
This project ultimately adopts a critical orientation to mainstream media’s role in 
shaping representations of, responsibility for, and reform of financial misconduct. Careful 
analysis of The New York Times coverage of causes and culprits of the 1929 crisis 
suggests that press coverage of criminal misdeeds and Pecora Commission findings 
played a role in building support for strong regulatory action, leading to passage of the 
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. In contrast, analysis of media coverage of the 2008 crisis by 
The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal indicates that stories de-emphasized 
criminal acts and problem-solution frames, thereby undercutting critical demands for a 
strong regulatory response by the U.S. government, although both newspapers 
acknowledged that repeal of Glass-Steagall was one of the major contributions to the 
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2008 meltdown. Consequently, the United States government had little mainstream media 
opposition to its unprecedented bailouts of financial institutions using taxpayer money 
(Crawford, 2011) and has faced relatively little public pressure for massive regulatory 
reforms, such as breaking up the large banks and prosecuting financial wrongdoings as 
criminal offenses.  
This thesis’s expanded analysis of the contemporary media environment suggests 
audiences wanting more critical coverage of 2008 crisis causes and culprits must turn to 
the alternative press, including the Internet blogosphere. Content analysis of popular 
alternative media reveals greater willingness than the mainstream press to investigate 
criminal wrongdoings and to call for strong regulatory action. The alternative media are 
especially more willing to interview interviewers and to report on their activist activities. 
 
Project Background 
 
The 1929 crisis resulted in the 1932 Pecora Commission investigation and 
subsequent prosecution of high-level banking executives like Charles Mitchell of 
National City Bank, considered the second-largest bank in the United States. These 
events paved the way for passage of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act, which imposed a 
stringent regulatory framework on the nation’s banks. The repeal of the Glass-Steagall 
Act in 1999 by the Clinton Administration with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999 
was instrumental in the creation of the subprime-loans bubble, which turned out to be the 
driving force behind the financial panic of 2007-2009. Until its repeal, the Glass-Steagall 
Act prevented many of the irresponsible banking practices that eventually contributed to 
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the stock market crash that began in late 2007. For example, the banking system set up by 
Glass-Steagall discouraged risky loans. According to Frank Shostak, the year before the 
repeal of Glass-Steagall in 1999, subprime loans were approximately 10 percent of all 
mortgage lending (Shasta, 2010). However, post-repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, by 
2005, the percentage doubled as it was approaching twenty-one percent.  
Yet, the 2007-2009 financial meltdown has not yet resulted in any criminal 
prosecution of high-level banking executives, nor has it resulted in the re-instatement of 
Glass-Steagall. Moreover, no new regulatory frame with the scope of Glass-Steagall has 
been implemented. The data from this thesis suggest that the lack of regulatory response 
may be partly a function of media framings of the 2007-2009 crisis in relation to 
“complexity” and “systemic risk,” in comparison to the theme of “criminality” that 
emerges in media coverage of the 1932 Pecora Commission findings. Thus, the themes 
emerging from media framing of financial crises may shape public demands for justice 
and government legislative and executive responses.  
 The mainstream media reports analyzed in this project were taken from The New 
York Times in 1929 and the early 1930s and The Wall Street Journal, and The New York 
Times for the contemporary crisis from 2007-2009. Coverage by The New York Times in 
1929-1932 is compared with coverage of the 2007-2009 crisis by both The New York 
Times and The Wall Street Journal. Content analysis reveals that in 1929 the media were 
more likely to represent financial misdeeds as criminal behavior, but were less likely to 
promote regulations as the solution to the crisis until the Pecora Commission findings 
were publicized. The New York Times then adopted a more proactive regulatory stance. In 
contrast, during the 2008 crisis, the mainstream media quietly recommended re-
 4 
 
establishment of the Glass-Steagall Act, but were less likely to represent the causes of the 
crisis as criminal in nature. In 2008, both The New York Times and The Wall Street 
Journal were more likely to blame the complexity of the system, than the criminality of 
the industry.  
 The tepid and technically-detailed accounts of causes and culprits of the 2007-
2009 crisis found in The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal are then compared 
with the more highly-charged and accusatory accounts and themes found in alternative 
media. Discourse analysis of news reports and interviews found on popular financial 
blogs and sites reveals a greater willingness to assign blame and demand strict regulatory 
response in alternative media accounts. Moreover, the alternative media accounts 
evidenced greater engagement with the criminal aspects of the financial risk instruments 
(e.g., derivatives) at the heart of the 2007-2009 meltdown. 
 The methodology for these analyses is based on qualitative research using 
discourse analysis of media accounts describing, comparing, and contrasting the two 
historic crises that occurred in 1929 and 2008. Discourse analysis is a qualitative method 
that examines what can be spoken about and how and what cannot be spoken about 
(Hjort, 2005). Themes emerge from careful readings of articles in a “grounded fashion.” 
Themes are not counted but rather are interpreted by focusing on the semantics of their 
language, the use of metaphor and symbolism, and their implicit worldviews. Textual 
data from original sources are used to illustrate and document the interpretive argument 
made by the critic. 
The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal were analyzed due their 
prominent reputation throughout the world. The stories were accessed and analyzed 
 5 
 
digitally using uploaded versions of The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal 
available through university databases, including ABI/Inform and LexisNexis. Searches 
using multiple sources and databases provided a well-rounded investigation of the 
communication issues and the media reports, as well as enabling insight into the 
government actions that affected the American economic landscape. Alternative media 
were found using Internet searches and by examining popular online financial websites, 
such as Zero Hedge. Sites were selected based on their high ranking within Google 
search results for searches such as “financial crisis” and “causes.” 
 
Background of the Great Depression and the Great Recession 
 
 President Herbert Hoover traveled to the industrial state of Michigan to 
acknowledge the progress of America, especially to business people and scientists (Foner, 
2005). On October 21, 1929, President Hoover stated, “We gain constantly in better 
standards of living, more stability of employment . . . and decreased suffering.”  Despite 
the positive rhetoric from President Hoover, three days later, Wall Street experienced the 
stock market crash of 1929. It was the most catastrophic financial crash in the history of 
the United States. As panic set in, more than $10 billion in market value, which is 
equivalent to over ten times that amount in today’s money, vanished in a span of five 
hours (Foner, 2005). Undoubtedly, the economic panic collapsed global financial 
activities.  
 Even though the stock market crash in 1929 was not the first financial panic in the 
United States, the Great Depression became a worldwide economic collapse by all 
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Western world establishments. At the end of the “Roaring Twenties,” the United States 
became the main source that triggered the Great Depression, resulting in extreme 
downturn in outputs, unemployment, and acute deflation on a global scale (Romer, 2003). 
Still considered as the worst economic crash in history, multiple factors such as 
diminished consumer demand, misled governmental policies, and financial fraud all 
contributed to the Great Depression, which endured for more than a decade (Romer, 
2003). Four years after the crash, the market hit its trough (lowest point of a business 
cycle) as the world’s industrial production dropped approximately 67% in just four years 
after Black Tuesday, skyrocketing unemployment rates in the United States to 13 million 
people (Chamber et al., 1983). 
 In 1933, the newly appointed President Franklin Delano Roosevelt made efforts to 
regain the public’s confidence. The situation was so out of control that banking activities 
were suspended in majority of the states, meaning the public could not gain access to 
their bank accounts (Foner, 2005). In June 1933, the United States Congress passed the 
Banking Act of 1933, otherwise known as the Glass-Steagall Act. The main architects, 
Senator Carter Glass from Virginia and Representative Henry Steagall from Alabama, 
drafted the bill. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 created a separation between commercial 
and investment banks in the financial sector (Sherman, 2009). Without much choice, 
banks were forced to pick between acting as a commercial bank, mainly composed of 
holding deposits and making loans, or as an investment bank, which conducted securities 
transactions (Crawford, 2011). This was an emergency response to the crisis as 
approximately 5,000 banks during the Great Depression collapsed (Glass-Steagall act, 
1933). The act provided strict regulations, forcing national banks to the Federal Reserve 
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System that prohibited bank sales of securities. Along with the banking legislation, the 
Glass-Steagall Act created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (Glass-Steagall act, 
1933), which insures bank deposits with a pool of money appropriated from banks 
(Crawford, 2011). In other words, the FDIC insured bank deposits of commercial banks 
in return for insurance protection as the Federal Reserve Bank’s control over commercial 
banks tightened (Crawford, 2011).  
 Despite harsh criticisms from the banks, the Glass-Steagall Act regained the 
public’s trust in the American financial system. Its main goal was to lay a new foundation 
to bring stability to the American economic system, particularly the banks. After the 
implementation of the Glass-Steagall Act, banks experienced occasional failures, but the 
depositors mostly walked away unscathed (Foner, 2005). Confidence in the stock and 
bond markets slowly recovered, eventually regaining trust and confidence. Not only the 
investors in the United States recovered, but also the international market took notice of 
the economic recovery as the U.S. financial system recovered (Crawford, 2011). 
 However, over time the Federal Reserve reconstructed certain portions of the 
Glass-Steagall Act by allowing banks to earn revenues from securities transactions. From 
the 1980s to 1996, the percentage increased from 5% to 25% of banks earning their 
revenues from securities transactions (Frank, 2010). In 1999, the final process of 
repealing the Glass-Steagall Act took place when the United States House of 
Representatives and Senate in an overwhelming fashion voted to abolish the firewall that 
separated the commercial banks from the investment banks. The U.S. Senate voted 90 to 
8 and the House voted 362 to 57 as all of Congress was in favor of repealing Glass-
Steagall (LaBaton, 1999). In its place, Congress was in favor of passing the Gramm-
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Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 that rescinded the Glass-Steagall Act’s control on banks and 
securities (Obama takes on banks with new glass-Steagall act, 2010). On November 1999, 
President Bill Clinton approved the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act by signing the bill into law. 
Feeling obsolete, the legislation no longer deemed appreciate: “Glass-Steagall was no 
longer appropriate to the economy in which we live. It worked pretty well for the 
industrial economy, but the world is very different” (Frank, 2010). 
 Since the crisis of 2008, some critics have suggested revisiting the idea of 
reviving the Glass-Steagall Act or implementing a similar plan that introduces new 
regulations for the banking industry to avoid excessive speculation (10 years later, 
looking at repeal of Glass-Steagall, no date). In 2010, former Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve Board, Paul Volcker, introduced what is perceived to be the modern-day Glass-
Steagall Act. Instead of re-approving of the old policies from the 1930s that separated the 
commercial and investment banks, the Volcker Rule, on paper, prohibits banks from 
proprietary trading, running hedge funds, and making private equity investments or using 
money to make bets on the financial market (Sweet Jr. & Christiansen, no date).  
 However, Wall Street and the United States financial landscape have immensely 
changed since the implementation of the Glass-Steagall Act. The Volcker Rule of 
regulating the banks has led to some modifications to the current market system; however, 
the new regulations fail to account for illegal trading activities through the electronic 
processors and computers that allow for market manipulation. Financial activities such as 
re-hypothecation, quote stuffing, credit default swaps, high frequency trading, and naked 
short selling, etc. significantly manipulate the global markets. These financial practices 
are rarely communicated to the public. The analysis of the alternative media accounts 
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reveal the limitations of the Volcker proposal and similar regulatory frameworks because 
of failures to address problems in the financial operations that are rarely mentioned in the 
mainstream media accounts, although widely recognized and discussed in alternative 
media accounts. Therefore, this project not only investigates the contemporary culture of 
Wall Street, but it advocates for regulating mischievous and often fraudulent trading 
practices that occur in secrecy. The communication messages pertaining illegal trading in 
the United States financial system is essentially absent for the public to acknowledge. 
 
Overview of the Upcoming Chapters 
 
 Chapter 2 details some of the historical economic landmarks in chronological 
order to help the reader understand the history involving governmental regulations. Adam 
Smith and other classical economists from England and France radically shifted from the 
state’s economic system of mercantilism to laissez-faire economics that advocated for the 
utmost economic freedom. This philosophy of laissez-faire carried on in the United States 
during the 1800’s with the booming industry of the railroad expansion pre and post Civil 
War. By the late nineteenth century, small to medium sized businesses in the United 
States experienced heavy consolidations, thus giving birth to modern corporations with 
little to no regulations. This style of laissez-faire economics brought financial prosperity 
during the “Roaring Twenties,” but it also paved a path toward the biggest economic 
collapse in financial history. In response to combating the problems, the newly appointed 
Roosevelt Administration implemented legislations such as the Glass-Steagall Act that 
downsized the banks. With the Western economies adopting the economic philosophy of 
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John Maynard Keynes, the Keynesian revolution became the hegemonic solution to 
economic instability.   
 Chapter 3 is a continuation of the economic history starting in the 1970’s with the 
rise of Chicago School of Economics led by Milton Friedman and George Stigler. This 
particular school of thought revived the old economic philosophy of laissez-faire, 
classical economics. This marked the end of the Keynesian Revolution predicated on 
aggregate demand because the United States suffered from stagflation (experiencing 
inflation and high employment levels simultaneously). In addition, the Glass-Steagall Act 
that was passed in 1933 began to lose its powers through constant reinterpretations and 
eventually was overturned in 1999. Arguably, the repeal was one of the factors that 
contributed to the crisis in 2007-2009 when the mortgage bubble imploded, setting off the 
second worst economic crash since the Great Depression. The final section in this chapter 
addresses some of the post-recession financial frauds that recently took place such as the 
LIBOR scandal involving the major banks around the world. 
 Chapter 4 identifies the critical themes through the methodology of discourse 
analysis examining the mainstream news publications The New York Times and The Wall 
Street Journal published during the Great Depression (1929) and the Great Recession 
(2008). The three themes identified through discourse analysis of article headlines and 
text include: (1) the individuals that are painted as “the financial heroes” and “responsible 
agents” during economic chaos; (2) the difference in how the prosecutors conducted the 
investigation and prosecution of financial crimes during the Great Depression and the 
current crisis; (3) the regulatory banking act implemented during the Great Depression 
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and its comparison with the bailouts for financial institutions, such as TARP, during the 
2007-2009 crisis. 
 Chapter 5 recaps the previous chapters and discusses the overall implications for 
our society, particularly by addressing what the Glass-Steagall Act has meant to the U.S. 
financial system. The second half of the concluding chapter analyzes the alternative 
media discourses involving the post-recession problems that still linger today such as 
high frequency trading (HFT), derivatives market, and quantitative easing (QE). Due to 
the trivialization of these problems by the mainstream media, only the alternative press 
offer fresh perspectives on the economic crisis.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND (1776 To 1946) 
 
 I will tell you a secret. Economics are supposed to be dry as dust, dismal fellows.  
 This is quite wrong, the reverse of the truth. 
-Paul A. Samuelson 
 A typical perception of advocacy is generalized in forms of essays or speeches, 
but advocacy also embodies itself in the realm of political and economic legislations. 
Legislative advocacy includes lobbying, ballot initiatives, legislative campaigns, etc. 
Economic legislative advocacy is an extremely powerful tool for shaping domestic and 
international financial policies. To understand the history of economic regulations and 
repeals, Chapters Two and Three will attempt to explain the history of market regulations. 
Chapter Two will begin by examining the history of the market and government 
regulations, starting in the seventeenth century with the father of classical economics, 
Adam smith (1723-1790), and continuing in Chapter Three by outlining four major 
historical periods:  
(1) Mercantilism and Laissez-faire (1776-1929) 
(2) Overturning laissez-faire and the installment of the Glass-Steagall Act 
(1929-1946)  
(3) De-regulation of the Glass-Steagall Act and other banking laws (1999-
2000) 
(4) Present crisis (2007-2009) 
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The chapter begins by explaining how the idea of an independent marketplace emerged. 
It addresses the regulatory impulse of government, particularly in relation to the growth 
of the modern corporations during the nineteenth century. It then examines how 
economic crises prompted governmental regulations, especially in financial markets 
because of their disruptive effects on the aggregate economy. It looks at the creation of 
quasi-independent regulatory agencies, such as the Federal Reserve that was set in place 
to reduce systemic risks, while still permitting industries’ autonomy. The chapter 
particularly emphasizes regulatory infrastructures, focusing on the Glass-Steagall Act 
(1933), which was passed to mitigate the systemic economic risks caused by the powerful 
banking industry. 
 
Mercantilism and Laissez-faire Economics 
 
By pursuing his own interest, he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually 
than when he really intends to promote it. 
-Adam Smith 
The celebrated work of Dr. Adam Smith can only be considered as an assemblage of the 
soundest principles of political economy, supported by luminous illustrations.  
-Jean-Baptiste Say 
 After the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, Europe’s national authorities 
predominantly functioned under the establishment of mercantilism (Cohn, 2012). 
However, the rise of classical economics most notably led by a Scottish social 
philosopher, Adam Smith, fundamentally reconfigured the realm of political economy 
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during the 18th and 19th centuries. Rejecting the old mercantilist principles of 
protectionism, state monopolies, and colonialism, Smith heavily supported a drastic 
overhaul in favor of free trade, limited government, balanced budgets, the gold standard, 
and laissez-faire economics (Skousen, 2005). In other words, Smith advocated for the 
utmost economic freedom for capitalists. Smith’s most famous work, An Inquiry into the 
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, published in 1776, declared economic 
independence against protectionism and state interventionism. In a laissez-faire economy, 
the government’s responsibility is considerably restricted only to protect private property 
and construct an atmosphere suitable to the operation of the market system (McConnell 
and Brue, 2008). Laissez-faire translates to “let it be,” that is, it prevents the government 
from intruding with the free market system. The notion is that governmental interference 
will only lead to further impediments pertained to the efficiency of the market.  
 Popularized by the French during the late 17th and early 18 century, the origin of 
laissez-faire literally translates from French to English as, “let-fair.” However, laissez-
faire is commonly interpreted as “hands-off” or “let it be.”  Orthodox liberalism or 
classical liberalism predates many of the well-known 18th century Western philosophers 
and economists such as Smith, Say, Bastiat, Ricardo, Malthus, Mill, etc. English 
philosopher John Locke (1632-1704) reasoned that the “state’s primary tenet is to 
preserve people’s lives, liberty, and Estates, by the general names property” (Locke, 
1964). Even though Locke predated Adam Smith by a few decades, Smith is considered 
as the father of classical economics, due to his extensive written works that heavily 
advocated for laissez-faire policies and resistance against state-operated mercantilism. 
According to Smith, the division of labor, interdependence, and unregulated economies 
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would benefit by efficiently producing goods and trading with other states (Cohn, 2012). 
Although Smith deeply preferred the government stepping aside from the market, he did 
not completely discount the government’s responsibilities. It is crucial for the state to 
possess the ability to retaliate against other states when engaged in times of national 
conflicts, protect individuals from injustice(s), and provide public goods that the private 
sector would not be able to provide on their own (Wyatt-Walter, 1996; Smith, 1776, p. 
180). In addition, the Government must enforce contracts, maintain state security against 
opposing nations, and supply public goods and services (Nadesan, 2010).   
 To resist the hegemonic forces of mercantilism, Smith sought to fight against the 
state by condemning the oppressive method of mercantilist economics. The mercantilists 
shrewdly operated by conjoining the bond between economics and politics, projecting 
both wealth and power as indispensable objectives to the state. The European 
mercantilists possessed the ability, power, and wealth to strengthen their military powers 
against enemies abroad. These powers operated under government-authorized 
monopolies domestically and abroad, imposing military forces on inferior nations to seize 
prized natural commodities such as gold, silver, opium, etc. (Skousen, 2005). Mercantile 
states mainly increased exports and decreased imports of manufacturing goods as they 
prevented other states from industrially prospering. Therefore, colonialism became the 
key tenet to a successfully operated mercantile state because colonies such as India for 
the British East Company supplied Great Britain (metropole) with raw materials to serve 
as resource markets for its manufactures (Cohn, 2012).  
 In addition, Adam Smith criticized high tariffs and trade regulations as a 
counterproductive formula to economic growth. Instead, he advocated for a drastic 
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solution to counter the oppressive forces suggesting free movement of labor, capital, 
money, national trade, and goods. For example, by expanding trade between Britain and 
France and other nations that provided valuable commodities: “If a foreign country can 
supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it from 
them” (Smith, 1776; 1965). Some contended his economic ideas were too radical, but 
Smith continued to advocate for the dismantling of state regulations regarding prices, 
employment, and trades that would lead to universal economic opulence, which extends 
to the lowest ranks of society (Smith, 1776; 1965). Milton Friedman praised Smith 
stating, “Adam Smith was a radical and revolutionary in his time, just as those of us who 
preach laissez-faire are in our time” (Friedman, 1978, p. 7). 
 The Wealth of Nations forever changed modern day economics over the next 
centuries by dismantling the hegemonic economic forces of state-run mercantilism. 
Adam Smith, who coined the term, “The Invisible Hand” argues that, individuals who 
chase their own interest will create a self-regulating and highly prosperous society. In a 
passage Smith states, “The private interests and passions of individuals naturally dispose 
them to turn their stock towards the employments, which in ordinary cases are most 
advantageous to the society” (Smith, 1776; pg. 1079). The core concept of Smith’s notion 
of the market explains the outcome of a certain kind of behavior in a particular, social 
framework resulting in definite and foreseeable outcomes (Heilbroner, 1992).  The drive 
of individual self-interest in a cutthroat environment not only results in competition, but 
also the provision of those goods and services society desires. According to Smith, self-
interest is a force that guides people to whatever work society is willing to pay. Smith 
states, “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we 
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expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not 
to their humanity, but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our necessities, but of 
their advantages” (p. 24). 
 Smith’s notions of economic liberty forever changed future generations’ by 
disassembling oppressive mercantilist policies. “The Invisible Hand” became the 
trademark of Smith’s model of economic liberty. He argued that if individuals were left 
to their own devices, chasing after their own self-interest, people would produce a self-
regulating system and a highly prosperous society (Skousen, 2005). Former Chicago 
School of Economics Professor George Stigler calls Smith’s invisible-hand doctrine the 
crown jewel of economics: “Smith had one overwhelmingly important triumph. He put 
into the center of economics the systematic analysis of the behavior of individuals 
pursuing their self-interests under conditions of competition (Stigler, 1976; p. 1201). In 
The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith spurned mercantilist ideals of economic control 
headed by the state in favor of the “invisible hand” that advocates for peoples’ self-
interest in labor. 
The Rise and Fall of Classical Liberalism 
 
 Unlike contemporary liberalism that is prevalent in the Western world that 
advocates for government intervention in the financial sector to stimulate growth, 
classical liberalism in the mid-18th century aligned with what is equivalent to 
contemporary conservatism, emphasizing the significance of free market and limited 
government intervention in the market economy. The classical economists had essentially 
disrupted and dethroned the sovereignty over the state’s economic operations. Sir Dudley 
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North, an advocate for economic liberty stated, “Peace, Industry and Freedom that bring 
Trade and Wealth and nothing else” (Davies, 1952, p. 284; Nadesan, 2010).  
 Despite crediting Adam Smith with coining the concept of laissez-faire, the 
foundation of this term originated in France during late seventeenth century. John 
Maynard Keynes noted in 1926 that the idea of economic freedom was first codified in 
1751 by Marquis D’Argenson (Nadesan, 2010). Keynes described Marquis’s idea of 
laissez-faire or economic freedom as follows: “The Marquis was the first man to be 
passionate on the economic advantages of governments leaving trade alone, to govern 
better, he said, one must be governed less.” Keynes further highlights the attraction of 
market economy in the 17th and 18th centuries through the transition from public 
advantage to private interest by stating, “The individualism of the political philosophers 
pointed to laissez-faire. The divine or scientific harmony (as the case might be) between 
private interest and public advantage pointed to laissez-faire” (Keynes, 1926).  
 During the eighteenth century, French philosophers, Jean-Baptiste Say and 
Frederic Bastiat, who predicated their studies on open trade and free entrepreneurial 
economy (Skousen, 2005), mainly led the economic school of laissez-faire in France. 
Known as the French version of Adam Smith, Jean-Baptiste Say developed his own law 
of markets, which became the cornerstone of classical macroeconomics. Say’s law states, 
“supply creates its own demand” that focuses on saving, capital investments, and 
entrepreneurship (Skousen, 2005). An admirer of Smith’s self-directing economic system 
of competition, liberty, and minimal government interference, Say contributed to 
classical economics in four areas: 
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(1) Belief in testing theories with facts and observation; (2) A subjective 
utility theory rather than a labor theory of value; (3) An appreciation of the 
vital role of the entrepreneur; (4) Say’s law of market forms the 
foundation of classical macro model of business fluctuations and 
economic growth.  (Skousen, 2009, p. 52) 
 
Say’s classical model of “supply creates its own demand” became the economic norm of 
market activity until the arrival of British economist John Maynard Keynes in the 20th 
century.  
 Frederic Bastiat firmly believed in free trade and laissez-faire policies. One of 
Bastiat’s profound works was debunking the popular fallacy of stimulating the economy 
through the destruction of war. Bastiat’s “Broken Window” fallacy notes: it’s true 
destruction leads to spending; however, that money could be used for something far more 
productive according to the individual’s need. Bastiat explained: 
The window having been broken, the glass industry gets six francs’ worth 
of encouragement; that is what is seen. If the window had not been broken, 
the shoe industry (or some other) would have received six francs’ worth of 
encouragement; that is what is not seen. (Bastiat 1995; p. 2) 
 
In Bastiat’s most critical thesis, The Law (1850), he established a proper social 
organization appropriately suited for people that preserves life, liberty, property and 
justice (Skousen, 2005). Bastiat further states, “If everyone enjoyed the unrestricted use 
of his faculties and the free disposition of the fruits of labor, social progress would be 
ceaseless, uninterrupted and unfailing” (Bastiat, 1850; 1998, p. 5).  
 Adam Smith was not the only British classical economist during the late 
eighteenth century, as Thomas Malthus and David Ricardo also maintained the classical 
economic ideologies by advocating free market, limited government, and gold-backed 
currency. However, the economists that succeeded Adam Smith took a different route 
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from his principles as they left a black eye on the face of Smith’s economic philosophies. 
Instead of carrying on Smith’s positive views of wealth creation, harmony of interest and 
universal opulence, his British heirs failed to communicate Smith’s economic ideologies 
(Skousen, 2005). For example, David Ricardo (1772-1823) further fortified the stance on 
free-trade defense by claiming that two nations could profit both ways through 
comparative advantage. Ricardo states that even if a nation did not possess absolute 
advantage in manufacturing goods, they are still able to concentrate on products based on 
relative advantage (Cohn, 2012). Smith, on the other hand, did not recognize free trade as 
a unilateral or unconditional policy. In unjust trade restrictions, a state should have the 
right to retaliate, thereby, progressively implementing free trade policies for domestic 
industries and labor groups in order to adjust to international competition (Cohn, 2012). 
Other than the division of labor explained in The Wealth of Nations, classical economists 
failed to produce and expound upon a sound theoretical framework on Smith’s vision of 
universal opulence. Another inconsistency in Smith’s work included the important 
concept of the diamond-water paradox that separates production in use and the 
production in exchange: 
What are the rules, which men naturally observe in exchanging goods for 
money or for one another, I shall now proceed to examine. These rules 
determine what is called the relative or exchangeable value of goods. The 
word value, it is to be observed has two different meanings and sometimes 
expresses the utility of some particular object and sometimes the power of 
purchasing other goods, which the possession of that object conveys. The 
one may be called “value in use,” the other, “value in exchange.” The 
things that have the greatest value in use have frequently little or no value 
in exchange; on the contrary, those that have the greatest value in 
exchange have frequently little or no value in use. Nothing is more useful 
than water, but it will purchase scarce anything can be had in exchange for 
it. A diamond, on the contrary, has scarce any use-value, but a very great 
quantity of other goods may frequently be had in exchange for it.  
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(Smith, 1776; 1965 p. 46-47) 
 
Smith is comparing and contrasting a precious commodity like water to an impractical 
product such as diamonds; yet, such stones are highly valued in the marketplace. This 
only provided ammunition to the socialists by painting the picture of capitalists 
generating massive profits over providing practical services. Despite Smith’s 
combination of economic freedom and limited government paving a path toward 
universal wealth, the father of classical economics failed to expand on a reliable 
theoretical framework that details how consumers and producers work through the profit-
and-loss system in order to achieve the ultimate goal of “universal opulence” (Skousen, 
2005).  
The laissez-faire logic of limited government became popular in the western 
world throughout majority of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Nadesan, 2010). 
However, too many mixed theories and doctrines by individual classical economists after 
Smith only provided the opposition with powerful incentives to label them as individuals 
with a conflict of interest by pushing profits ahead of the overall wellness of society. In 
Adam Smith’s perfect world, every individual stood to gain as the division of labor 
expanded to all ranks of society; however, in the eyes of David Ricardo, only one group 
of people are stood to gain (Heilbroner, 1987). Ricardo argued that the workers are 
subjected to subsistence due to spending majority of their earnings on family. Adam 
Smith believed that the landlords, workers, and capitalists would collectively come 
together to reap the benefits. Contrary to Smith, Ricardo viewed the three-way triangle 
between the landlords, workers, and capitalists as a “class conflict” model of who gets the 
biggest piece of the pie. If the landlords receive the majority of the wealth, the capitalists 
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and workers stand to receive only a small fraction of the remaining wealth (Skousen, 
2009).  
Inspired by Ricardo, the famous Prussian (German) economist and philosopher, 
Karl Marx was greatly influenced by David Ricardo, heralding him as his intellectual 
mentor. According to Murray Rothbard (1980), classical economics came to a halt, thus 
leaving the Western world of economics at the hand of the Marxists. The failure of 
Smith’s successors seemed to have negative consequences as Thomas Carlyle, an English 
critic, labeled economics as a “dismal science.” The French decided to head towards a 
different route as they embraced socialism over Say’s and Bastiat’s free market ideology. 
The Prussians were facing similar circumstances by rejecting the ideology of classical 
economics as the theoretical analysis came to be regarded with “deep distrust,” as noted 
by Friedrich Hayek (Hayek, 1976). By end of the eighteenth century and beginning of the 
nineteenth century, first industrial revolution propelled the states’ economies into a new 
direction of prosperity as the multitude of agricultural-based economies shifted toward 
industrial production. 
Nineteenth-Century United States Business Boom 
 
 The history of modern corporations traces back to the early seventeenth century, 
when Queen Elizabeth I of England instituted the British East India Company. Unlike the 
contemporary era of large corporations, the crown financed large operations such as 
expeditions in the Fourteenth century. According to Lee Drutman, the monarchs kept a 
close eye on these corporations and if they became discontent with the overall lack of 
results, the crown quickly rescinded their charters. For example, prior to the American 
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Revolution during the late eighteenth century, the Massachusetts Bay Company fully 
supervised the American Colonies. This section will mainly address the rise of 
corporations in the United States during pre-and post-Civil War. The United States in the 
early nineteenth-century mostly engaged in agricultural production, while large 
corporations sanctioned by the state government provided transportation such as canals 
and newly formed railways (Nadesan, 2010). 
 The early nineteenth-century railroad tycoons became the original founding 
fathers of the modern day corporations (Bakan, 2004). Due to massive amounts of capital 
investments and finances to fund nationwide manufacturing projects, railroad operations 
required corporate forms of finances. According to Chandler (1965), the creation of 
railways helped launch the rise of private American corporations, but it also played a 
critical role in advancing the American financial system such as the capital markets and 
the stock exchanges (Pontecorvo, 1958). Railroad manufacturing commenced during the 
nineteenth century in the United States then boomed after the United States Civil War 
from 1865 to 1885. When the railroad industry expanded into the scene, it had the same 
effect on corporations (Bowman, 2009). Initially, railroads were subsidized by newly 
established towns in the West to attract visitors from the East and Mid-West to stimulate 
the local towns (Nadesan, 2010). For example, to attract tourism, local towns created 
artistic portraits that contained a lavish scenery of the nature with a train heading toward 
a rail station; within the middle of the portrait, it would read, “Don’t miss the train.” 
Local towns promoted bogus portraits to influence outsiders for visits and the quickest 
method was by implementing the railroad system as a catalyst to entice tourism.  
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 With a booming railroad industry in sight, it was only a matter of time before 
corporations fully seized control. In the mid-to-late nineteenth century, railway stocks 
enabled middle-class Americans to invest in corporations. According to The Economist, 
“everyone was in the stocks now. Needy clerks, poor tradesman’s apprentices, discarded 
services men and bankrupts all have entered the ranks of the ranks of the great monied 
interest” (Bakan, 2004, p. 11). No matter how much people had invested in a company, 
individuals were held liable without limit for the company’s debts (Bakan, 2004). 
Investors’ possessions were at stake because their personal assets such as savings and 
homes would evaporate if the company turned out to be unsuccessful. In other words, 
individual investors jeopardized all their wealth by simply owning shares in a company. 
To counter these financial risks, politicians and business leaders advocated regulatory 
legislations by limiting the liability of shareholders to the amounts the customers had 
invested (Bakan, 2004).  Those that supported limited liability believed it was imperative 
to entice middle-class investors. In spite of the outcome of the company, if an individual 
purchased $100 of shares, they should be protected from liability regardless of the 
success or failure of the company (Bakan, 2004, p. 11).  
 However, limited liability posed moral hazards because it permitted the 
shareholders to escape unharmed from corporate collapse, thus leaving the investors 
without any sense of responsibility for the fate of the company. The critics of limited 
liability claimed shareholders could potentially be apathetic or disinterested in the 
company’s fortunes (Bakan, 2004). A member of the English Parliament stated, “The 
first and most natural principle of commercial legislation that every man was bound to 
pay the debts he had contracted, therefore, it enables the investors to undertake in trades 
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with a limited chance of loss, but an unlimited chance of gain” (Weiss, 1986). Regardless 
of the praises and the criticisms, limited liability was established in both English and 
American corporate laws in the mid to latter half of the nineteenth-century. 
 According to Bakan (2004), limited liability removed the risks of investment in 
stocks and paved a path for the multitude to dive into the stock markets. However, 
publicly traded companies during the nineteenth century in the United States were 
uncommon as companies were often family-owned businesses and regularly traded on a 
smaller scale of person-to-person circumstances. Unlike the contemporary era of stock 
market exchanges engaging in business trading, the nineteenth-century United States did 
not rely on the stock markets until the early twentieth century when corporations became 
fixtures of the United States economic landscape (Horwitz, 1987). In 1887, the U.S. 
Congress enacted the Interstate Commerce Law that gave the U.S. government full 
authority to regulate interstate railroad rates (Dodd, 1936; Nadesan, 2011). By the late 
nineteenth-century, corporations in the United States experienced drastic modifications. 
  In 1890, New Jersey and Delaware revolutionized corporate structures, as they 
became the pioneers of discarding corporate regulations that limited controls on mergers 
and acquisitions, along with terminating corporate laws that prohibited from owning 
stocks in other companies (Bakan, 2004; Nadesan, 2011). New Jersey and Delaware’s 
actions created a ripple effect that pressured other states to stay competitive in the 
business world. That same year, the U.S. Congress signed the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 
which was originally intended for substantial federal surveillance over corporations, 
business transactions and regulating competition in the free market economy (Dodd, 
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1936). Despite its original intentions of economic regulations, The Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act led numerous corporations to consume one another, thus undercutting competition.  
 Although the concept was sound for the U.S. economy, The Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act restructured corporate ownership, which inevitably prompted market consolidations 
(Roy, 1997). Intermediate-sized companies utilized pools, which inevitably lead to 
monopoly because the competing companies agree to fix prices and divide regions among 
members, so that only one company operates in each area (Nadesan, 2011). With many of 
the regulations on mergers and acquisitions repealed, vast numbers of small and mid-
sized companies morphed into large corporations. For example, the landscape of 
American corporations witnessed drastic consolidation of 1,800 companies to 157 from 
1898 to 1904, thus corporations consolidated thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of 
shareholders (Marchand, 1998). This model failed to produce a figure that is capable of 
making managerial decisions; instead, the logjam of shareholders watered down the 
power to act jointly in the decision making process. With the dispersion of power, it was 
paramount for the lawmakers to find individuals, groups, or someone else to seize the 
rights to a corporation within the financial market (Marchand, 1998).  
 In the case Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroads in 1886, the United States 
Supreme Court ruled corporations as “persons” under law that was protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court ruling embodies corporations free from 
discrimination, speech, due process, and equal protection of the laws (Bakan, 2004). In 
1911, a law professor reminisced over the phenomenon of the court rulings saying, “no 
imaginary or fictitious, but real, not artificial but natural” (Horwitz, 1987). By end of the 
nineteenth-century to the beginning of the twentieth-century, the United States economic 
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and financial system underwent a revolution from individual enterprises to mega 
corporations, thus initiating the era of corporatism. Businesses at the end of the 
nineteenth century organized into corporate forms through consolidations, limited 
liabilities, and legal persons (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2000-2001). The five-core feature 
that shaped the corporations today, are:  
(1) Full legal personality, including well defined authority to bind the firm 
to contracts and to bond those contracts assets that are the property of the 
firm, as distinct from the firm’s owners; (2) Limited liability for owners 
and managers; (3) Shared ownership by investors of capital; (4) Delegated 
management under a board structure; and (5) Transferable shares. 
(Hansmann & Kraakman, 2000-2001, p. 440) 
 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, corporations accounted for approximately sixty 
percent of manufacturing in the United States (Dodd, 1936). According to the Manual of 
Statistics published in 1905, only six steel industries produced half of all manufacturing 
capital and U.S. Steel was responsible for one-third of all common stocks (Roy, 1997; 
Nadesan, 2011). Roy (1997) states industrial consolidation occurred due to the 
exhaustion of railroad securities and anti-trust efforts that generated an economic schism 
between the small and large businesses. Although the rise of corporations transformed 
American businesses, the overall public sentiment of fear of these powerfully 
consolidated companies soon became a reality during the beginning of the twentieth-
century. Apparently, public opinion shifted negatively as the multitude recognized the 
hazards of these corporations hijacking the government and social institutions. During the 
early twentieth-century, corporations were perceived as gloomy, merciless, impersonal, 
and amoral monsters of society (Bakan, 2004). The imprisonment of the U.S. financial 
system through corporate consolidations suddenly became susceptible to civil grievances 
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and disputes due to rapid growth in size. In the awakening of the public discontent, 
corporations, business leaders, and media members called for a new strategic plan that 
still contains significant implications to this day.  
 One of the largest U.S. corporations in the early twentieth-century, AT&T 
launched a new style of advertisement to combat the public outrage by instilling 
corporations with flash-and-blood human traits, similar to the Supreme Court ruling that 
defined corporations as “human.” By using public relations (PR), AT&T convinced the 
public to love the company. For several decades, AT&T experienced immense success 
through its “friend and neighbor” campaign that presented real people for promotion of 
the company (Bakan, 2004). As a new public relations strategy, employers frequently 
emerged in corporate advertisements and this style of humanitarian campaign established 
the blue print for rest of the mega-corporations. Once considered impersonal, amoral and 
leviathans of society, at the beginning of the twentieth-century, corporations revamped 
the art of public relations to appear as compassionate and responsible “persons.” This 
perpetuated the new economic outlook of the twentieth-century that established new 
promises of corporate responsibility, improved wages, and overall working conditions. 
 
The Downfall of Laissez-Faire Economics 
 
 The rise of corporations in the United States gained substantial momentum 
entering the twentieth-century through excessive leveraging transpired by the banks and 
securities markets. The banks in the United States and Europe for the most part failed to 
regulate the states economies until the 1930s, or even post-WWII. In addition, the 
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government loosened charter restrictions for corporations and created limited liability 
during the mid to late nineteenth century. The lack of sufficient accounting criteria led 
investors to acquire securities that solely relied on private rating agencies such as the 
United States Standard & Poor’s (S&P), which still exists today, to offer detailed insights 
regarding company finances (Nadesan, 2011). Marked by laissez-faire economic 
practices, the issues listed above paved a path toward destabilization of the American 
financial system, due to the lack of sovereign control over credit (Ahamed, 2009; 
Dumenil & Levy, 2001).  
 Post-WWI from 1914-1918 marked the conclusion of laissez-faire economics in 
the Western world. According to Nadesan (2011), the Great War provided lucrative 
outcomes for an alliance or partnership between sectional economic interests and national 
policy in the name of war profiteering. Even in times of horrid atrocities, the Great War 
proved to be a lucrative success for several American corporations such as DuPont, 
which profited millions of dollars from contracts. Furthermore, from the late nineteenth-
century to the early twentieth-century, the European expansion over resource-seeking 
colonial investments in Africa and the Middle East (e.g. oil, railroads, canals, minerals 
and agricultural products) increased exponentially, while relying on manufacturing and 
finances in the developed nations (Gabel & Bruner, 2003). 
 The post-war decade of the “Roaring Twenties” was characterized by prosperity, 
economic growth, and cheap money that financially propelled economic growth. 
However, the speedy financial growth and rapid increase of consumption came to a 
screeching halt due to the threats of overproduction, which inevitably led to the stock 
market crash of 1929 (Black Tuesday). The American population no longer possessed the 
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wealth to consume newly produced products such as Henry Ford’s Model T’s along with 
other goods (Nadesan, 2011). According to Palmer and Colton (1984), the depression of 
1929 caused business expansion that was financed on credit resulted in diminished 
agricultural crops harvested in Europe. To further note, three years into the depression, 
world manufacturing sharply plummeted by 67% and unemployment sharply escalated to 
over 13 million people in the United States (Chambers et al., 1983). The most 
catastrophic financial crisis to this date did not occur by accident. Presumably, the states 
failed to comprehend the boom and bust cycles of capitalism as the deregulated market 
and unsound governmental policies led to the outcome of substantial economic and social 
fragility (Dumenil & Levy, 2001). In response to the apocalyptic disaster, the United 
States government granted a legislation that authorized the private Federal Reserve 
System to become the principle regulator of all banks and it prohibited bank deposits 
from selling securities (Dodd, 1936; Nadesan, 2011).  
 Woodrow Wilson would ultimately have unhappy thoughts about the Federal 
Reserve Banking System he signed into law in 1913: 
“I am a most unhappy man I have unwittingly ruined my country. A great 
industrial nation is controlled by its system of credit. Our system of credit 
is concentrated. The growth of the nation. Therefore, and all out activities 
are in the hands of a few man. We have come to be one of the worst ruled, 
one of the most completely controlled and dominated government in the 
civilized world. No longer a government by free opinion, no longer a 
government by conviction and the vote of the majority, but a government 
by the opinion and duress of a small group of dominant men.”  
   
       -Woodrow Wilson 
 
 The United States Congress in the early twentieth-century was determined to 
create an efficient banking system in the awakening financial crisis of 1907 or widely 
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known as, the Panic of 1907. One of Fed’s crucial objectives is to regulate the nation’s 
overall money supply through a satellite of privately operated regional banks (Greider, 
1987). There are 12 Federal Reserve banks scattered regionally across the nation, whose 
policies are to be directed by the Fed’s Board of Governors (McConnell & Brue, 2008).  
Since its inception, the president of the United States appoints the chairman of the 
Federal Reserve. Prior to its creation, rapid flooding of money triggered excess inflation; 
conversely, shortage of liquidity impeded national economic growth. Since no single 
entity controlled the national money supply along with creating and implementing 
national banking policies, two United States Congressman, Carter Glass, and Robert 
Owen drafted the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 and signed into law by President 
Woodrow Wilson on December 23, 1913 (McConnell & Brue, 2008).  
 Although the Federal Reserve System sounds innocuous and necessary to 
supervise the American financial system, on July 31, 2012, a local journalist, Ben Swann 
from Fox 19 Cincinnati, provided a new angle on the Federal Reserve. Popularized by 
Ron Paul’s audit the Federal Reserve (H.R. 459) legislation in July 2012, the report 
provided an alternative outlook on the Fed. In an in-depth investigation of the Federal 
Reserve, Swann stated, Federal Reserve Act of 1913 was drafted under great secrecy in a 
meeting involving powerful individuals and families such as J.P. Morgan, William 
Rockefeller, the Rothschilds, and two other families at a location called Jekyll Island. 
These five families represented one-fourth of all the wealth in the world. Next, Swann 
presented what he perceives as five critical objectives of the Federal Reserve: 
(1) stop competition from newer banks, especially the banks in the 
Western region of the United States; (2) to obtain a franchise to create 
money out of nothing (not backed by a physical commodity) for the 
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purpose of lending; (3) to get control of all reserves of other banks, so that 
reckless banks would not be over run; (4) to shift the losses from the banks 
to the taxpayers; (5) to convince Congress that the purpose was to protect 
the public. (Swann, 2012) 
 
If the government needs money, the United States Treasury prints the required amount, 
but the treasury does not have the authorization to release the newly printed money. This 
is where the Federal Reserve comes into play by taking newly printed money and 
supplying it to other banks, and then the regional banks loan it to the public to pay 
interest. The interest people pay goes back to the U.S. Treasury, thus completing the 
cycle (Swann, 2012). The Federal Reserve Bank is not responsible to the president, 
congress and most importantly, the American people. Although, the evidence is not clear, 
Swann’s critique raises questions and issues that deem relevance for the Federal 
Reserve’s role in the financial crisis, which will be discussed later in this thesis. 
 
Overturning Laissez-faire 
 
There is no cause to worry. The high tide of prosperity will continue. 
-Andrew W. Mellon  
Gentleman, a depression is for capitalism like a good, cold douche. 
-Joseph Schumpeter 
 Although the stock market crash in 1929 became the triggering mechanism for the 
Great Depression, the United States economy actually began to trend downward years 
prior to the crash (Kangas, 1997). Three Republican presidents reigned office during the 
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economic “boom” of the 1920s: Warren G. Harding (1920-1923), Calvin Coolidge 
(1923-1929), and Herbert Hoover (1929-1933). Their central economic philosophy of 
laissez-faire operated with little to no government interference or installing of regulatory 
legislations. This was the belief that the markets always corrected automatically and that 
government must not interfere with the self-correcting operations. Financial regulations 
were gashed dramatically, monopolies were allowed to form and inequality of wealth 
occurred (McElvaine, 1984; 1993). The Republican presidents abolished government 
regulations, anti-trust laws and the top tax rate was cut from 73 to 25 percent as the top 
one percent owned approximately 40 percent of the nation’s wealth (Kangas, 1997). 
The Great Depression 
 
 During the 1920s laissez-faire economic system, manufacturing, services, and 
finances gained record highs as the stock market sharply increased. The United States 
economic growth was mainly predicated on two industries: construction and automobile 
manufacturing. As the 1920s progressed, even the merchandise sales of the well 
performing industries decelerated prior to the crash (Kangas, 1997). The NYSE prices 
failed to reflect market pains, including reduced demand for houses, automobiles, and 
other durable goods. Over-investment and speculation in stocks inflated the prices that 
contributed to what was considered a “robust” economy. In October of 1929, massive 
sell-offs of stocks triggered a serious pandemonium at the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) that spread like wildfire across the globe. In fact, the market did not hit its trough 
(lowest point of a business cycle) until 1932. When the U.S. economy hit its lowest point, 
a quarter of the working population was unemployed. The United States banking system 
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was in life support as 11,000 banks failed, or were given the orders to merge with other 
banks issued by the newly elected Roosevelt administration. The drastic cuts in the 
banking system resulted in a 40% decrease from 25,000 to 14,000 banks and the 
governors of several states had to shut down its state banks (Foner, 2005). By far, The 
Great Depression was the most traumatic economic event in the United States during the 
twentieth century. It occurred at a time of great advances in technology and living 
standards, as economic fallout was inconceivable. The Great Depression of 1929 did not 
occur by accident. The crisis was an accumulation of massive fraud that built up over the 
years and there was only one brave soul to conduct an investigation against the 
hegemonic giants of the financial industry.  
Legal Proceedings 
 
 During President Hoover’s last year in office, the U.S. Senate committee 
summoned a series of judicial hearings over banking and currency to investigate the 
transactions that destabilized the U.S. financial system. The initial attempt was 
unsuccessful because the hearings only managed to produce weak testimonies and they 
failed to reveal Wall Street’s phony financial practices (Crawford, 2011). However, the 
overall dynamics of the legal proceedings radically shifted a year later. The new outlook 
on tackling the main causes of the Great Depression was led by Ferdinand Pecora, a 
Manhattan prosecutor, who proceeded as an advocate for public transparency. Rarely 
mentioned as a key figure in unearthing fraud, cronyism and reckless use of depositors’ 
funds, Bill Moyers described Pecora as a “savvy immigrant from Sicily that proved the 
undoing of Wall Street banking world gone berserk with greed and fraud” (Moyers, 
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2009). The hunt for the lawbreakers responsible for the crisis began on April of 1932 by 
the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency (Galbraith, 2009). The primary goal was 
to investigate the fraudulent operations of the stock exchanges. Regarding the trial, 
Galbraith stated, “Under the later guidance of Ferdinand Pecora, this committee became 
the scourge of commercial, investment, and private bankers. But this was not foreseen 
when it was organized” (p. 156).  
 One by one, Pecora placed the top banking executives on the stand starting with 
Chase National Bank (JP Morgan Chase) whose president enriched himself by short 
selling his company’s shares during the economic crash. Pecora then proceeded with his 
interrogation of Charles Mitchell of the National City Bank (modern day Citibank), 
exposing fraudulent practices, such as giving bonuses to traders based on sales figures 
(the riskier the security, the higher the bonuses). This outcome translated to selling off 
failed loans to Latin American nations through palming off bad loans by packaging them 
into securities and selling them to unsuspecting investors (Chernow, 2009). The revealing 
of Mitchell’s fraud was one of the most astonishing moments of the hearings because of 
his excessive speculation in stocks using the bank’s money. In addition, Mitchell sold 
stocks of his own bank that he used to secure loans from J.P Morgan (McElvaine, 1993). 
To worsen the situation, he sold the stocks to his wife for less than the original payment, 
thereby creating an enormous paper loss and eliminating all tax obligations (McElvaine, 
1993). Mitchell stated, “I sold this stock, frankly, for tax purposes.” Pecora’s series of 
investigations forced Charles Mitchell of National City Bank to resign. 
 Due to the exposure of financial corruption, the public was enraged over the 
corporate greed these top executives possessed. Michael Perino stated, “Pecora was a 
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smart lawyer and he knew that the game plan that he had to follow was to, quite frankly, 
whip up some popular outrage. If he could get the clamor for reform was in place – 
Congress essentially fell in line” (Moyers, 2009).  Ferdinand Pecora overcame the task of 
interrogating the financial giants in an era of economic system that heavily favored the 
mega-bank executives. Through transparency, Pecora sacrificed his entire career to 
advocate for a greater public interest by exposing the individuals that participated in the 
greatest economic collapse the U.S. ever experienced, which put millions of people on 
the unemployment line.  
 Prior to Pecora’s investigation, the top financial executives were ignorantly 
commended for their business practices, as the public was completely oblivious to their 
deceitful methods that eventually led to the financial collapse of 1929. The large banks 
profitably advocated in circumventing regulatory financial legislations. In effect, 
unregulated banks traded freely in securities and possessed no interest in discontinuing 
their profitable, yet fraudulent, business dealings (Crawford, 2011). As a Credit to Pecora, 
once all the information of immoral financial practices and the inherent conflict of 
interest became transparent, the public was in an uproar, as the multitude demanded 
restructuring of these large financial institutions. Pecora not only took Wall Street and the 
bankers by storm but also helped the public focus on the bigger picture: “the Pecora 
hearings provided public transparency of the financial fraud that collapsed the American 
financial system” (Moyers, 2009). Charles Mitchell’s confession during the Pecora 
Hearings not only created a public outrage, but the exposure of excessive greed 
surrounding the financial sector became the overwhelming substance of the trial. Other 
factors addressed included manipulation of stock prices, trading of proprietary holdings, 
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and unsupportable holding companies. Pecora Commission findings of bank records 
included giant loans to bank officials and tax evasion (McElvaine, 1993). The remaining 
faith people had in the financial system evaporated after the newly released indictments.  
 The public rage at the financial executives yielded a cultural change that led to the 
installment of economic regulations that provided the necessary protection over the 
financial sector. The public backlash forced the politicians to enact as they composed and 
ratified stringent financial legislations. Under FDR’s New Deal, the financial crash led to 
the inception of regulatory reforms and not blindly putting faith in corporations to make 
the right decisions (Nadesan, 2011). 
The Glass-Steagall Act 
 
 More than 2000 banks failing in 1931, the United State’s banking system was in a 
state of panic. President Hoover passed the first Glass-Steagall Act in 1932, which 
attempted to halt deflation and expand the Federal Reserve’s ability to offer rediscounts 
on more types of assets, such as government bonds and commercial paper (Lardner, 
2009). The inception of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s presidency in 1933 entered a new 
age of economic financial reforms. As a part of FDR’s New Deal, the Glass-Steagall Act 
contained two separate pieces of legislations that passed in 1932 and, more notably, in 
1933 during the Great Depression. FDR approved the Glass-Steagall Act after the Pecora 
hearings that aggressively sought economic justice by dragging bank officials in front of 
the Senate Banking and Currency Committee demanding them to reveal their role in the 
stock-market crash. The crucial advocacy effort in fighting against the hegemonic forces 
of the bank-preferred laissez-faire market logic paved a path toward regulating the U.S. 
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financial system. Roosevelt’s approval of the Glass-Steagall Act was one of the first 
reforms Roosevelt immediately signed into effect. According to Time (June, 1933, p. 45): 
The Banking Act of 1933 (passed last week by accident because a 
Presidential blunder kept congress in session four days longer than 
expected) requires private bankers to give up either banking or their 
securities business. 
 
The Banking Act of 1933, commonly known as the Glass-Steagall Act, was a pivotal 
moment for regulating the banking system in the aftermath of the Great Depression. It 
effectively separated commercial banking practices from investment houses. Under 
Glass-Steagall, the commercial banks that accepted deposits were barred from engaging 
in investment banking practices. It also, disallowed the investment banks to principally 
engage in trading of securities and underwriting and selling securities (Tabarrok, 1998). 
The new banking legislation gave the banks an option to decide whether to withdraw 
from the securities business and receive the benefits of federal deposit insurance or 
bypass the acceptance of deposits and convert to an investment bank. The rules within the 
Banking Act made a clear distinction, as banks had to decide between enacting as a 
commercial or as an investment bank (Crawford, 2011). According to Parrish (1992), the 
passage of Glass-Steagall transferred the control over open market operations such as 
buying and selling of government securities from the private Federal Reserve System to 
the Federal Reserve Board in the nation’s capital. Insurance funds subsidized by the 
federal government and banks were set to be administered by a newly formed agency, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (Parrish, 1992). The Banking Act of 1933, 
enacted on June 16, 1933, established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
and controlled speculations, keeping the banks away from the stock market. The 
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protection from the FDIC guaranteed customer deposits to a certain level in order to calm 
the widespread panic that resulted in rapid bank collapses (Sherman, 2009).  
 During that same year, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933, which 
required issuers of securities to “file with a federal commission and make available for 
investors an amount of information about the issuer and the security to be issued which 
far exceeds in volume and completeness of detail anything required by state law” (Dodd, 
1936, p. 54). Failing to comply resulted in exclusion from future sales, criminal penalties, 
and civil liability to issuers and directors (Nadesan, 2011). The Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 lengthened the provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and transformed these 
entities into what is widely known today as the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). 
A year after, the construction of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
provided regulatory power over telephone and telegraph corporations such as AT&T 
(Nadesan, 2011). Therefore, the widespread efforts of regulating the financial markets 
and securities helped transition the U.S. financial system toward recovery. 
 The Glass-Steagall Act (P.L. 73-66, 48 STAT, 162) prohibited commercial banks 
from owning securities, brokerage firms, established a temporary deposit insurance 
program under the Federal Reserve, and included Regulation Q, which prohibited the 
practice of paying interest on commercial checking accounts and capped the interest rate 
on savings accounts (Sherman, 2009). In other words, Regulation Q allowed the Federal 
Reserve to regulate interest rates in savings accounts. It tightly regulated the interest rates 
these banks could offer on deposits. It also made exemptions for institutions specializing 
in mortgage lending, particularly the savings and loans associations. According to 
Sherman (2009), deposits at these firms received a ¼ of a percent advantage over 
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consumer deposits as these transactions were unequivocally intended to promote a flow 
of money into housing. In the 1920s and early 30s, the overall make-up of this bill was 
overwhelmingly ostracized amongst the American legislators (Benston, 1990). There was 
minimal congressional support to regulate the American financial system even after the 
crisis. Just two years after the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act, Carter Glass tried to 
repeal his own legislation, as he believed it was a mistake and an overreaction; however, 
he passed on the decision to repeal the Banking Act in 1946 (Benston, 1990). 
 However, despite personal doubts regarding the implementation of financial 
regulations, the reforms produced overwhelming results. Glass-Steagall’s goal was to 
revamp the old financial structure, pave a new groundwork based on integrity, and, more 
importantly, provide financial stability to the banking system. Constant financial crises, 
or panics were reoccurring events that resulted in devastating consequences dating back 
to the 1800s, but Glass-Steagall kept the financial panics in check (Lardner, 2009). While 
individual banks collapsed occasionally, the depositors escaped unharmed. The United 
States financial system regained its confidence by setting high standards of reliability and 
transparency. As time passed, trust in stocks and bonds steadily recovered for investors 
not only in the United States, but also on a global scale (Lardner, 2009).  
 The U.S. Congress decided to exercise the Glass-Steagall Act in 1956 with the 
passage of the Bank Holding Company Act, which prohibits companies that own 
commercial banks from engaging in non-banking activities, particularly insurance 
(Mitchell, 2010). The policy-makers strongly advocated for barring banks from risky 
investments in underwriting insurance (Mitchell, 2010). Despite the bankers’ complaints 
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about deposit insurance, the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act immensely strengthened 
the American private banking system (McElvaine, 1993).  
The Main Advocates 
 
 It is important to acknowledge the legislative advocates that assembled the Glass-
Steagall Act in 1932 and 1933. Who were these people? Standing at an imposing height 
of 5 feet, 4 inches, the primary force behind the legislation was Senator Carter Glass from 
Virginia. According to Federal Reserve documents, Glass was responsible for drafting 
the Federal Reserve Act in 1913, due to the Panic of 1907. Considered as the father of 
Federal Reserve, Carter Glass acted as an advocate to bring financial stability to the 
United States economy. Fast-forward to the 1930’s, Carter Glass was one of the few 
critics of the banking culture that indulged in perilous investments. It was imperative for 
Glass to advocate for the limitation of the banking sector in order for him to push for the 
notion of regulatory modifications he desired. Although this particular legislation 
strongly opposed the culture of laissez-faire economics, he had two strong allies on his 
side. First, what was considered an improbable legislation became a reality once the 
revelation on National City Bank’s corrupt practices were brought to the forefront during 
the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency’s Stock Exchange Practice Hearings 
(Benston, 1990). Second, a major contributor to Glass’s regulatory actions occurred when 
Representative Henry Steagall decided to support Glass’s legislation. Steagall was a 
member of the House Banking and Currency Committee. He initially possessed very little 
interest in economic regulations when he first encountered Glass; however, both 
congressional representatives came to an agreement after Carter Glass promised to 
 42 
 
include Henry Steagall’s proposal, which allowed bank deposit insurance (Benston, 
1990). Overall, these two factors became essential elements that led to the creation of the 
Glass-Steagall Act. The next section will briefly discuss the economic philosophy of 
Keynesian economics, which main tenets are derived from aggregate demand in an 
environment of regulated capitalism.  
When All Else Fails, There is Keynes 
 
Did Keynes create a sense of hope? Oh, unquestionably. There was this breath of hope 
and optimism, and I came back from Cambridge to find a whole group of people here 
who had also read The General Theory. 
-John Kenneth Galbraith  
“I believe myself to be writing a book on economic theory which will largely 
revolutionize—not I suppose, at once but in the course of the next ten years—the way the 
world thinks about its economic problems.” 
“The long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run we are all dead” 
                                        -John Maynard Keynes 
 One of the most prolific economic minds of the twentieth century, John Maynard 
Keynes (1883-1946) immensely influenced the realm of political economy, and a great 
number of people swear by his economic ideology (Hall, 1989). During the Great 
Depression, laissez-faire economists overvalued the degree of junction between self-
interest and public interest. He saw an inherent flaw in the classical model that focused 
too much on the aggregate supply-side over the aggregate demand curve. Keynes claimed 
that market-produced equilibrium might occur at a juncture where labor and capital are 
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underutilized. The economic modification results in unemployment rather than wage cuts, 
due to labor unions resisting the downward movement of wages; thus, unemployment 
leads to decrease in demand and deduction in production and investment (Cohn, 2012). 
 In a passage from his most well known published work, The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest, and Money, Keynes writes, “the central controls necessary to 
ensure full employment will, of course, involve a large extension of the traditional 
functions of government” (Keynes, 1936). Keynes advocated for the government to 
implement fiscal policies to boost demand, supporting government investment through 
public projects. Contrary to laissez-faire economics, Keynes simply saw that state 
intervention in the economy would boost aggregate demand based on infrastructure over 
monetary easing. After WWII, Keynes supported an internationalist solution at the 
Bretton Woods Conference in summer of 1944, otherwise known as the Financial 
Conference (Nadesan, 2011). Representing Britain as a postwar negotiator, Keynes 
heavily advocated for liberal policies of the Labour government and encouraged the 
United States to provide England with $3.75 billion in loans due to Britain’s serious 
fiscal problems (Block, 1977, p. 62-69). 
 To counter systemic economic disasters, the Bretton Woods Conference also gave 
birth to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Originally, Keynes 
pushed for the development of a global currency, but the members of the conference 
decided to peg the U.S. dollar as the world’s reserve currency (Gokay, 2005). During the 
Depression era and WWII, Keynes encouraged states to combat unemployment, and his 
advocacy effort for national and international economic management contributed largely 
to contemporary liberal economic thought. From Keynes’s perspective, greater 
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government intervention would facilitate the efficiency of the market; thus, instead of 
replacing capitalism, government intervention would help rescue and revitalize economic 
activities (Arblaster, 1984, p. 292).  
 Despite Keynesian post-war solutions and FDR’s New Deal headlined by the 
Glass-Steagall Act, all good things must end. One of FDR’s pillars that prolonged the 
greatest run of economic prosperity in the United States faced major challenges when 
lawmakers started to reinterpret the banking legislation. The firewall that separated 
commercial banking transactions from the investment houses gradually dissolved to 
allow buying and selling of stocks, safekeeping securities and switching funds between 
bank and stock accounts (Mester, 1996). Next, chapter three will continue with the 
economic history starting with the rise of Neoliberal era during the 1980s and the repeal 
of the Glass-Steagall Act that enabled the U.S. financial system to experience another 
round of deregulatory era. 
 In conclusion, we witnessed several historic landmarks that revolutionized the 
global economy from Adam Smith’s doctrine of laissez-faire to the implementation of 
regulatory capitalism through John Maynard Keynes’ economic philosophy of 
government interventionism in the early twentieth-century. By drafting and advocating 
for legislative regulations, the Glass-Steagall Act truly served the interest of protecting 
the public sector. Will be seen in the next chapter, the Banking Act of 1933 slowly lost its 
regulatory powers, and even more during the late-1990s. By end of the 20th century, the 
United States legislative and executive branches completely repealed the Glass-Steagall 
Act and in its place, implemented the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act that further deregulated 
the United States financial system. The interest of protecting the public’s money shifted 
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as the policymakers deceptively advocated on behalf of corporations, financial firms, 
insurance companies, and securities.  
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CHAPTER THREE  
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND (1970 TO PRESENT) 
 
 Chapter Two addressed the history of economics starting with the Classical 
Liberals in 1776 led by Adam Smith’s model of laissez-faire economics. This style of 
limited government and self-regulation became the hegemonic economic system 
throughout the Western world. However, the United States abandoned laissez-faire in 
response to the catastrophic stock market crash in 1929 that resulted in nationwide bank 
failures. Senators Carter Glass and Henry Steagall assembled what is widely known as 
the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 (Banking Act). 
 This regulatory reform separated the commercial banks from the investments 
banks. In effect, the Glass-Steagall Act forced the banks to choose between being a 
commercial bank or an investment house; thus, the legislation created a firewall between 
the two banking activities. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 stated there is an inherent 
conflict of interest between the commercial banks (the lending side) and the investment 
banks (taking an ownership position). This bill ended the conflict of interest by separating 
the two entities. For example, one could be a commercial bank like Bank of America or 
an investment house like Merrill Lynch, but under Glass-Steagall, a bank could not 
proceed to take the responsibilities of both banking activities. The Glass-Steagall Act 
operated as a form of advocacy by regulating the financial industry in order to protect the 
national economy ranging from customers, investors, and the banks -- from a catastrophic 
financial meltdown. Chapter Three is a continuation of economic history starting in the 
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1970s when the United States entered a new era of global economy led by the well-
renown Chicago School of Economics.  
 From 1944 to the late 1970s, the United States economic system operated under 
the Keynesian model of economics, which emphasized policy efforts to increase 
aggregate demand. The model holds that demand creates its own supply. Keynes believed 
that increased demand reduced unemployment and that interventionist government policy 
could stimulate demand. The majority of the Western states operated under Keynesian 
interventionist policies post-WWII era through the 1970s. However, the United States 
entered a new era of global economics led by the Chicago School in the final decades of 
the twentieth century. The shift began in the late 1960s when Keynesian policies failed to 
combat the stagflation caused first by the Vietnam War, rising energy prices and 
increased competition from countries such as Japan, Brazil, Taiwan, South Korea, and 
Germany. The stagflation was particularly pronounced in 1973 after the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) announced oil prices would rise substantially. The recession 
proved costly for support for Keynesian government programs, such as welfare and full-
employment policies (Cohn, 2012). Keynesian policies were held responsible for the 
stagflation, defined as low economic growth and high levels of inflation. As a result, 
Chicago School critics argued for abandonment of Keynesian economic policies.  
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The Rise of Neoliberal Economics  
 
Keynes had nothing to offer those of who had sat at the feet of Simons, Mints, Knight, and 
Viner. 
 -Milton Friedman 
 A War can ravage half a continent, but raises no new issues in economic theory. 
                                                                                                              -George Stigler 
 There is no center of intellectual ferment like the University of Chicago. 
 -James Buchanan 
The cold war is over and the University of Chicago has won. 
          -George F. Will  
 Milton Friedman (1912-2006), one of the central pillars of Chicago School, 
received numerous honors, including a Nobel Prize in 1976. He was an economics 
professor at the University of Chicago and served as an economic advisor to President 
Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. Originally, a Keynesian economist, Friedman broke free to 
advocate for monetarism (Nadesan, n.d.). Friedman and other monetarists believed that 
Keynesian economic philosophy of injecting capital via government projects leads to 
market destabilization. They advocated for control over fiscal policy and discarded the 
Keynesian method of stimulating aggregate demand, engineered by government spending 
and infrastructure investment (Nadesan, n.d.). In regard to the dangers of government, 
Friedman stated: “Government is an instrument through which we can exercise our 
freedom; yet, by concentrating power in political hands, it is also a threat to freedom” 
(Friedman, 1962). Influenced by Adam Smith, Friedman stressed the significance of 
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classical liberalism and the belief that the market preserves and protects liberty. In his 
book Capitalism and Freedom (1962) states, ”A state that takes its citizens’ freedom 
through anything more than necessary action is no better than one that seizes their 
freedom guided by fascist, mercantilist or even a socialist” (Balaam & Dillman, 2011). 
Thus, Milton Friedman critically opposes state interference with the market economy. In 
the quote below, Friedman further explained his contempt for interventionist economic 
policies.  
Wherever we find any large element of individual freedom, some measure 
of progress in the material comforts at the disposal of ordinary citizens, 
and widespread hope of further progress in the future, there we also find 
that economic activity is organized mainly through the free market. 
Wherever the state undertakes to control in detail the economic activities 
of its citizens, ordinary citizens are in political fetters, have a low standard 
of living, and have little power to control their own destiny. (Milton 
Friedman & Rose Friedman, 1980; p. 54-55) 
 
A champion of the free market ideology, Friedman believed in the significance of 
advocating for economic freedom for the greater good of the general public. The more 
responsibility and intervention the state bears on society, it hinders economic freedom for 
the populace. Friedman advocated for radical changes in national economic policies as it 
brought fresh ideal that deviated from the Keynesian method of regulated capitalism. The 
next section will discuss the Glass-Steagall Act under the Neoliberal ideology that begun 
to weaken its regulatory policies. 
 
The Dismantling of the Glass-Steagall Act and Market De-regulation  
 
 As economic prosperity declined in the late 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, 
Friedman’s advocacy of orthodox liberalism started to captivate government policies. 
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The written works of Milton Friedman and Friedrich A. Hayek (one of the famous 
members from the Austrian School of Economics) tremendously influenced 
governmental policymakers starting in the 1980s (Cohn, 2011). Academic scholars often 
coin the term “neoliberalism” to distinguish these twentieth century thinkers from Adam 
Smith, David Ricardo and other British and French classical economists from the 
Chicago School of Economics led by Milton Friedman and George Stigler. 
 During the Twentieth Century, two prominent political leaders strongly advocated 
for the resurrection of classical economics: known as the “Iron Lady,” British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher and the United States President Ronald Reagan (Balaam & 
Dillman, 2011). The revitalization of classical economics was seen as reinvigorating 
confidence in the American financial system by repudiating modern liberalism. However, 
Neoliberal policies advocated by Reagan and Thatcher was not well received by 
government employees, trade unions and welfare recipients (Cohn, 2012). The outcome 
of the conflict only led to greater pressure for the government to implement 
classical/orthodox liberal philosophies such as privatization, deregulation, and free trade 
and foreign investments (Cox, 1987, p.286-288; Lipietz, 1992, p. 30-31). The transition 
to the return of classical style of economics led to these implementations:   
(1) Advancement in technology, communications, and transpiration has 
enabled Multinational Corporation (MNCs) and international banks to 
shift their activities and funds around the globe. (2) The IMF and World 
Bank provide the least developed countries with financing since the 1982 
foreign debt crisis, but these conditions include privatization, deregulation, 
and liberalization of least developed economic nations. (3) The 
disintegration of USSR, orthodox liberal economics has spread to the 
former Soviet bloc’s that are in transition of economically recovering. 
(Cohn, 2012, p. 83) 
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Instead of increasing government spending that would boost money supply and generate 
its own demand, the implementation of supply-side economics decreased taxes. As a 
result, the top income tax rates in the U.S. slashed from 70 percent to 33 percent in a span 
of six years (1980-1986) (Balaam & Dillman, 2011). Industries such as trucking, 
telecommunications, and airlines experienced privatization to expand competition. 
Although the policies created inequality, neoliberals viewed the market as a positive tool 
for redistribution of wealth; therefore, in theory, economic growth from the top would 
eventually find its way for all socioeconomic classes. However, in reality, instead of 
society as a whole benefiting from the economic philosophy of neoliberalism, the 
prevalence of deregulation plagued the United States economic system. 
 As time passed, the focus on the United States economy shifted away from 
Keynesian economics in favor of the neoliberal model. The Glass-Steagall Act 
maintained its regulatory powers until the 1980s. From the inception of the law signing it 
into effect in the 1930s, the large corporate banks advocated to abolish the Glass-Steagall 
Act (Crawford, 2011). During the 1980s and on, an abundance of congressional 
legislative bills commenced to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act piece by piece. A single bill 
did not completely abolish the legislation, but through a series of legislative acts, the 
Banking Act slowly disintegrated, thanks to administrative rulings that crossed over 
commercial banking activities and investment activities (Sherman, 2009). In 1986, the 
Federal Reserve reinterpreted sections of the Glass-Steagall Act’s constraints and stated 
banks could earn up to 5 percent of gross revenues in investment banking business 
(Sherman, 2009; Crawford, 2011). As the decade ended, the Federal Reserve loosened its 
restrictions by raising the revenues to 10%. The Federal Reserve justified their policy by 
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stating that Glass-Steagall’s ambiguous definition of the phrase “engaged principally” 
allowed for multiple reinterpretations (Sherman, 2009).  
 Known as the “Wizard” of the financial industry, Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve Alan Greenspan who served no fewer than four presidential regimes (1987-
2006), advocated for deregulating the American financial sector (PBS Frontline, 2003). 
During the mid-90’s, Greenspan and the Federal Reserve increased the revenues from 10% 
to 25% for the allowable percentage of investment banking operations holding companies 
could own (Sherman, 2009). The reinterpretation of Glass-Steagall continued in 1998 
when Citicorp and Travelers Insurance Company merged into Citigroup. Under Glass-
Steagall, this transaction was illegal, but the Federal Reserve’s reinterpretation of the 
banking regulation assisted the completion of the merger between Citicorp and Travelers 
Insurance Company (PBS Frontline, 2003). Some believe this was the major blow prior 
to its complete demise in 1999. Phil Rubinstein of the LaRouche PAC stated:  
In order for the merger to occur, the Glass-Steagall Act had to be 
overturned. With banking regulation completely abolished, you have bank 
holding companies, which had subsidiaries of commercial banks; however, 
what this means is they can now take the deposits of commercial banks 
and siphon them into speculative investment activity, mortgage-backed 
securities. (Rubinstein, no date) 
 
During the conclusion of the twentieth century, under the supervision of the Clinton 
Administration, Citicorp transformed into the most prodigious financial service 
corporation in the world finalizing the merger with Travelers (Sherman, 2009). The 
unification of these two corporations violated a major financial law; however, Citicorp 
heavily advocated for two solid years to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act (Lucus, 2000). The 
Wall Street Journal published an article regarding the merger under the Bank Holding 
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Act: “The Fed can do what it wants, says Martin Mayer. The Greenspan Fed- strongly 
supportive of removing the barriers between banking, securities, and insurance” (Wessel 
and Schroeder, 1998, p. 1-C1). Despite majority of bankers and legislators advocating for 
consolidation, this merger criminally violated the law: 
Under today’s securities laws, proponents of repeal say those abusive 
practices would be illegal, so Glass-Steagall’s protection is no longer 
needed.  Besides, they argue, the financial-services industry has outgrown 
the 65-year-old law. The merger plan will face scrutiny by insurance 
departments in some other states, but unless unexpected opposition 
emerges among state regulators, the review is likely to be pro forma. In 
brief states, New York Insurance Superintendent Neil D. Levin also 
indicated no opposition to the merger. (p.1-C1) 
 
This transaction allowed Citigroup to become the world’s biggest financial company 
(Sherman, 2009). Many begun to realize the magnitude of the economic shift coming to 
fruition as the new financial economic era was taking its shape entering the twenty-first 
century. Through multiple interpretations, the Federal Reserve essentially gutted one of 
Roosevelt’s regulatory cornerstones, the Glass-Steagall Act. To reiterate, the Banking 
Act prevented risky and fraudulent banking activities that caused the financial crash of 
1929. In the mid-90’s, Alan Greenspan, the Clinton Administration, and the Federal 
Reserve gave the green light to the regular banks to become deeply involved in 
investment banking activities, which provoked the conflict of interest in these banks to 
push for shady financial investments on investors who were ignorant of the consequences 
(Gupta, 2008). 
In 1998, The New York Times published an article titled, “Shaping the Colossus” 
(O’Brien & Treaster, 1999) discussing the benefits of the merger: 
The transaction would combine two companies with very different 
cultures and chief executives. Although Citicorp is much more aggressive 
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than some of its peers, it still tends to fit the profile of a cautious buttoned-
down bank. Travelers, by contrast, are marked by the entrepreneurial style 
of its chief executives. The new company would vault ahead of other 
global financial giants, including Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Ltd. And 
Deutsch Bank A.G., both of which already offer the menu of financial 
products that Citicorp and Travelers are trying to put together. The size of 
the deal would easily eclipse the largest merger agreement to date. 
(O’Brien & Treaster, 1999, section A; p. 1; Column 6) 
 
Despite violating the Glass-Steagall Act, the article further elaborates the future financial 
implications for the corporations and the customers at stake: “This proposed merger 
challenged regulators and lawmakers to either end the Banking Act or force the merged 
company to cut back on its offers to customer (O’Brien & Treaster, 1999, section A; p. 1; 
Column 6).” To continue the explanation of overcoming the regulatory rigors: “The 
transaction would have to negotiate a maze of regulations governing the bank industry 
that were put in place precisely to prevent the creation of the type of company Travelers 
and Citicorp now aim to put together. Those laws were enacted in response to public 
concerns about unfettered financial power and the economic consequences when such 
giants collapse (section A; p. 1; Column 6). 
 The final blow that completely abolished the Glass-Steagall Act occurred in 1999, 
when the U.S. Congress decided to pass the Financial Modernization Act or as many 
called it, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. This legislation passed 90 to 8 in Senate and 362-
57 in the House of Representatives, resulting in a majority consensus from the legislative 
branch (LaBaton, 1999). The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (1999) revoked constraints 
against everything that Glass-Steagall mandated, such as the combination of banks, 
securities and insurance operations for financial institutions (Sherman, 2009). President 
Clinton signed the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 into law, deregulating 
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the derivatives market and destroying any remaining vestiges of the Glass-Steagall Act. 
The abolishment of the regulatory firewall marked a monumental moment of 
deregulation that shaped the coming future of an economy heavily predicated on the 
financial sector (Barth, Brumbaugh Jr., and Wilcox, 2000).  
 In the early part of the 20th century, we saw how legislative advocacy affected the 
entire economic system by providing stability through regulations. However, as decades 
passed it also contained a dark side filled with deceptive ideals to promote reckless 
policies. As stated earlier, the Federal Reserve’s constant reinterpreting of the Banking 
Act severely weakened its powers, which led to its demise in 1999. The Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act of 106th United States Congress not only repealed the Glass-Steagall Act of 
1933, but it consequently opened up the market among banks, securities, and insurance 
companies (Crawford, 2011). This very practice countered the integrity of the Glass-
Steagall Act that prohibited the combination of any one institution from acting as an 
investment house, a commercial bank, and/or as an insurance company.  
 The support behind the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act took its shape through 
legislative, written and speech advocacy. By knocking down the regulatory barriers 
created during the Great Depression, it allowed banks, investment firms, and insurance 
companies to sell each other’s products, thereby, providing a one-stop shopping for 
financial services (Crawford, 2011). Clinton’s Secretary of Treasury, Larry Summers, 
who is one of the prominent advocates of deregulation, expressed his optimistic thoughts 
upon the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act:  
Today, Congress voted to update the rules that have governed financial 
services since the Great Depression and replace them with a system for the 
21st century. This historic legislation will better enable American 
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companies to compete in the new economy (LaBaton, 1999).  
 
Senator Phil Gramm, one of the key contributors to repealing Glass-Steagall stated: 
The world changes and we have to change with it. We have a new century 
coming and we have an opportunity to dominate the same way we 
dominated this century. Glass-Steagall, in the midst of the Great 
Depression, came at a time when the thinking was that the government 
was the answer. In this era of economic prosperity, we have decided that 
freedom is the answer (LaBaton, 1999). 
 
Judging by the quotes above, the common themes of future progress and modernization 
truly resonated in the public sphere. The policy-makers completely bypassed any 
concerns of repeating another historical meltdown similar to the Great Depression. These 
legislative advocates framed and communicated in ways that deceptively advocated for 
the betterment of the American financial system. The same legislative advocates struck 
fear in the public by communicating that a regulatory firewall only impeded the progress 
of the United States financial markets from maintaining its global leadership position. 
Even though the rhetoric of sustaining the success of the U.S. financial system resonated 
with the public, the deregulatory legislation only intended to advocate on behalf of the 
financial industry. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act only benefited the financial investors, 
the top corporate executives, firms and the wealthy hedge funds. The legislation 
completely neglected the rank and file investors, derivatives market, the American people, 
and 401k due to the loosened restrictions of securitization. 
 Senator Phil Gramm, one of the authors of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act famously 
repealed the Glass-Steagall Act, included a stipulation that exempted over-the-counter 
derivatives like credit-default swaps from regulation by the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC). In other words, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act was not 
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liable of credit-default swaps from regulators. This legislation pertains to the 
contemporary crisis because credit-default swaps crumbled AIG, which the United States 
taxpayers approximately paid over $180 billion in bailout money (Dealbook, 2009). What 
took about fifty years to rebuild and prosper for the overall health of the United States 
economy, the system was on a verge of obliteration within the first decade of the twenty-
first century. 
 
The Present Crisis 
 
Virtually nobody foresaw the Great depression of the 1930s, or the crisis, which affected 
Japan and Southeast Asia in the early and late 1990s. In fact, each downturn was 
preceded by a period of non-inflationary growth exuberant enough to lead many 
commentators to suggest that a “new era” had arrived. 
-Bank of International Settlements, June 2007 
“If stupidity got us into this mess, then why can’t it get us out?” 
-Will Rogers 
 For approximately a half a century, our nation was able to experience the benefits 
of legislation that truly advocated for public policy by protecting the national wealth 
through a series of financial regulations. Many consider the Glass-Steagall Act to be the 
cornerstone of the financial regulation that brought stability to the American banking 
system; however, from the 1980s to present, regulated capitalisms shifted in favor of 
promoting economic deregulation. For example, in 1972, James Tobin proposed an 
international uniform tax on all spot conversions of one currency into another, 
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proportional to the size of the transaction (Tobin, 1978). At the tax rate of only one 
percent, Tobin thought his proposed plan would be enough to discourage temporary 
speculative capital flows and produce revenues in least developed countries to combat 
poverty. The pros of Tobin’s idea were that it would decrease the potential damage of the 
global economic crisis and provide impoverished nations with capital; however, the 
orthodox liberal economists believed it was an unnecessary change because the financial 
sector was in perfect shape (Eichengreen, 1999, p. 88-90; Michalos, 1997).    
 Former Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan loosened the monetary policy 
in the early 2000s to promote the well-being of the financial sector of job growth and 
investments. According to Nadesan (n.d.), financial de-regulation broadened the retail 
banking and credit opportunities. The loose regulations allowed two major housing 
institutions, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, to initiate a massive purchase of subprime 
loans. According to a presentation titled, “The End of Growth?” by Satyajit Das, our 
global economic system operates under “Botox Economics” by flooding in cheap, easy 
money, and government debt (Das, 2012). The low interest rates set by Greenspan, which 
intended to expand the economy destroyed the construction in the fields of residential and 
commercial real estates (Nadesan, n.d.).  
 Similar to the Great Depression of 1929, the catastrophic economic crisis that 
unfolded in late 2007 to 2009 did not occur by accident.  The contemporary financial 
collapse commenced with the explosion of the subprime mortgage crisis in the United 
States housing market that consequently sent the world in a global credit crunch, which 
ultimately led to macro and micro financial collapses. During the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first century, the United States housing market drastically soared as a large 
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portion of the American people invested in the hype of mortgage-generating financial 
security. Significant portions of mortgage financing was backed by subprime mortgages; 
subprime borrowers include those who did not qualify for market interest rates for the 
reasons of credit history, size of down payment, lack of income level, and/or employment 
prospect (Cohn, 2012). 
  James K. Galbraith, the son of John K. Galbraith (1908-2006) explains that in the 
early 2000s, the Bush Administration bypassed all ideas of mortgage regulations as “liars’ 
loans,” “no-doc loans,” and “neutron loans” were bundled together, rated AAA, 
securitized, and then circulated until the crashing prices demolished the financial system 
(Galbraith, 2009). Richard Cohen of the Washington Post painted a clear scenario of the 
housing manipulation through the example of Marvene Halterman of Avondale, Arizona: 
At age 61, after 13 years of uninterrupted unemployment and at least as 
many years of living on welfare, she got a mortgage. She got it even 
though at one time she had 23 people living in the house (576 square feet, 
one bath) and some ramshackle outbuildings. She got it for $103,000, an 
amount that far exceeded the value of the house. The place has since been 
condemned. Halterman’s house was never exactly a showcase – the city 
had since cited her for all the junk (clothes, tires, etc.) on her lawn. 
Nonetheless, a local financial institution with the cover-your-wallet name 
of Integrity Funding LLC gave her a mortgage, valuing the house at about 
twice what a nearby and comparable property. Integrity Funding then sold 
the loan to Well Fargo & Co., which sold it to HSBC Holdings PLC, 
which then packaged it with thousands of other risky mortgages and 
offered the indigestible porridge to investors. Standards & Poor’s and 
Moody’s Investors Services took a look at it, as they are supposed to do, 
and pronounced it AAA. (Galbraith, 2009) 
 
As one can see, this is just one example of the financial fraud enabled by the government 
that took advantage of credulous people taking out mortgages that never had a chance of 
paying down in reality. The government created an illusion of assuring lenders that 
housing prices would always rise; therefore, the bad loans could always be refinanced 
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(Galbraith, 2009). Consequently, numerous subprime borrowers that failed to pay higher 
rates faced the option of defaulting on their loans, and ultimately owed more than the 
value of their homes due to declining prices (Cohn, 2012). Unfortunately, what was once 
considered a lucrative dream turned into a living nightmare as millions of Americans 
faced foreclosures and evictions from their home.  
 Even prior to the “economic doomsday,” there was one major warning signal in 
March of 2008 when one of the top investment firms Bear Stearns filed for bankruptcy, 
admitting to losing over than $50 billion from subprime mortgages. The final triggering 
point occurred on September 15, 2008, when Lehman Brothers, one of the top investment 
banks in the United States, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. As panic set in, the entire 
system contracted as if the collapse of Lehman were an anchor dragging down the entire 
financial system. During that same month, the Federal Reserve of New York intervened 
and authorized the lending to AIG of $85 billion in bailouts money. To worsen the 
outcome, AIG neglected to back the financial derivatives; therefore, when the subprime 
meltdown occurred, it suffocated AIG’s ability to pay in credit default swaps to their 
counterparties until the intervention of the New York Fed’s credit line that lent a hand to 
AIG in more bailout money surpassing over $182 billion (Nadesan, n.d.; Teitelbaum & 
Son, 2009).  
 According to Charles Ferguson’s documentary, Inside Job the world’s largest 
insurance company, AIG sold massive quantities of derivatives called credit default 
swaps. This particular type of derivative operates similar to an insurance policy. The 
collapse of collaterized debt obligations (CDO) comprised of pooled mortgages, car loans, 
student loans and other debt-triggered payouts of credit default swaps (CDS). It was 
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AIG’s job to keep their promise on credit default swaps by paying back the investors for 
their losses (Ferguson et al., 2010). The investment banks paid rating agencies to evaluate 
the collaterized debt obligations (CDO), and many of them were undeservedly awarded 
AAA ratings, which is the highest possible investment grade. Lenders did not care 
whether a borrower could repay, so they made even more risky loans. For the investment 
banks, the more CDOs they sold, the higher profit these firms generated. However, in a 
bizarre fashion, unlike insurance, speculators possessed the purchasing power to buy 
credit default swaps from AIG in order to bet against the CDOs that they did not own 
(Ferguson et al., 2010). AIG failed to save enough capital for emergencies to pay 
counterparties in case of an economic panic; instead, the company excessively paid its 
employees large bonuses once the contract transactions were completed, thereby 
encouraging risk-taking actions. 
 Unlike the Great Depression, the current crisis profoundly failed to fix, let alone 
even attempt to prosecute the central figures involved in today’s financial fraud. Not a 
single financial executive served time in prison, which prompts the question, where is our 
Pecora Commission? Instead of prosecuting guilty individuals, the government created 
moral hazards that hooked the taxpayers to bailout failing institutions such as AIG by 
forfeiting over $180 billion. NYU economist Nouriel Roubini states the bailouts of these 
financial institutions such as Freddie, Fannie, AIG, large banks and other institutions and 
corporations added an additional seven trillion dollars to public debt (Fallows, 90; 
Nadesan, n.d.). The government bailout efforts in response to the 2008 crisis was such an 
atrocity that economist Michael Hudson argues, “This is the largest and most inequitable 
transfer of wealth since the land giveaways to the railroad barons during the Civil War 
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era” (Hudson, 2008). To worsen the outcome, Bloomberg reported in August 2011 that 
current Chairman of the Fed Ben Bernanke gave the green light to lend the mega-banks 
$1.2 trillion of taxpayers’ money to “save” the U.S. economic system from falling into an 
economic depression (Keoun & Kuntz, 2011).  
 It has been nearly five years since the post-mortem of the Great Recession of 
2008. Unfortunately, the volatility of the financial industry has gotten much worse. In 
short, from the financial institutions, to the government, to the public and private sectors, 
they have collectively failed to learn the lessons of the past two decades. The financial 
giants and Wall Street have circumvented all the laws and rules such as the Volcker Rule 
proposed by the former Fed Chairman, Paul Volcker. The Volcker Rule bans banks from 
taking risky speculative trading with federally insured money. The Volcker Rule was 
launched in July of 2012, but the final provisions are significantly weaker than the 
original proposal due to the feud between legislators, regulators, and bank lobbyists. In an 
interview with a financial expert Satyajit Das on a New Zealand news station, he 
discussed the powerful influence of bank lobbyists resisting regulatory solutions (Tarrant, 
2012):  
I will give you one example. In the United States there is a rule called the 
Volcker Rule, which is designed to prevent the banks from trading with 
their own money. But the problem is the rule has been watered down and 
made so complex, it is 270 pages long and its got loopholes everywhere. I 
had a lovely conversation with a lawyer who said he would be 
embarrassed if he could not get one of his clients to get through one of the 
loopholes. Essentially, we are not making any progress. There is a lot of 
activity, but have yet to see much achievement. (Tarrant, 2012) 
 
The Volcker Rule does not necessarily separate banking activities; instead, it mainly 
prohibits proprietary trading of dealing in securities and other financial instruments, 
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rather than on behalf of the customers (Sweet Jr. & Christiansen, no date). It also imposes 
additional capital requirements on shadow banks (unregulated activities by regulatory 
institutions) engaged in proprietary trading. According to the definition on Investopedia, 
the shadow banking system came under heavy fire during the subprime meltdown in 
2008 because it managed to escape regulations due to not accepting traditional bank 
deposits. The consequence led to employing higher market, credit, and liquidity risks, and 
failed to provide capital requirements to compensate with those risks. Lastly, the Volcker 
Rule restricts banks’ ownership stakes in hedge funds and private equity funds (Mitchell, 
2010). The Volcker Rule’s ability to limit the power of these mega-banks sounds nice on 
paper, but the effectiveness of the banking provisions of separating commercial banking 
from risky securities will most likely to be circumvented by the powerful banking 
lobbyists. 
 Since the recession of 2008, fraud is still at the heart of the financial sector as 
companies, banks, and individuals are responsible for losing millions and billions of 
dollars. Even with the implementation of the Volcker Rule, the sophistication of 
technological advancements has made regulations fall further into the depths of 
irrelevance. Known as High Frequency Trading (HFT) or “black box trading,” mainly 
predicated on complex algorithmic systems, computerized trading transactions occur at 
fractions of a second at speeds that are beyond comprehension. Today, algorithmic 
trading accumulates over 60% of all trades nationwide at all the exchanges (Casey Report, 
2012). HFT is not only a lucrative method of outperforming competitors, but it has 
drastically changed how traders strategize. According to Michael Hudson (2010), the 
average time a stock was held involving HFT was only 22 seconds. These powerful 
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processors are physically placed in close proximity to electronic exchanges (Nadesan, 
n.d.). The combination of speed and proximity provides an advantage over traders on the 
exchange floors as the HFT’ers find an insight into the trading prices. As Ellen Brown 
(2010) noted, it is similar to poker players peeking in a mirror to see their opponents’ 
hands. With a similar advantage, flash orders allow the program traders to preview the 
incoming orders, so they have the advantage of leaping in front for gaining profits off the 
top (Brown, 2010). On any given day, the market performance swings one way or the 
other for better or worse, as long as the market keeps moving, profits are generated for 
the HFT’ers (Nadesan, n.d.). One of the alternative media sources, Zero Hedge, wrote an 
article regarding the close relationship between the practice of HFT and the former 
investment bank, Goldman Sachs. A former investment house, which recently converted 
to a commercial bank, Goldman Sachs is able to generate lucrative profits through 
Alternative Trading System’s (ATS), which is the ability to trade around the clock. In an 
attempt to compare the corruption of HFT, Zero Hedge states:  
As the market keeps going up day in and day out, regardless of the 
deteriorating economic conditions, it is just these HFT’s that determine the 
overall market direction, usually without fundamental or technical reason. 
Based on a few lines of code, retail investors get suckered into a rising 
market that has nothing to do with green shoots or some Chinese firms 
buying a few hundred extra Intel servers: HTFs are merely perpetuating 
the same Ponzi market mythology last seen in the Madoff case, but on a 
massively larger scale. (Zero Hedge, 2009) 
 
By taking advantage of the afterhours trading, Goldman Sachs on average profited over 
$100 million from 116 out of 194 trading days in 2009 (Durden, 2009; Brown, 2010). 
Although the media and the regulatory agencies largely ignored HFT, an infamous 
incident occurred on May 6, 2010, known as the “Flash Crash.” The incident started at 
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approximately 2:41 p.m.; when the traders watched in disbelief a sharp decline of Dow 
Jones Industrial by nearly a thousand points, only to see it quickly salvage nearly 600 
within a matter of minutes (Buchanan, 2012). According to the investigative report by the 
SEC, it all started when an individual trader working for a mutual fund company 
requested a substantial order to sell more than 75,000 futures contracts worth nearly $4.1 
billion, which were tied to the S&P 500. It is normal to see significant transactions take 
hours to fully process, even with an algorithmic computer processing the orders 
(Goldstein, 2010). However, a major blunder occurred when the computer completely 
neglected the price, so this little mishap ripped open the market by sending into a spiral. 
The failure between two parties triggered other traders to sell stocks and funds, which 
caused many traders to temporarily step aside to assess the situation. Therefore, the 
limited number of trade partners at the NYSE sped up the sharp decline in the overall 
performance of the market. However, according to Robert Whitelaw, a finance professor 
at NYU, contrary from the SEC report, the Flash Crash was an outcome of traders 
leaving in purchase orders that would never gain any substantial momentum. According 
to the New York Times (2011), the SEC proposed a regulatory law called a consolidated 
audit trail that would collect data on trades in real time from all the exchange floors. 
 Another major financial scandal involves the mega-banks in a LIBOR 
manipulating scandal that occurred during the summer of 2012. According to The New 
York Times, the acronym for LIBOR is London Interbank Offered Rate. Simply put, 
Libor is the average interest rate at which large international banks such as Barclays in 
London can borrow from other banks (Times Topics: Libor Barclays Interest Rate 
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Manipulation Case, 2012). The banking scandal was officially reported late June 2012 
and new reports are continuing to arrive since the LIBOR scandal hit public.  
 When a British financial mega-bank, Barclays, was fined $450 million for 
manipulating the Libor rates, the CEO of Barclays Bank, Robert Diamond, resigned in 
disgrace. Reports indicate that he will not be the last CEO to testify in court because 
other financial giants such as JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, HSBC, and others are under 
heavy investigation. According to Reuters report of the LIBOR scandal:  
More than a dozen banks are under investigation by authorities in Europe, 
Japan and the United States over the suspected rigging of the London 
interbank offered rates, a key interest rate used in contracts worth trillions 
of dollars globally. (MacLellan, Tostevin, 2012)  
 
There have been up to 16 banks linked to the manipulation of LIBOR rates in 2008, but 
only one bank (Barclays) has confessed to criminal misconduct.  
 During middle of the financial crisis from 2007 to 2009, the mega-banks around 
the world attempted to appear stable, so these dozen or more banks offered lower than 
usual borrowing rates (AccountingDegree.net, 2012). The manipulation of LIBOR allows 
bank balance sheets to appear healthier at the expense of the public. The banks involved 
were lending money in the market at lower interest rates and in returned collected less 
profit. The clients that received the payout profits such as the cities, governments and 
financial institutions, which involve hospitals, fire departments, police departments, 
school, local libraries and so on all suffered due to insufficient shares of lending profits in 
a distorted market. One of the prolific financial columnists for the Rolling Stone 
Magazine, Matt Taibbi concisely stated: 
This is the world’s biggest banks stealing money that would otherwise 
have gone toward textbooks and medicine and housing for ordinary 
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American, and turning the cash into sports cars and bonuses for the 
already rich. It is equivalent of robbing a charity or a church fund to pay 
for lap dances. (Taibbi, 2012) 
 
In June 2008, the former Secretary of Treasury and former Secretary of the New York 
Federal Reserve, Tim Geithner sent a private message to British regulators concerning 
the potential manipulation of LIBOR. Since the LIBOR manipulation scandal went public, 
Geithner is under heavy fire for the lack of action concerning the central role LIBOR that 
plays in the global markets. In an article by The Wall Street Journal, Geithner sent a letter 
to Mervyn King (Bank of England Governor) demanding him to “eliminate incentive to 
misreport” by banks (Treanor & Rushe, 2012). During the time of the financial crisis, 
“Fed officials became deeply concerned about the functioning of short-term lending 
markets in late-2007 to early 2008. One problem was that large banks engaged in the 
development of short-term loans to fund their operations and their borrowing costs soared” 
(Paletta & Hilsenrath, 2012). The ongoing investigation in the LIBOR manipulation 
scandal is examining whether banks purposely provided false lending rates, affecting the 
interest rates for trillions of dollars in financial banking products. Milliken and Ahmann 
(2012) reported LIBOR is used for $550 trillion of interest rate derivatives contracts and 
influences rates from credit cards to mortgages to student loans. James Rickards of 
Tangent Capital claimed the monstrosity of the Libor manipulation scandal:  
So big I don’t think people have got their minds around it. This is the 
largest financial scandal I have seen in my career. If $500 trillion of swaps 
are tied to Libor and the rates are manipulated by 10 basis points over a 
five-year span, which equates to $2.5 trillion of fraudulent dealings. The 
entire situation may get so out of control that Congress may have to 
intervene to limit the damage because it has great potential to destabilize 
the global banking system. (Task, 2012) 
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In an article titled, “A Huge Break in the LIBOR Banking Investigation” written by Matt 
Taibbi of Rolling Stone Magazine breaks down the sheer amount of fraud that is tied to 
the LIBOR scandal: 
This is unbelievable, shocking stuff. A sizeable chunk of the world’s 
adjustable-rate investment vehicles is pegged to Libor, and here we have 
evidence that banks were tweaking the rate downward to massage their 
own derivatives position. The consequences boggle my mind. For instance, 
almost every city and town in America has investment holdings tied to 
Libor. If banks were artificially lowering the rates to beef up their trading 
profiles that means communities all over the world were cheated out of 
ungodly amounts of money. (Taibbi, 2012) 
 
Since the 1980s, our world has been living under an imperial system based on money and 
power. Carter Glass managed to draft a legislation that advocated for the restoration of 
the American financial system. Who is willing to be the next Carter Glass or Ferdinand 
Pecora? These two individuals in particular knew the implications as they promoted 
legislative advocacy that paved a road for justice and economic stability. Our nation 
needs a new direction that reflects the principles of the FDR, Carter Glass, Pecora, and 
the founders. One must advocate not only against the kleptocratic style of government 
that allows elites to take advantage of government corruption by extending their personal 
wealth and political powers, but also the advocates must expose the hidden financial 
corruptions through new transparent measures.  
 The Bush and Obama Administrations responses to the economic crisis have been 
characterized by large bailouts of large financial firms and institutions and failures to 
prosecute top banking executives. William K. Black, who criminally prosecuted 
individuals responsible for the Savings and Loans crisis in the late 1980s, slammed the 
responsible financial culprits for committing fraud by gambling away approximately $11 
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trillion in household wealth, eliminating six million jobs and five more million job that 
would have been available (Nadesan, n.d.). Instead of learning from the past mistakes, the 
world of economics and finances is more corrupt than ever as it trivializes financial 
practices such as high frequency trading, tolerates the unregulated derivatives market, 
enables re-hypothecation, etc. The narrative limits and self-censorship of mainstream 
media discourses constrain popular understanding of the extent of Wall Street’s 
fraudulent culture. Chapter Four will identify the discursive themes found in mainstream 
media by analyzing news reports from The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal 
representing the Great Depression and the present crisis. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
  
 By briefly examining the global economic history, Chapters Two and Three 
provided a condensed historical framework of economic landmarks that took place dating 
from the seventeenth century up to the contemporary era. Chapter Four will explore the 
media’s role in framing and shaping interpretations of the complicated system of 
economic, political, social and market forces that rocked the nation in the 1930s and 
again in 2008. Professor Delli Carpini (2004) from University of Pennsylvania 
emphasizes the power of the media in shaping public opinion, “As one of several 
socializing agents, the media provide much of the ‘raw material’ that make up social and 
political, attitudes, and schema” (p. 408). The media, I argue, have shaped interpretations 
of financial crises, thereby influencing government’s regulatory responses. The media 
analysis in Chapter Four compares and contrasts the stock market crash of 1929 and the 
implosion of the housing bubble in 2008 by looking at articles from two mainstream 
publications: The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal.  
 This chapter identifies three major themes that emerge from analysis of The New 
York Times and The Wall Street Journal news accounts. The first major theme concerns 
the pseudo-heroes (bankers) portrayed in the media discourses during the Great 
Depression and during the contemporary era. The second theme of this chapter details the 
criminality aspects of how individuals and institutions are portrayed by the media over 
time. The third and final theme of this chapter addresses and compares the regulatory 
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responses during the Great Depression and the 2008 financial crisis. The analysis 
compares policy responses in relation to these media representations.  
The data for this chapter will examine articles from the two most prominent 
United States newspaper companies: The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal. 
These two publications have a long-held reputation of covering historical moments that 
occurred in the U.S. dating back to the late nineteenth century, so it is feasible to conduct 
a meticulous investigation of events occurring in two separate timelines dating back to 
1929. The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal ranked first and third in national 
standing according to the Audit Bureau of Circulations (2012). These two companies not 
only draw readers from all fifty states, but attract a global audience as well. The data 
collection will primarily be acquired electronically through academic databases such as 
Lexis/Nexus, and ABI/INFORM.   
The timeline for the Great Depression will be narrowed from 1929 to 1937, and 
the Great Recession will be narrowed from 2007 to 2009. However, there was one 
exception in data analyzed when it came to the analysis of the Volcker Rule. The date 
range had to be expanded from 2007 to 2010 because President Obama first embraced the 
regulatory act during the beginning of 2010. Articles from The New York Times were 
analyzed from both eras. On the other hand, these databases for The Wall Street Journal 
created complications because the availability of articles at ASU only covered the 
contemporary era. Searches in these two media outlets used more than one database. 
Using key word searches to filter through large numbers of articles simplified searches 
and allowed for scanning of hundreds of headlines, facilitating identification of recurring 
themes and frames. Detailed searches helped narrow down the articles, but ambiguous 
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searches such as “AIG” resulted in hundreds of articles. For example, using ProQuest, I 
would select The New York Times and type key words such as “Glass-Steagall Act” 
during the 1932 to 1937 selecting news, editorials, and articles. Other examples of key 
words include: Banking Act, The Great Depression Headlines, Glass-Steagall bill, 
banking regulation, stock exchange crash/collapse, economic crash, banking fraud, 
Pecora commission, Federal Reserve, Carter Glass bill, Henry Steagall bill, criminal 
bankers, National City Bank fraud, Charles Mitchell banking fraud, financial speculation, 
AIG bailouts, banking bailouts, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bailouts, housing 
speculation, Bear Stearns purchase, Banks acquisitions, Bank mergers, Wachovia and 
Wells Fargo, financial institutions, bailouts, etc.    
 Chapter Four will utilize APA 6th edition formatting style using block quotations 
of excerpts from the primary data sources to illustrate and document critical analysis. 
Discourse analysis will be the methodology employed to identify and analyze recurring 
ideas and themes in the data. According to Hepburn and Potter (2007), discourse analysis 
examines the text through analyzing and transcribing written texts, deciphering the 
arguments, metaphors, and themes within the text. Discourse analysis is an outlook on the 
complexity of human language and its essential connection to the fundamental issues in 
social sciences (Wood & Kroger, 2000). The ultimate goal of analyzing language is to 
seek the in-depth significance of the text(s) that is important to society.  
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Theme One: High Praises, Heroes and Lies during the Great Depression 
 
The first major theme has been named “high praises, heroes, and lies” because the 
analysis of Depression era coverage revealed a striking shift in tone in newspaper 
accounts of the key players in the financial industry and in representation of the industry 
as a whole. Prior to the Pecora Commission in the 1930s, The New York Times provided 
optimistic headlines and articles regarding heavy losses around the time of “Black 
Tuesday” in the stock market. To combat the negative discourses, the publication framed 
the bankers as a voice of reason, deceiving the public concerning long-term problems. 
However, as the Pecora Commission findings were reported The New York Times tone 
changed and “lies” appeared as a dominant theme. The heroes of finance were revealed to 
have been duplicitous.   
Analysis of media accounts revealed that the financial industry during the 
“Roaring Twenties” possessed “celebrity” status (Senate.gov, no date). President Hoover 
praised the financial industry at an investment banking convention stating: 
Your work is of double value. On the one hand, it helps to prevent our 
reservoir of capital from being drained into unsound and unprofitable 
ventures. On the other hand, it is important to secure a greater 
participation of the public in its enterprises, which are essentially sound 
and profitable. Such widespread participation tends to the dissemination of 
knowledge of the needs and achievements of industry. Such knowledge 
cannot fall to be helpful in furthering a mutual understanding between 
business and the public in general. (Bankers see an era of long prosperity, 
1925, p. 4) 
 
The praises for the financial industry came at a time during the peak years of economic 
prosperity during the “Roaring Twenties.” However, the discourse started to shift from 
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“Bankers See Era of Long Prosperity” in 1925 to “5 Bankers Called in Market Inquiry” 
in the early 30s.  
 As revealed here, the bankers were represented as valuable to the society. By end 
of the 1920s, a major theme arose from The New York Times article’s trivializing the 
deep-rooted problem of the economic crisis. During any crisis, the publication’s job is to 
inform the audience using facts such as numbers, dates, statistics, and the events that led 
to the outcome(s), but also possess the ability to formulate civic sentiments. Below, there 
are four major headlines from The New York Times that trivialized the market’s horrid 
performances around the time of “Black Tuesday.” During the developing stages of the 
market crash from October 25 to 30, a series of daily headlines emerged that promised 
optimistic conditions despite record losses. The major headlines from the paper states: 
WORST STOCK CRASH STEMMED BY BANKS; 12,849,650-
SHARESDAY SWAMPS MARKET; LEADERS CONFER, FIND 
CONDITIONS SOUND (The New York Times, 1929, Oct. 25) 
     STOCKS GAIN AS MARKET IS STEADIED BANKERS PLEDGE 
CONTINUED SUPPORT; HOOVER SAYS BUSINESS BASIS IS 
SOUND (The New York Times, 1929, Oct. 26) 
     STOCK PRICES SLUMP $14,000,000,000 IN NATION-WIDE 
STAMPEDE TO UNLOAD; BANKERS TO  
SUPPORT MARKET TODAY (The New York Times, 1929, Oct. 29) 
     STOCKS COLLAPSE IN 16,410,030-SHARE DAYS BUT RALLY 
AT CLOSE CHEERS BROKERS; BANKERS OPTIMISTIC, TO 
CONTINUE AID (The New York Times, 1929, Oct. 30) 
 
The headlines above disguises the core issues with false hopes of future recovery and 
exhibits the desperation by the mainstream press to avoid a financial panic that extends 
from Wall Street to Main Street. All four of these headlines are carbon copies as they 
commence the article by utilizing negative discourses, “Stock Prices Virtually Collapsed,” 
“Hurricane of Liquidation,” “Chaos in Wall Street,” and “Overwhelmed by Selling 
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Orders,” then proceeding to end with a positive outlook such as, “Business Basis is 
Sound,” “Bankers Support the Market” and “Sound Conditions.” The narratives of the 
article essentially takes the readers through the major transactions that occurred in the 
previous day ranging from massive sell-offs to causes of the market decline, and the 
uncertain economic outlook. Some articles ended on an optimistic note. For example, 
“The New York and out-of-town commodity markets also experienced a recovery of 
good spirits, which in many cases were translated into gains in prices for the day” (Stock 
prices slump, 1929). While others were pessimistic, “Failure aboard had diverted a 
tremendous volume of selling to the United States, and under these influences the market 
continued to sag until it literally crumpled of its own weight” (Stocks collapse, 1929).  
 Contrary to the reckless bankers during the Great Depression, Ferdinand Pecora, a 
Manhattan prosecutor investigated Wall Street’s phony banking and stock brokerage 
practices under the United States Senate Committee on Banking and Currency.  
According to Jacobi (2009), Wall Street sold roughly $25 billion of rubbish stocks 
investors during the economic boom; however, Pecora’s investigation was able to stop 
more than a billion dollars from falling into the hands of the financial crooks. Pecora’s 
investigation revealed the fraudulent culture behind Wall Street as they accumulated their 
wealth on predatory financial practices: 
The old regime of unlimited license may be said to have definitely come 
to an end. The testimony had brought to light a shocking corruption in our 
banking system. A widespread repudiation of old-fashioned standards of 
honest and fair dealing in the creation and sale of securities and merciless 
exploitation of the vicious possibilities of intricate corporate chicanery. 
The public had been deeply aroused by the spectacle of cynical disregard 
of fiduciary duty on the part of many of its most respected leaders of 
directors, who conveniently subordinated their official obligations to an 
avid pursuit of personal gain; of great banks, which combined the 
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functions of a bank with those of a stock jobber, of supposedly impartial 
public markets for the sale of securities, actually operated as private clubs 
for the individuals benefit for their members. (Jacobi, 2009) 
 
To change the landscape of the United States financial system, Ferdinand Pecora’s 
investigative report candidly exposed the financial executives that indulged themselves in 
pursuit of personal profits. The abuse of power and wealth among the Wall Street bankers 
empowered the public to advocate for systemic changes based on regulatory structures. 
Overall, Pecora’s audacity to confront these bankers for financial fraud helped emerge 
Pecora as a hero during the Great Depression. 
 
Theme One: High Praises, Heroes and Lies during the Present Crisis 
 
Lies were not a dominant theme in The New York Times and Wall Street Journal 
coverage of the 2007-2009 crises. Instead of emphasizing duplicity, the news reports 
emphasized complexity and systemic risks. Heroic government figures were featured in 
these reports as technocratic saviors of the system. Three agents stood out as the saviors 
of our financial system: Tim Geithner, Ben Bernanke, and Hank Paulson. According to 
media accounts, with hard work and persistence from these men, the global economic 
system avoided a “financial Armageddon.” The executives of the financial firms 
implicated in causing the crisis were not represented as criminals, but rather were 
represented as risk-seekers who handed over their companies to dangerous quantitative 
analysts. 
 During the contemporary era, bankers may not have received the highest praises; 
however, powerful policymakers and central bankers in Washington such as Tim 
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Geithner (New York Fed), Hank Paulson (Secretary of Treasury), and Ben Bernanke 
(Chairman of Fed) received some of the highest praises for their heroic efforts during the 
2008 economic turmoil. After the collapse of investment bank, Lehman Brothers, 
Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson organized a $700 billion bailout plan to “rescue” the 
financial sector from a complete annihilation.   
The $700 billion financial rescue that Congress votes on today must surely 
rank as the least popular legislation in modern times. And yet it deserve a 
pass because in reality it is an attempt to shield middle America from 
further harm caused by the mistakes of Wall Street and Washington. 
Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson’s plan should do some good, and if 
executed properly shouldn’t cost taxpayers anything close to its $700 
billion showroom price. (A main street rescue, 2008) 
 
Although, the article stated, “it shouldn’t cost taxpayers anything,” large bulk of the 
bailout money came from the taxpayers to relieve the troubled financial institutions. The 
American International Group Inc (AIG), one of the world’s largest financial institutions 
devised a bailout plan with the chairman of the New York Fed, Tim Geithner:  
Mr. Geithner was the driving force behind the government takeover of 
insurance giant AIG –that has had to be rescued with more taxpayer 
capital. The most frustrating part of the AIG episode has been the New 
York Fed’s lack of transparency, both about the nature of the “systemic 
risk” that required the takeover and why it was superior to bankruptcy. 
(Secretary of bailouts, 2008) 
 
The totality of “rescuing” AIG approximately reached $150 to $180 billion of taxpayers’ 
money. The article begs the question, “why was AIG the exception over other financial 
institutions such as Lehman Brothers that went under?” The lack of transparency by 
Geithner and the New York Fed displayed that they were willing to inject large sums of 
capital to keep AIG afloat over other financial institutions that failed. Geithner’s financial 
 78 
 
decisions gained considerable attraction as he left the New York Fed to succeed Hank 
Paulson as the new United States Secretary of Treasury under President Obama: 
Mr. Geithner gained respect among Wall Street chiefs over the past year 
for his hands-on role in the credit crisis. For instance, he was instrumental 
in engineering the government-assisted rescue of Bear Stearns. Mr. 
Geithner was one of the first officials to warn about a financial instrument, 
known as a credit-default swap. (Weisman, Solomon & Hilsenrath, 2008) 
 
However, Tim Geithner was not alone in the grand scheme of “rescuing” the American 
financial system from utter chaos as Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke received high praises 
for his efforts. Originally selected by George W. Bush as Fed Chairman in 2006, 
Bernanke looked to maintain his status as world’s top central banker: 
As central bankers and economists from around the world gather on 
Thursday for the Fed’s annual retreat in Jackson Hole, Wyo., most are 
likely to welcome Mr. Bernanke as conquering hero. In Washington and 
on Wall Street, it would be a surprise if President Obama did not nominate 
Mr. Bernanke for a second term. (Andrews, 2009) 
 
In 2009, newly elected President Obama decided to nominate Ben Bernanke to a second 
term as chairman of the Federal Reserve. Despite the positive reputation on these central 
bankers, few politicians became skeptical of their financial achievements regarding the 
crisis: 
Senator Christopher J. Dodd, Democrat of Connecticut and chairman of 
the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, said in an 
interview that he would use forthcoming Congressional hearings to press 
Mr. Bernanke and Mr. Paulson to defend their decision to rescue AIG, and 
to prod the administration to do more to address the problems in the 
housing market. Mr. Dodd said twice pressed for assurance that the 
administration and the Fed had the legal authority for the bailout of AIG 
and Mr. Bernanke and Paulson said that they believed the Fed could aid 
any company posing systemic risk to the economy. (Dash & Ross-Sorkin, 
2008) 
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Senator Dodd’s inquiry on the central bankers that bailed out the financial sector using 
700 billion dollars of taxpayers’ money raised legal skepticisms, particularly on AIG. 
However, Senator Dodd’s questioning became a non-issue once Bernanke and Paulson 
justified the bailouts by using Fed’s monetary policy. This also communicated that the 
Fed can justify any type of monetary policy in a time of an economic downturn. In 
addition, one of the notorious Wall Street bankers, Jamie Dimon of JPMorgan Chase 
received high praises for his role during the financial crisis: 
Heroic figures have been a rarity amid the evils and embarrassments of the 
current economic crisis. Duff McDonald claims to have found one in the 
form of the chairman and chief executive of JPMorgan Chase. Mr. 
McDonald described the defining events in Mr. Dimon’s life and career 
that led him to become such a powerful force during the financial crisis. 
Mr. Dimon was “quite literally the only chief of a major bank to have 
properly prepared for the hundred-year storm that hit Wall Street. (Hurt, 
2009) 
 
As one of Wall Street’s top investment banker, JPMorgan’s Jamie Dimon holds an 
impregnable reputation as the investment bank grew larger during the financial crisis in 
2008.  
During a time of crisis, the populace seeks a hero to escape from heavy turbulence 
despite the repercussions. Media publications possess the discourse to manipulate or 
misinform the public that changes the entire complexion of the news story. The next 
section will examine the second major theme of criminality during the Great Depression 
(1929) and the Great Recession (2008). 
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Theme Two: Investigations during the Great Depression and the Great Recession 
 
 Once the stock market crashed in 1929, the federal authorities searched for 
answers to why the stock market collapsed during an era of economic boom. The U.S. 
Senate Banking Committee assembled a legal team led by Ferdinand Pecora to 
investigate criminal transaction involving the financiers. Earlier accounts tend to offer 
high praise to the financiers for economic opulence during the 1920s; however, the 
discourse shifted as disclosures of financial fraud became rampant in the newspapers. 
During the 1930s, The New York Times extensively covered the financial allegations 
involving Charles Mitchell of National City Bank, the second largest bank at the time for 
speculation and reckless securities. The widespread reporting made an example out of 
Charles Mitchell as one of the key figures responsible for the Great Depression.  
However, newspaper publications during the current crisis reluctantly mention the 
high-level banking executives that may have been responsible for the crisis. Instead of an 
assemblage of federal prosecutors similar to the Pecora Commission in 1932, the 
contemporary articles communicate a lack of resources, staff, and urgency to hunt down 
the individuals responsible for the current economic crisis.     
 To expose the underlying causes of the financial crisis that triggered a shockwave 
of enormous losses from the banks to public and private sectors, the United States 
Congress called for an investigation. In 1932, the Senate passed Resolution 84, which 
was an investigative committee created by the United States Congress Banking and 
Currency to inquire individuals that participated in financial fraud. The investigation was 
originally formulated under a Republican-dominated Senate Committee; however, after a 
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year of little progress, the committee decided to employ an assistant district attorney 
named Ferdinand Pecora (Moyers, 2009).  
Criminality during the Great Depression (1929) 
 
 In 1933, The New York Times published various articles regarding National City Bank 
and their involvement relating to the sales of insurance and securities. The article claimed six 
members of National City Bank were scheduled to be subpoenaed including the chairman, 
Charles Mitchell. The article described Mitchell’s testimony regarding his involvement in the 
manipulation of Anaconda Copper Company (5 bankers called in market inquiry, p. 26). The 
New York Times covered the investigation and reported on findings. One article is particularly 
noteworthy for its critical discussion of investigative findings, “National City Sold Bank Stock 
Short During 1929 Boom.” The article cites testimony by National City Company’s President 
Hugh B. Baker that the company sold 1,359,000 shares of National City Bank’s stock prior to the 
crash. The outlined three major actions caused by the National City:  
(1) Assuming the successful outcome of the proposed merger of the Farmers 
Loan and Trust Company with the National City Bank, the National City 
company sold short, at least ‘technically,’ on a large number of shares of the 
bank’s stock and borrowed 30,000 shares from Charles E. Mitchell chairman 
of the boards of both National City institutions. 
(2) The National City Company gave the brokerage firm of Dominick & 
Dominick a gratuitous option on 32,000 shares of National City Bank 
stock at prices substantially below those prevailing at the time of the 
agreement, which yielded a profit of $354,088 to the brokerage firm. 
(3) Hugh B. Baker borrowed $75,000 in the form of 1,500 shares of 
National City Bank stock from the bank’s purchasing plan and turned 
it over to a brother to support the position of the latter’s partnership in 
a brokerage house which had been imperiled by the stock market 
collapse. (National city sold bank stock short during 1929 boom, 1933, 
p. 1) 
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The excerpts above described some of the monetary transactions committed by the 
National City Bank during the time of “Black Tuesday” that provided the federal 
prosecutors with evidence of their shady business dealings.   
 Known as one of the notorious bankers of the early twentieth century, the legal 
battle between Charles Mitchell of The National City Bank and prosecutor Ferdinand 
Pecora steadily revealed the financial corruption that contributed to the economic 
downturn. An article by The New York Times published on May 3, 1934, titled, “Mitchell 
Denies Income Tax Fraud (1934, p. 11)” detailed his alleged crimes starting with 8,500 
shares of Anaconda Copper stock purchased at $116.31 a share in 1930, but sold at $27 
and similar actions occurred when Mitchell subsequently repurchased the stock. Mitchell 
confessed that he organized the sale to write off the loss against his income tax and that 
John D. Ryan, a member of the National City Bank board, arranged the sale for him. 
Mitchell denied his awareness of John Ryan’s decision of repurchasing the stock for him 
(p. 11). In another article by The New York Times titled, “Mitchell Pictured as ‘Ruined’ 
Patriot” (1933, p. 1), it reported the details of the speculation behind Mitchell’s 
resignation as the chairman of the National City Bank and the National City Company.  
Lawyers for the government and for the defense delivered their opening 
addresses to the jury before Federal Judge Henry W. Goddard at Mr. 
Mitchell’s trial on the charge of evading payment of $850,000 Federal 
income taxes for 1929 and 1930. (Mitchell pictured as ruined patriot, 1933, 
p. 1) 
 
United States Attorney, George Z. Medalle accused Mitchell of deliberately defrauding 
the government and shifted the burden of his own taxes by the selling fraudulent stocks to 
his wife and friends and failed to report a large payment to the management fund of the 
National City Company. (p. 1). 
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 The investigation disclosed Mitchell’s devastating losses after the stock market 
crash in 1929 involving his personal income ranging from 25 to 30 million. Mitchell 
offered all of his property as collateral for a $12 million loan he received from J.P. 
Morgan & co., which was downsized to $6 million. This was enacted in response to 
salvage what was left of National City Bank (Mitchell pictured as ruined patriot, 1933, p. 
1). However, Max D. Steuer, a counsel for the defense not only justified Mitchell’s 
business transactions, but also painted the banker as a righteous man who is suffering 
from the effects of the financial depression as Steuer stated: 
Mrs. Mitchell could have sold at a profit while she owned the stock, 
except that Mr. Mitchell believed the stock would go higher and wanted 
her to hold it order to ‘make her fortunes.’ He repurchased the stock in a 
natural desire to protect his wife from loss. (Mitchell pictured as ruined 
patriot, 1933, p. 1) 
 
Aside from portraying Charles Mitchell as a noble executive who based his decisions on 
an immense false impression, Mitchell blamed the federal government for waiting 
approximately four years to prosecute him. In defense of Mitchell, Steuer claimed: 
“Somebody must be made a victim when mob psychology is in control. Who is to be 
made the victim, some underling? No, we need some big fish, so it’s Mitchell” (Mitchell 
pictured as ruined patriot, 1933, p. 1). 
Clearly, the tactic behind this particular discourse discredits the criticisms behind the 
banker’s involvement in the stock market crash. Steuer further added:  
Every man is honest and decent who used every possible legal means of 
reducing the total tax he may be called upon to pay. It is a recognized, 
absolutely legal, proper, and moral practice from every point of view. Mr. 
Mitchell has not, does not, and will not ever deny that his purpose in 
making the sale was to fix a loss on that day to deduct from his income tax 
(Mitchell pictured as ruined patriot, 1933, p. 1). 
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Nevertheless, the plea and justification of Mitchell’s actions from the defense counsel 
fails to hold in court as evidence showed his shady financial transactions between 
National City and JPMorgan & Co.: 
Charles Mitchell pledged with J.P. Morgan & Co., of 30,000 shares of 
National City Bank stock, which he owned outright against a credit of 
$12,000,000, out of which the Morgan firm paid for the first 28,300 shares 
of National City Bank stock purchased on that date, keeping the purchased 
stock as collateral. Mr. Steuter denied that Mr. Mitchell took the stock at 
the low price, saying that he took the first 28,300 shares regardless of 
price. The stock was bought at an average of $367, and Morgan’s paid out 
$10,600,000. When Mr. Mitchell sold the 18,300 shares to establish a tax 
loss, he sold to his wife in order to avoid throwing it into the market. 
(Mitchell pictured as ruined patriot, 1933, p. 1)  
 
Steuer continued to validate Mitchell’s actions by uttering the nationwide economic 
“doomsday” scenario: “If he had sold it in the regular way through a broker, the effect 
might have been disastrous, creating a nation-wide havoc” (Mitchell pictured as ruined 
patriot, 1933, p. 1). 
 Despite the justification from Steuer’s client, the prosecution fired back at 
Mitchell by expressing:  
Mr. Mitchell was placing everything he had at the risk of the situation, 
because he had absolute confidence in the United States and in the 
National City Bank and in the security market. The fact remains that he 
put up his fortune as a sacrifice for the institution he headed. (Mitchell 
pictured as ruined patriot, 1933, p. 1) 
 
Even though Mitchell appeared to be oblivious of his own company’s financial 
transactions, it is tough for anyone justify Mitchell’s dishonest financial dealings that 
greatly destabilized the stock market.  
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 In a published articled titled, “Mitchell Penalty on Tax Demanded” (1934, p. 20), 
the formerly disgraced president of the National City Bank, Charles Mitchell, came under 
heavy fire for tax fraud:  
Notwithstanding his acquittal on criminal charges of income tax fraud, 
Charles E. Mitchell, must pay the government $1,275,644 in taxes in 
penalties for 1929 and 1930, as it was argued yesterday with the Board of 
Tax Appeals in Washington. The government’s lawyers undertook to 
show that although Mr. Mitchell had an income of about $3,500,000 in 
1929, he paid no income tax for that year and that in 1930, with an income 
of more than 750,000, he also failed to pay any tax. (Mitchell penalty on 
tax demanded 1934, p. 20) 
 
In addition to Mitchell’s unpaid taxes, the prosecutor’s investigation of Mitchell’s stock 
that he sold to his wife turned out to be an illegal transaction.  
The sales of 18,000 shares of National City Bank stock, which Mr. 
Mitchell alleges he sold to his wife in December, 1929 was a sham sale 
and that former bank president’s act in claiming a tax deduction of 
$2,827,305 as a loss resulting from the sale constituted fraud with intent to 
evade payment of taxes. (Mitchell penalty on tax demanded, 1934, p. 20) 
 
To continue, Mitchell reached insolvency approximating an excess of $3.5 million as he 
repurchased the stock from his wife at the original price of $212. The prosecution team 
unleashed more damning evidence against Mitchell pertained to the sale of 8,500 shares 
of Anaconda Copper to W.D. Thornton on Dec. 26, 1930, at a loss of $758,918.25 
making the sale fraudulent. Mr. Mitchell’s failure to include his income tax return of 
$666.666.67 from the National City’s management fund in July 1929 also constituted 
fraud. (Mitchell penalty on tax demanded, 1934, p. 20) 
 About a year later, The New York Times released an article titled, “Mitchell Guilty, 
Tax Board Rules” (1934, p. 1) indicated the Board of Tax Appeals in a civil suit ruled 
that Mitchell must pay in 1.1 million in penalties and taxes (Mitchell Guilty, Tax Board 
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Rules, 1934, p. 1). Despite his criminal charges of failing to pay his income taxes in 1933, 
“The tax board held that this did not bar it from finding fraud in the civil proceeding 
before the board. Conviction of fraud in a civil suit imposes a penalty equal to 50 percent 
of the deficient tax” (Mitchell Guilty, Tax Board Rules, 1934, p. 1). To simplify the 
financial fraud involving Charles Mitchell and The National City Bank, the article briefly 
formulated six parts explaining the ruling: 
1. Mr. Mitchell was guilty of fraud in claiming in his 1929 tax return a 
$2,872,305.50 loss on 18,300 shares of stock sold to his wife and later 
repurchased. The Board upheld the government’s argument that this was 
not a bona fide sale. 
2. Mr. Mitchell was guilty of fraud in failing to include in his 1929 income 
$666.666.67 received from the National City Company’s management 
fund, notwithstanding the fact that he subsequently signed a receipt 
acknowledging the money to be an overpayment subject to later 
repayment. These two omissions made his 1929 return “fraudulent with 
intent to evade tax” the board held. 
3. Mr. Mitchell’s 1930 income tax return was also made fraudulent by his 
failure to include $54,900 in dividends received on the National City Bank 
stock sold to Mrs. Mitchell in 1929. 
4. Mr. Mitchell actually sustained a loss of $758,918.25 in 1930 on the sale 
of 8,500 shares of Anaconda Copper Mining stock to W. D. Thornton. 
This was the only point decided in Mrs. Mitchell’s favor. 
5. That acquittal of Mr. Mitchell by a jury in New York in 1933 on criminal 
charges of income tax evasion did not prevent the finding of fraud and 
assessment of penalties by the board in civil proceedings. 
6. That collection of the deficient taxes and penalties was not blocked by the 
statute of limitations, since fraud was involved. (Mitchell guilty tax board 
rules, 1934, p. 1). 
 
Despite the damning evident against Charles Mitchell’s failure to pay taxes, Mitchell 
escaped unscathed and ultimately led to his acquittal of tax evasion. 
 On June 24, 1933, in an article titled, “Press Tax Inquiry for Evasion Data” 
(1933), it explained that Charles Mitchell of National City Bank was acquitted of tax 
 87 
 
evasion, but the Senate Banking and Currency Subcommittee was determined to act on 
persistence on those who escaped charges of financial fraud: 
Congress has not been relieved of any responsibility because Mr. Mitchell 
escaped jail. Unwholesome income tax practices are encountered during 
the further conduct of the investigation, they will be disclosed. If they 
have the color of fraud, I have no doubt they will be prosecuted. But in 
any event, neither the absence of prosecution, nor an astute criminal 
defense, will deter Congress from taking legislative action to make our 
income tax laws equally applicable to – and equally enforceable against – 
all our people without regard to their wealth or the source from which 
their income is derived. (Press tax inquiry for evasion data, 1933) 
 
It was unbelievable that Mitchell was acquitted for his crimes, but the prosecutors 
remained optimistic, as they felt obligated to the public: 
The authority given the committee by the Senate to examine income-tax 
returns has been of, great value to our investigators in checking the 
reliability of evidence obtained in other quarters. When unwholesome or 
unethical practices were discovered, we owed a public duty to expose 
them and to call them to the attention of Congress for such remedial action 
as might be deemed appropriate. (Press tax inquiry for evasion data, 1933) 
 
In another scandal pertained to the National City Bank, former U.S. Attorney, Charles H. 
Tuttle decided to press charges involving fraud and misallocation of bank’s funds: 
The officers and directors not only issued false and misleading financial 
statements to conceal their abuse of office, bur employed funds of the 
bank to make loans to corporations of which they were directors. The 
officers and directors of the bank used the assets of the bank wrongfully 
for their own private profit. (Tuttle lays fraud to bank officials, 1934, p. 2). 
 
The unearthing of financial fraud involving Charles Mitchell and The National City Bank 
proved to be complex as it contained multiple layers of fraud from tax evasions to the 
selling of fraudulent stocks to misallocation of bank’s capital. Regardless of the 
prosecutions concrete investigation, the committee was in a desperate need of a lawyer 
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who not only possessed great knowledge, but also exuded great attributes of a stoic 
attitude, bravado, and gravitas against the bankers. 
 An article published by The New York Times, “The Man Who Will Question 
Morgan” (1933, p. 2) portrayed the New York prosecutor, Ferdinand Pecora as a 
maverick that possessed the might to resist the banking hegemony that corrupted the 
American financial system. 
It will be the first time in twenty years that the affairs of J.P. Morgan & Co. 
have been the subject of public inquiry. Within a week, he subpoenaed 
Charles Mitchell, chairman of the board of the National City Bank, and 
later wrung him admission, which caused him to resign and to face trial on 
the charge of evading income tax payments amounting to $858,000 in 
1929 and 1930. He also probed into the Insull securities crash and 
questioned Richard Whitney, president of the New York Stock Exchange, 
at the length upon the practice of the Exchange. Mr. Pecora has been 
delving into the affairs of the Morgan Company and other among the 
sixteen important private banking firms whose seventy-one partners hold 
996 directorships in the major part of the economic structure of the 
country. These firms he has defined as private bankers who make their 
own rules and are not subject to examination at the hand of any public 
authority. (The man who will question Morgan, 1933, p. 2)  
 
Prior to the Great Depression, the banking hegemony in the United States grew so 
powerful that it was inconceivable for anyone to picture these men in front of a Senate 
Banking Committee publically confessing to financial crimes that destabilized the 
American economic system.  
 Even though the Pecora Commission demanded financial justice that captivated 
the public, other cases of banking frauds involving the stock market crash became 
prevalent after 1932. For instance, some of the headlines read: “Banking Fraud Charged” 
(1932, p. 2), “Detroit Banker Accused Of Fraud” (1933, p. 7), “Gets 4 To 8 Years in 
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Banking Fraud” (1933, p. 13), “Bernardino’s Guilty of Banking Fraud” (1934, p. 22), and 
“Ex-bankers Guilty in Detroit Fraud” (1935, p. 21).  
 The sheer number of criminal and civil violations during the Great Depression 
completely defrauded the national and local banking systems in the United States. 
Despite news reports on financial fraud on an annual basis, the Pecora Commission 
scrutinized the banking hegemony that led to the investigation of the financial 
manipulations that took place before and after the stock market crash of 1929. By making 
an example out of Charles Mitchell of National City Bank, the allegations of financial 
fraud enraged the public, which ultimately forced the U.S. Congress to draft and 
implement regulatory acts. For example, the Glass-Steagall banking legislation was 
drafted in an effort to separate commercial banking from investment banking. Within the 
Glass-Steagall Act, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) provided 
guaranteed safety of deposits in member banks. The criminal prosecutions created a 
ripple effect of regulatory agencies that provided financial stability. Unlike the Great 
Depression, the second half of this theme focuses on the contemporary crisis that failed to 
assemble a meaningful committee to investigate Wall Street’s role during the 
contemporary financial crisis. Similar to the early twentieth century, the banking 
hegemony deemed to be untouchable in the 2000s. 
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Criminality during the Contemporary Crisis (2007-2009) 
 
The second part of this theme covers the contemporary crisis involving the 
discourse of criminality. Unlike the Great Depression, the prosecutors in the twenty-first 
century failed to criminally prosecute the top banking executives for their financial 
criminality. When the investment bank Lehman Brother filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
on September 15, 2008, it sent a financial shockwave throughout the global economic 
system. Similar to the Great Depression, corporations, firms and individuals must be held 
accountable for the atrocities of criminal exploitation. Instead of holding these entities 
responsible for insurmountable losses, the discourse drastically shifted from crime to 
normal growth of “risk.” In an article written by Morse (2008), prior to its final demise in 
2008, Lehman Brothers lost approximately $350 million when employees of a large 
Japanese trading company allegedly exercised forged documents and an imposter to 
boost capital for business. The alleged fraud seems to be one of the substantial cases in 
Lehman’s history: 
The New York based investment bank entered into with a medical 
consultancy owned by Tokyo-based pharmaceutical company LTT Bio-
Pharma Co. last year. The alleged fraud is unusual for its size and because 
the victim is one of Wall Street’s most venerated institutions. The episode 
of alleged fraud appears to involve early investors making money as they 
were paid from funds provided by subsequent ones. As far back as three 
years ago, other investment banks had entered into smaller agreements 
with the LTT Bio-Pharma subsidiary, but received their principal and 
interest. (Morse, 2008, p. 1) 
 
Shortly after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, The New York Times published an 
article expressing the prosecutions courage of “bumping elbows” at the grand level of the 
Justice Department:  
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In the investigation of the collapse of Lehman Brothers, United States 
attorney in three different jurisdictions – Manhattan, Brooklyn and New 
Jersey – have issued nearly two dozen subpoenas. Recipients include the 
chief executive, Richard S. Fuld Jr., and other top executives as well as 
Wall Street banks that provide research coverage on Lehman, like Merrill 
Lynch, and funds that invested in it. (Segal, 2009; Weiser & White, 2008) 
 
The discourse of prosecuting financial criminals is assuring to the public, but when these 
New York prosecutors failed to send Rich Fuld Jr. (CEO of Lehman Brother) to prison 
for financial fraud, they essentially failed to bring economic justice. Perhaps this may 
indicate the lack of legal accountability:  
The Department of Justice is missing important staff members. Former 
members of the Justice Department say that prosecutors and regulators are 
reluctant to act while the markets are in such disarray for fear of further 
unnerving investors and the public. (Segal, 2009) 
 
This is just one example of a government agency that failed to sufficiently organize 
evidence in order to bring economic justice. The CEO of Lehman Brothers, Rich Fuld Jr., 
was able to escape without criminal charges despite losing billions of dollars in investors’ 
money.  
 The New York Times featured a story on American International Group (AIG), 
one of the largest global financial institutions that inflicted self-harm based on failed 
derivatives, and poor financial risk-taking. An article written by Spitzer, Partnoy and 
Black (2009) posed simple, yet critical, investigative questions such as who knew what, 
and when? Who benefited, and by exactly how much? Would AIG’s counterparties have 
failed without taxpayer support? The authors do not accurately have the answers to these 
questions; however, suggested where such answers could be found: 
But we know where the answers are. They are in the trove of e-mail 
messages still backed up on AIG servers, as well as in the key internal 
accounting documents and financial models generated by AIG during the 
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past decade. Before releasing its regulatory clutches, the government 
should insist that the company immediately make these materials public. 
(Spitzer, Partnoy & Black, 2009) 
 
By evading to releasing the e-mails, investigators are prohibited from inquiring about 
AIG’s trade partners and counterparties from the large investment and commercial banks. 
In addition, the e-mails may explain how much information the board of directors knew 
prior to the economic doomsday: 
Why haven’t the Treasury and the Federal Reserve already made sure the 
public could see this information? Do they want to protect AIG, or do they 
worry about shining too much sunlight on their own performance leading 
up to and during the crisis? (Spitzer, Partnoy & Black, 2009) 
 
Nonetheless, why would the chairman of the Fed play such large role in protecting AIG? 
In a response to AIG and its troubles, Ben Bernanke stated, “AIG’s ‘irresponsible bets’ 
had made him ‘more angry’ than anything else in regards to the financial crisis” (Nocera, 
2009). AIG was represented as irresponsible risk-takers, rather than criminal fraudsters. 
The conflict of interest by Bernanke displays that the central bankers are willing to 
protect AIG at all costs, as Tim Geithner bailed out the insurance company at the 
staggering rate of $150 to $180 billion. The paradox in Bernanke’s statement is quite 
evident in lacking real condemnation of individuals like Joe J. Cassano, former head of 
AIG’s financial division who cashed out his money in retirement. 
 During the Great Depression, the United States Senate Banking and Currency 
Committee assembled an investigation team led by Ferdinand Pecora to investigate the 
origins of the Great Depression. In another article published by The New York Times 
titled, “Where is Our Ferdinand Pecora?” written by Chernow (2009, A25) advocated the 
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United States Congress to refer back to the Pecora Commission as an inspiration to 
compose a contemporary investigation for financial crimes.  
The moment calls for nothing less than a sweeping inquest into the twin 
housing and stock market crash to create both the intellectual context and 
the political constituency for change. Our current stock market slump and 
housing bust can seem like natural calamities without identifiable culprits, 
creating free-floating anger in the land. The new Congress has a change to 
lead the nation, step by step, through all the machinations that led to the 
present debacle and to shape wise legislation to prevent a recurrence. 
(Chernow, 2009, p. A25) 
 
 The latest financial crisis has caused infuriating public sentiments as our 
policymakers are urgently seeking for answers, so it is logical for our financial and 
political leaders to assemble an investigative committee similar to the Great Depression. 
However, the current system is so out of control that it may dilute or bypass any criminal 
investigations. In an article published by The Wall Street Journal by Davis (2008), “The 
World Bank’s in-house watchdog said the bank’s effort to set-up anticorruption 
commission and ethics codes to combat graft in developing nations has been largely a 
flop.” In another article by the same publication written by Rappaport in 2009, took a 
survey of 500 certified examiners. The overwhelming majority witnessed a rise in 
internal financial fraud in the past year (Rappaport, 2009, p. 4-C): 
The greatest increase comes from employees embezzling money from 
their firms, which includes all types of theft including pocketing money 
and altering inventory accounting. Fraud committed against companies by 
unrelated third parties or vendors also increased sharply, doctoring 
financial statement and corruption have increased more than 10% in the 
past year. (Rappaport, 2009, p. 4-C) 
 
As the financial system gets destabilized, increase in fraud trickles down to the lowest 
ranks of society as people engage in pocketing money to falsifying inventory. As a result, 
the expansion of fraud increases revenue loses for organizations: 
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In a weak economy, the window for committing fraud opens up. U.S. 
organizations on average lost 7% of their annual revenue to fraud last year 
– or $994 billion based on 2008 U.S. gross-domestic-product estimates – 
according to the association’s 2008 Report to the Nation on Occupational 
Fraud & Abuse. That is up from 5% in 2006, the last time the association 
published the report. Even as finagling goes up, most companies are 
cutting back costs and aren’t planning to add resources to prevent it. Most 
of the examiners responded that he companies they for also are cutting 
back staff, which often leads to a higher incidents of fraud. (Rappaport, 
2009, p. 4-C) 
  
For example, according to a report from The Wall Street Journal titled, “Mortgage Fraud 
Jumped 42% in Year” (2009, p. 6-D): 
The most common mortgage-fraud cases include misrepresenting income, 
employment history, debt, and assets. Mortgage fraud has represented 
about $1 billion in losses over the past decade as reported incidents comes 
as lenders raise credit standards to curb rising foreclosures. Many banks 
have been criticized for their offering up of mortgages without asking for 
thorough documentation. Critics charge the industry with being too lax in 
qualifying risky borrowers during the boom, which fueled an overheated 
housing market. (Mortgage Fraud Jumped 42% in Year” (Mortgage fraud 
jumped 42% in year, 2009, p. 6-D) 
 
Despite a low wave of prosecutions, some of the published stories from the heralded New 
York Times and Wall Street Journal provided articles on the federal government cracking 
down on financial crimes that positioned the United States economy under heavy turmoil. 
Here are few examples: 
Federal prosecutors in Manhattan have charged four New Yorkers with 
conspiring to obtain more than $10 million in fraudulent home mortgage 
loans in a plan that relied on former prisoners living in a halfway house to 
pose as home buyers. Most of the mortgages, which were subprime loans 
provided to borrowers considered high credit risks, are now in default or 
in foreclosure. (Weiser, 2009) 
 
It is encouraging to see criminals sentenced to prison for financial fraud, but targeting the 
“smaller” guys won’t affect the financial industry as long as the banking titans are 
protected from serious prosecutions. Although in a report by McKinnon (2009, 1-C) 
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stated a group of U.S. Senators issued a court order from large banks such as Goldman 
Sachs and Deutsche Bank: 
A Senate panel has subpoenaed financial institutions, including Goldman 
Sachs Group Inc. and Deutsche Bank AG, seeking evidence of fraud in 
last year’s mortgage-market meltdown, according to people familiar with 
the situation. The congressional investigation appears to focus on whether 
international communication, such as email, show bankers had private 
doubts about whether mortgage-related securities there were putting 
together were financially sound as their public pronouncement suggested. 
Collapsing values for many of those securities played a big role in 
precipitating last year’s financial crisis. (McKinnon, 2009, 1-C) 
 
The Senate deserves a credit for taking action, however, if Charles Mitchell of National 
City Bank avoided charges of tax evasion back in the 1930s, these large bank officials are 
well capable of escaping from legal charges as well. At worst, these mega banks pay their 
way out of trouble.  
 Even the FBI decided to investigate and hunt down individuals and organizations 
that diabolically utilized financial instruments to gain record profits:  
 The Federal Bureau of Investigation has opened criminal inquiries into 14 
companies as part of an investigation of the subprime-mortgage crisis. The 
probe is focusing on accounting fraud, securitization of loans and insider 
trading, among other areas. The FBI wouldn’t identify the companies 
under investigation but said it is looking into allegations of fraud in 
various stages of the mortgage process, from companies that bundled the 
loan into securities to the banks that ended up holding them. FBI officials 
say the bureau is working with the SEC, which has opened more than 
three dozen investigations in the subprime-mortgage business of 
companies involved in the underwriting and securitization of loans. The 
probes are complicated because of the sophisticated financial vehicles 
used to propel the mortgage-business boom in recent years. (Perez & 
Scannell, 2008, p. 3-A) 
 
However, the FBI is confronted with serious problem of experiencing a shortage of 
detectives, particularly in the department of white-collar crimes:  
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The number of mortgage fraud cases has grown so fast that government 
agencies that investigate and prosecute them cannot keep up, lenders and 
law enforcement officials have said. Reports of suspected mortgage fraud 
have doubled since 2005 and increased eightfold since 2002. Banks filed 
47, 717 reports this year, up from 21,994 two years ago. In 2002, banks 
filed 5,623 reports. Law enforcements agencies say they are overwhelmed, 
especially because investigating and prosecuting fraud can be complex 
and time consuming. (Leland, 2007) 
 
 The excerpts above mostly involve mid-level individuals that committed financial 
fraud. During the Great Depression, the U.S. Senate assembled a commission led by 
Ferdinand Pecora in an attempt to criminally prosecute the well-known bankers such as 
Charles Mitchell of National City for financial fraud, which paved a path toward 
regulatory acts. In contrast to the current crisis, U.S. Senate Banking Committee and the 
prosecutors essentially failed to set a precedent on criminally charging the big banking 
executives for their role in the mortgage crisis. Although we are seeing some legal 
measures by the prosecutors and the FBI, impediments ranging from legal barriers to a 
lack of sufficient resources equates to a lack of prosecution. The next theme will discuss 
the regulatory policy responses during the Great Depression in contrast to the 
contemporary economic downturn.  
 
Theme Three: Policy Responses during the Great Depression and the Great 
Recession 
 
 This final section compares policy responses during the Great Depression, which 
implemented regulatory acts in response to the catastrophic bank failures and financial 
corruption. On the contrary, the current economic crisis led to monetary policies like 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) that bailed out the large financial institutions, 
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such as banking and insurance for their malinvestments using taxpayers’ money. The 
former Chairman of the Fed, Paul Volcker, introduced a new regulatory act that bans 
proprietary trading, which prohibits financial firms such as banks from trading bonds, 
commodities, currencies, derivatives and stocks with the company’s own capital to 
generate large sums of profit. Proprietary trading may lead to gambling on property, 
complex derivatives, or any trade assets (Stewart, 2010). Despite an attempt to limit the 
financial hazards of risk taking, the lobbyists diminished the integrity of the proposed 
Volcker Rule by watering down its regulatory structures.   
Policy Response during the Great Depression 
 
 At the height of the Great Depression in 1932, the implementation of financial 
regulations brought stability to the American economic system. According to “The 
Political Economy of Regulation” (2002) by MIT, regulations in its broadest sense is a 
government intervention in market outcomes conducted through regulatory agencies with 
legislative mandates to oversee specific industries. Senators Carter Glass and Henry 
Steagall drafted the momentous Banking Act of 1933 that barred commercial banking 
from underwriting securities (Crawford, 2011). This financial legislation forced the banks 
to pick between investment banking that conducted securities transactions or commercial 
banking that holds deposits and loans (Crawford, 2011).  
 Dr. Edward S. Mead from the Wharton School provided his own analysis of the 
Glass-Steagall Act in an article titled, “Expert Analyzes Bill” (1932, p. 2): 
The Glass-Steagall bill serves to free an amount of gold equal to the 
government securities held by the Federal Reserve Bank, which gold can 
be used as a basis for new notes. The method is as follows: A group of 
member banks, joining together for this purpose, may apply to the Federal 
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Reserve Bank of their district for loans from the Federal Reserve Bank, 
secured by municipal bonds, railroad bonds, real estate mortgages or any 
other collateral, which may be approved by five members of the Federal 
Reserve Board, and Secured also by the joint liability of the members of 
the group. After these loans are made, the borrowing banks have a credit 
with the Federal Reserve Bank for the amount of the loan. They can now 
turn this credit into Federal Reserve notes to be used to strengthen their 
cash position to re-establish confidence among their depositors by 
promptly meeting all demands. Next, the Federal Reserve Bank to obtain 
from the Federal Reserve agent the amount of notes which it is called 
upon to furnish to these member bank borrowers. (Expert analyzes bill, 
1932, p. 2) 
 
Even Wall Street became intrigued and optimistic on the regulatory act. According to 
Lockey (1932), the Glass-Steagall Act stirred hope in Wall Street as they appeared: 
To be pleased by the fact that the sacrosanct character of the Federal 
Reserve Act does not prevent its alternation to meet a national emergency. 
Speedy passage of the Glass-Steagall bill by both the House and Senate 
was, from Wall Street point of view, the overshadowing event of last week. 
The central banking system will do more to hasten the economic recovery 
than anything else that has been attempted. (Lockey, 1932, p. 9-N9) 
 
Prior to Glass-Steagall, the Fed acquired these notes in one of three methods: commercial 
paper, gold, or fifteen-day notes of the member banks secured by government bonds 
(Expert analyzes bill, 1932, p. 2). Under the Glass-Steagall Act, the Fed is able to obtain 
reserve notes with securities along with United States Treasury notes. A year later, the 
U.S. Congress proposed the second wave of the Glass-Steagall Act that largely dealt with 
the American banking system. 
  Initially, the Banking Act faced adversities as members of Congress failed to 
reach a deal. On May 14, 1933, The New York Times published an article titled, “Glass 
Bank Bill Ready For Senate” (1933, p. 6) provided information on the banking 
legislation put forth by Senator Carter Glass and Representative Henry Steagall: 
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The House Banking Committee read primary portions of the Steagall and 
Glass bills today, but reached no decision on any controversial feature. 
The Glass and Steagall bills differ materially on one point, the proposal of 
Representative Steagall to allow State banks not members of the Federal 
Reserve wide opportunity to obtain benefits of the Deposit Insurance 
Corporation. Mr. Glass wishes to have the State non-member banks ask 
for membership in the Reserve to qualify for the insurance. (Glass bank 
bill ready for senate, 1933, p. 6) 
 
To satisfy the controversial demands, Senators Glass and Steagall were forced to make 
the necessary adjustments to pass the legislation. In an article titled, “Banking Reform 
Drafted” (1933, p. 1), introduced a compromising bill that satisfied the requirements for 
the Republicans and the Democrats: 
The administration’s banking reform bill, including a bank depositors’ 
insurance fund corporation. Senator Glass and Representative Steagall, 
chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee are jointly 
sponsoring the bill. The new bill represents a compromise between the 
views of Senator Glass, a conservative who opposes lessening the 
restrictions of the Federal Reserve System, and Representative Steagall, an 
out-and-out advocate of government initiation of guarantees for bank 
deposits.  (Banking reform drafted, 1933, p. 1) 
 
Senator Glass’s banking reform provisions entailed different components: 
a) Divorce of security affiliates within two years. 
b) Prevention of interlocking directorates between investment banking 
houses and industrial enterprises. 
c) Stopping payment of interest on checking accounts in Federal 
Reserve member and national banks. 
d) A possible prohibition upon banks lending money to their own 
officers. 
e) Authorization for State-wide branch banking where State laws 
permit 
f) Increase of minimum capital for national banks from $25,000 to 
$50,000.  
g) The President favors the plan in principle, leaving the details to be 
worked out by the two congressional banking experts. The 
President was represented as gratified by the apparent fact that Mr. 
Glass and Mr. Steagall have compromised their hitherto divergent 
views.  
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(Banking reform drafted, 1933, p. 1) 
 
Glass understood systemic risks that positioned the United States financial system into an 
extraordinary economic depression, so he had to propose radical solutions by placing 
restrictions and assembling new financial regulatory agencies in order to revamp the 
unregulated banking sector. Despite not agreeing to all accounts, Senators Glass and 
Steagall were determined to pass the regulatory act. 
 As the banking regulation took its shape, The New York Times published an article 
titled, “Roosevelt Favors Pushing Bank Bill,” (1933, p. 19) stated, President Roosevelt 
demanded a radical banking transformation that separated the commercial banks from 
investment banking activities: 
More rigid supervision of national banks: discouraging the use of bank 
deposits for speculation; separation of investment and commercial banking 
and barring the use of Federal Reserve funds for speculative purposes. 
Investment banking is a legitimate business. Commercial banking is 
another wholly separate and distinct business. Their consolidation and 
mingling is contrary to public policy. I propose their separation. 
(Roosevelt favors pushing bank bill, 1933, p. 19) 
 
In response to the regulatory demands, The New York Times reported the approval of the 
Glass-Steagall Banking Act. The standing vote in the House overwhelmingly passed 161 
to 6 and in the Senate as well (Bank reform bill swiftly approved, 1933, p. 1). The article 
praised Glass and Steagall for their historic achievement in the approval of the regulatory 
act.  
Senator Glass and Representative Steagall were warmly praised in their 
respective houses. Senator Walcott declared it was ‘one of the rare 
privileges’ of his live to have been associated with Senator Glass in the 
three-year fight for the legislation, while Representative Goldborough 
asserted that the name of Mr. Steagall should be ‘inscribed’ in an 
outstanding place. (Bank reform bill swiftly approved, 1933, p. 1) 
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However, not everyone was on board with Glass and Steagall. The approval of the 
banking regulation caused a tremendous backlash against the banking hegemony. Initially, 
the first Glass-Steagall Act was passed in 1932 during the final year of the Hoover 
Administration. In an article published by The New York Times titled, “Bankers 
Denounce Glass Bill’s Terms” (1932, p. 1), individuals who were well entrenched in the 
financial sector did not hesitate to denigrate the new regulatory law: 
Henry J. Haas, president of the American Bankers’ Association, and Allan 
M. Pope, president of the Investment Banker’s association, emphatically 
told the Senate Banking and Currency Committee that the Glass banking 
reform bill is deflationary in character and that it would be a mistake to 
enact it at this time. Without exception, each of several hundred of our 
association members with whom I talked opposed the bill at the present 
time on the ground that we are engaged in attempting to stem the tide of 
deflation, and have enacted emergency legislation for the purpose. The 
result of this bill would be diametrically opposed to such movements 
because of its extremely deflationary provisions. We are of the opinion 
that it would be a serious mistake to pass a bill at this time having so many 
provisions of a deflationary and regulatory nature, which would, in our 
opinion, cause withdrawal of a considerable number of members of the 
Federal Reserve System. We believe that its effect would be injurious not 
only to member banks but to the business interest of the country. (Bankers 
denounce glass bill’s terms, 1932, p. 1) 
 
The approval of Glass-Steagall sparked an outrage, especially from the bankers whose 
reactions were mainly negative. In an article titled, “Glass Bill Called Bar to Recovery” 
(1932, p. 31), the vice president of the Cleveland Trust Company, Leon P. Ayres testified 
in court before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee stating his concerns toward 
the financial legislation.  
American banks will suffer severely if the Glass bill is enacted into law. It 
is not wise to choose the worst period of the worst depression that we have 
ever experienced as the time to disrupt those parts of our banking 
machinery on which we most directly rely for the financing of 
reconstruction. (Glass bill called bar to recovery, 1932, p. 31) 
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However, Senator Glass countered the criticisms by stating, the purpose of the bill is to 
prevent a repeat of 1929. Under this bill, a national bank may gamble its head off with its 
own money, but it cannot recoup at the Federal Reserve Bank (Bankers denounce glass 
bill’s terms, 1932, p. 1). 
 The conventional criticisms from the bankers condemning the legislation 
attempted to salvage the old practices that contributed to the financial corruption prior to 
the Great Depression. Looking back, the 1930s era of regulations provided radical 
revisions to the American banking system. During the 1930s, Wall Street bankers and 
politicians sharply disapproved financial regulations (Fosner, 1933). Despite the overall 
negative sentiment surrounding the act, it did not discourage Senators Glass and Steagall 
from drafting the bill as Steagall stated:  
The bill was not written to please the banker. The bill was written to 
correct a state of chaos and disorganization in our banking structure which 
had its inception in the century-old conflict between the States and the 
national government with forty-nine legislative bodies regulating and 
granting special privileges to their respective banks.” The Result has been 
a competitive liberalization of bank laws which permitted unsound banks 
and unsound baking accompanied by losses and tragedies. (Fosner, 1933, 
p. 3-XX3) 
 
To address the vital principles of this legislation, the author of the article highlighted the 
central functions proposed by Senator Carter Glass, as he wanted to fortify the Federal 
Reserve System by circumventing the utilization of Federal Reserve credit for stock-
market speculations. The prevention for changes in laws pertained to banking, affiliation, 
and bank reserves. The other half of the bill drafted by House of Representatives Henry 
Steagall persistently advocated for a deposit guarantee, a proposal for insurance bank 
deposits (Fosner 1933). This created an uproar that it became the most debated clause in 
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the legislation. In a heated battle between the supporters and detractors, “The bankers and 
other conservatives protested vigorously. The American Bankers Association fought to 
the bitter end, even urging a Presidential veto to kill the provision in Congress, but it 
failed” (Fosner, 1933). In a brief explanation in relation to the Federal Reserve Bank and 
the Glass-Steagall Act:  
Bring many non-member banks into the Federal Reserve System. 
Temporary participation in the deposit insurance pool is permitted to any 
solvent bank until July 1, 1936, but after that time only member banks of 
the Federal Reserve System or those banks which have applied for 
membership may have the insurance benefits. The number of banks 
outside the Federal Reserve System, which cannot be regulated or aided 
by the Reserve authorities, has been a significant factor in the number of 
failures in the crisis of 1920 and 1929. (Fosner, 1933, p. 3-XX3) 
 
On the contrary, some valued the Banking Act in a positive manner praising Glass and 
Steagall. Prior to the passage of the regulation in 1933, the United States banking system 
was on the verge of complete collapse. The U.S. government suspended banking 
activities in majority of the states, barring citizens from banking transactions (Foner, 
2008). The New York Times published an article titled, “Controller Sees One Bank 
System” (1933, p. 33), citing financial expert, J. F. T. O’Conner for praising Glass and 
Steagall at the annual Minnesota Bankers Association.  
It was drafted by two of the ablest financial minds in America if not in the 
world. It will eliminate the disadvantages and expense of having two 
banking system serving the public. The duplication of bank examination is 
one item that shows how cumbersome our present system is. With both 
national and State governments chartering banks, there were certain to be 
too many banks in the country, and that was one great cause of our 
banking troubles of the past decade. (Controller sees one bank system, 
1933, p. 33) 
 
Within the same article, Minnesota’s banks started to experience its own recovery: 
“Twenty-eight of thirty-five banks which were not at first licensed have been reopened.” 
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To continue, he reminded the readers about the dark days when President Roosevelt 
declared bank holidays that barred banking activities: “Uncertainty, doubt, bewilderment 
was written in every face, but confidence and courage came to the rescue” (Controller see 
one bank system, 1933).   
 Although the Glass-Steagall Act promoted public interest that aimed to renovate 
the banking system in response to a near collapse of the American banking industry, the 
detractors remained persistently critical. Francis Sisson, the president of the American 
Bankers Association condemned the Banking Act of 1933 by advocating against the act 
stating he would, “ultimately force its own repeal in amendment” (Banking act 
condemned, 1933; p. 38). 
The one forcing commercials banks to give up investment activities, 
through bond departments or investment affiliations is a mistaken theories 
of the originators of the bill. Commercial and investment banking 
operations under the same organization are incompatible and that the over 
expansion of investment credit, which was a factor in  the ‘new era’ boom 
preceding the 1929 reaction was mainly blamable upon the investment 
activities of commercial banks. The most questionable feature of the act is 
the guaranty or insurance of the deposits. Guaranteeing of deposits, he 
added, had failed wherever tried in many previous tests, invariably causing 
weaker instead of stronger banking. The present banking law repeats the 
old mistakes on a bigger scale. (Banking act condemned, 1933, p. 38) 
 
Due to constant complaints against the Glass-Steagall Act, revisions were inevitable. 
Brought forth by one of the Federal Reserve Board member, Marriner S. Eccles, he 
proposed another Banking Act that was approved and signed by President Roosevelt in 
1935.  The act changed the structures of the Federal Reserve System to centralize the 
control of money supply for the entire nation (Banking bill wins favor as revised, 1935). 
This legislation incorporated changes in the Federal law. First, it created open-market 
committee devised of seven board members from the Federal Reserve Board and five 
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representatives of Federal Reserve Banks, warranted to regulate credit fluctuations 
through the purchase and sales of government securities in the open market by the 
Reserve banks. Another provision empowers the president to disperse the Federal 
Reserve Board and reconstitute the board as the “Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System” (Roosevelt signs new banking law, 1935). 
 It was officially signed and approved in 1935, but the revision of the Glass-
Steagall Act was proposed in 1933 in an article published by The New York Times titled, 
“Saving Banks and The Banking Act” (1933, p. 18):  
“The Glass-Steagall Banking Act of June needs ‘thorough overhauling.’ 
This remark had reference particularly to the deposit-guarantee clauses, 
which indeed, have already turned out to hasty and imperfect piece of 
legislation.” (Saving banks and the banking Act, 1933, p. 18) 
 
After the approval of the revisions, the president of the American Bankers Association, 
Rudolf S. Hecht called the legislation, “sound” as it was published in an article titled, 
“Roosevelt Signs New Banking Law” (1935, p. 19): 
Legislation of this kind is invariably the result of compromises and 
adjustments. However, the act as finally passed is basically sound and 
merits the confidence of bankers. We believe the new bill constitutes a 
forward step in constructive banking legislation and is a decided 
improvement upon the present system” Marriner Eccles who sponsored 
the revision praised the act, “In my judgment the Banking Bill now signed 
by the President marks an important advance in the development of the 
country’s banking system and the adaptation of monetary administration 
to present-day conditions and national needs. (Roosevelt signs new 
banking law, 1935, p. 19) 
 
The advocacy efforts on behalf of the financial sector by the American Bankers 
Association heavily influenced Glass-Steagall’s revisions as they endorsed the Banking 
Act of 1935: 
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Declaring that it is basically sound and merits confidence on the part of 
banks. The association’s approval of the measure was expressed in a 
statement sent out by its special committee on the act to all banks in the 
United States. Although many extreme measures pertaining to banking 
were introduced this session, none of those which threatened serious 
danger to sounds banking prevailed. We believed that, on the whole, the 
Banking Act of 1935 is an acceptable piece of legislation. (Roosevelt signs 
new banking law, 1935, p. 19) 
 
Despite the heavy criticisms from the financial sector, the Glass-Steagall Act (1933) 
downsized the banking sector through the separation of commercial and investment 
banks that brought stability toward the American financial system. However, at the 
conclusion of the twentieth century, the legislative branch in 1999 thought they could 
outwit the congressional members from the 1930s by deregulating the financial sector. 
This was not only a new era of deregulation, but it set the stage for the contemporary 
financial crisis. Once the crisis struck on September 15, 2008, instead of looking back in 
history by reinstalling robust regulations similar to the 1930s, the United States 
government responded by bailing out the financial intuitions by using taxpayers money.  
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Policy Responses during the Contemporary Era 
 
The second half of this section will primarily deal with the policy responses 
regarding the contemporary financial crisis. In contrast to the policymakers in the 1930s, 
the current group of legislators drafted and approved a massive bailout plan for the 
troubled financial institutions that faced imminent collapse. In other words, congress 
during the 1930s implemented regulations, while congress today paved over the crisis by 
bailing out the financial sector. Instead of downsizing the banks, the bailouts allowed 
large investment banks such as JPMorgan, Bank of American and Wells Fargo to 
consolidate with weaker banks, thus prolonging the infamous slogan, “too big to fail.” 
This section will discuss the mergers and bailouts of financial institutions involving the 
large banks, AIG, Freddie and Fannie along with the creation of the regulatory act call 
the Volcker Rule.  
 Prior to the economic doomsday on September 15, 2008, one of the largest 
investment banks in the United States, Bear Stearns found themselves in deep financial 
hole that required an intervention from the Fed and JPMorgan Chase (Norris, 2008, p. 1): 
Bear Stearns, which boasts that it has never had a losing year in its 85 
years, was plagued by rumors that it owned securities it could not sell and 
that it might be unable to borrow enough money to hold on to the 
securities. Overnight, the Federal Reserve and JP Morgan Chase arranged 
to provide the cash Bear Stearns needed. Bear could not borrow directly 
from the Fed because it is not a commercial bank. The Fed had seen such 
problems coming, and had announced plans this week to lend money to 
major dealers in Treasury securities – like Bear – by taking in as collateral 
mortgage securities that are now hard to sell. The rescue of Bear is not 
permanent – the loans are for only a month – and there is an expectation 
that authorities will seek to arrange for Bear to be acquired, perhaps at a 
low price, or that it will be broken up and sold to more than one buyer. 
Bear stock fell 47% on Friday; all of the decline came after the rescue was 
announced. (Norris, 2008, p. 1) 
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The “robust” bank no longer possessed the financial flexibility to support itself, due to 
malinvestment of mortgages that severely paralyzed their abilities to perform any type of 
financial transactions. With Bear Stearns going up in flames, JPMorgan Chase aimed to 
pillage what was left of the rotting corpse that was Bear Stearns, thus initiating a period 
of massive banking mergers and financial bailouts. An article written by Eavis and Reilly 
(2008, p. C.1) titled, “Bear’s Fall Spark Soul Searching; At a Certain Point; Wall Street 
Firms Are Buys,” broke the news of the acquisition:  
The fire sale of Bears Stearns over the weekend highlighted the inherent 
risks in the business and how quickly a firm can come undone. Bear last 
reported it had network of about $11.7 billion and executives on Friday 
said that figure wasn’t likely to change much when the firm reported first-
quarter results. On Sunday, it was sold to J.P. Morgan Chase for $236 
million. (Eavis & Reilly, 2008, p. C.1) 
 
Prior to the JPMorgan Chase-Bear Stearns acquisition, The New York Times examined, 
why go through the trouble of bailing out Bear Stearns? (Morgenson, 2008, p. 1): 
But why save bear Stearns? As one of the biggest players in the mortgage 
securities business on Wall Street, Bear provided munificent lines of credit 
to public-spirited subprime lenders like New Century (now bankrupt), It is 
also the owner of EMC Mortgage Servicing, one of the most aggressive 
subprime mortgage services out there. Let’s not forget that Bear Stearns 
lost billions for its clients last summer, when two hedge funds investing 
heavily in mortgage securities collapsed. And the firm tried to dump toxic 
mortgage securities it held in its own vaults onto the public last summer. 
Recall, too, that back in 1998, when the Long Term Capital management 
hedge fund required a Fed-arranged bailout, Bear Stearns refused to join 
the rescue effort. Jimmy Cayne, then chief executive at the firm, told the 
Fed to take a hike. (Morgenson, 2008, p. 1) 
 
Poor financial history of toxic mortgage securities and playing financial hardball with 
hedge fund managers raised legitimate questions to why pump large quantities of capital 
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into a firm that is on a verge of extinction. In a statement by Bill Fleckenstein of 
Fleckenstein Capital advocated for the policymakers to let the investment bank perish:  
Why not set an example out of Bear Stearns, the guys who have this 
record of dog-eat-dog, we’re brass knuckles, we’re tough? This is the 
perfect timing to set an example, but they are not interested in setting an 
example. We are Bailout Nation. (Morgenson, 2008, p. 1) 
 
Instead of making a prime example out of Bear Stearns, the Fed opted to aid JPMorgan 
Chase in the acquisition of the failing investment bank, thus completing the merger in 
March 2008. Fast forward to September 15, 2008, the fourth largest investment bank, 
Lehman Brothers officially filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy, thereby triggering a 
widespread of bank acquisitions and mergers across the board. In an article published by 
The Wall Street Journal titled, “Bank of America to Buy Merrill” (Karnitschnig, 
Mollenkamp & Fitzpatrick, 2008, p. A.1) detailed Bank of America’s merger with Merrill 
Lynch, despite the dangers of inheriting huge risks: 
Merrill Lynch & Co. agreed late Sunday to sell itself to Bank of America 
Corp. for $50 billion. The deal, worked out in 48 hours of frenetic 
negotiating, could instantly reshape the U.S. banking landscape, making 
the nation’s prime behemoth even bigger. In adding Merrill Lynch, it 
would control the nation’s largest force of stockbrokers as well as a well-
regarded investment bank. The combination would create a bank of vast 
reach, involved in nearly every nook and cranny of the financial system, 
from credit cards and auto loans to bond and stock underwriting, merger 
advice and wealth management. (Karnitschnig, Mollenkamp & Fitzpatrick, 
2008, p. A.1) 
 
Bank of America made a risky purchase by consolidating with Merrill Lynch. 
Encumbered with more debt by the acquisition, Bank of America eventually begged for 
more capital from the U.S. government (Bank of America to Receive $20 Billion More, 
2009, p. B1): 
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Kenneth D. Lewis gambled on bold acquisition to build Bank of America 
into the nation’s largest bank. Two weeks after closing its purchase of 
Merrill Lynch at the urging of federal regulators, the government 
cemented a deal at midnight Thursday to supply Bank of America with a 
fresh $20 billion capital injection and absorb as much as $98.2 billion in 
losses on toxic assets. The Bank had been pressing the government for 
help after it was surprised to learn that Merrill would be taking a fourth-
quarter write-down of $15 billion to $20 billion, in addition to Bank of 
America’s rising consumer loan losses. With losses mounting in the 
financial industry, other banks may eventually feel compelled to turn to 
the government for assistance, and the program could to use for other big 
banks. Taxpayers could end up guaranteeing hundreds of billions of 
dollars of banks’ toxic assets. (Bank of America to receive $20 billion 
more, 2009, p. B1)  
 
By inheriting substantial quantities of toxic assets, Bank of America had no other options, 
but to seek for federally funded bailout money from the government, which was mainly 
derived from the taxpayers. Bank of America and JPMorgan Chase were not alone in 
acquiring banks as Wells Fargo entered the competition of bank consolidations.  
 Wachovia, fourth-largest bank holding company in the U.S. was another bank that 
came under heavy fire during the post-Lehman collapse. The New York Times published 
an article titled, “Wachovia, Looking for Help, Turns to Citigroup” stated (White & Dash, 
2008, p. C1): 
More banks might run into trouble even with a $700 billion rescue for the 
financial system, Wachovia, one of those hardest hit by the housing crisis, 
became the latest to reach for a lifeline. Weighed down by a huge portfolio 
of troubled mortgage loans, the nation’s fourth-largest bank by assets 
entered into preliminary deal talks with Citigroup, and extended feelers to 
Wells Fargo and Banco Santander of Spain. (White & Dash, 2008, p. C1) 
 
Once Wachovia disclosed their books on troubled mortgage loans, it suddenly became a 
feeding frenzy between Wells Fargo and Citigroup. In an article, “Regulators Push for 
Sale of Wachovia” (Dash & Ross-Sorkin, 2008, A. 15) discussed the auction between the 
two banking firms:  
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A sale of either Wells Fargo or Citigroup would further concentrate 
Americans’ bank deposits in the hands of just three banks: Bank of 
America, JPMorgan Chase and whichever bank acquired Wachovia would 
control more than 30 percent of the industry’s deposits. Together, those 
three would be so large that they would dominate the industry, with 
unrivaled to set prices for their loans and services. Given their size and 
reach, the institutions would probably come under greater scrutiny from 
federal regulators. (Dash & Ross-Sorkin, 2008, A. 15) 
 
Dash and Ross-Sorkin (2008) correctly forecasted the mergers that inevitably led to bank 
consolidations that grew even larger during the financial crisis. Instead of downsizing the 
banking industry, the opposite effect of banking cannibalism occurred under a lack of 
regulatory supervision. 
 Less than a month after the Lehman collapse, The New York Times published an 
article titled, “Wells Fargo Wins the War for Wachovia” (de la Merced, 2008, p. 1) 
highlighting the winner of the Wachovia sweepstakes:    
One of the biggest showdowns on Wall Street ended with a whimper 
Thursday when Citigroup walked away from efforts to block a deal 
between Wachovia and Wells Fargo, paving the way for a merger that 
would concentrate power within the American banking industry to a few 
firms. Citigroup, which mounted a whirlwind legal battle after Wachovia 
spurned its $2.2 billion government-brokered deal last week for a surprise, 
superior offer by Well Fargo, said it would continue to seek $60 billion in 
legal damages. Together, Wells Fargo and Wachovia will have $1.42 
trillion in assets, 48 million customers, and 280,000 employees. The 
combined bank will be present on both coasts in the fastest-growing 
markets, playing on the same field as JPMorgan Chase and Bank of 
America, two of the nation’s largest banks. (de la Merced, 2008, p. 1) 
 
The Wall Street Journal broke the same news regarding the banking merger between 
Wells Fargo and Wachovia reported by Fitzpatrick and Enrich (2008, p. C.1): 
Wells Fargo & Co. won the battle for Wachovia Corp. as rival suitor 
Citigroup Inc. walked away from compromise negotiations because of 
worries about the quality of some of Wachovia’s assets. Unlike 
Citigroup’s original agreement, the Wells Fargo takeover doesn’t involve 
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government financial assistance. A person close to Wachovia said 
Citigroup officials didn’t express serious concerns about the bank’s books 
until talks reached an impasse. (Fitzpatrick & Enrich, 2008, p. C.1).  
 
As mergers became rampant during the financial crisis, the regulators neglected to 
investigate the acquisitions as they abandoned their duties of overseeing the economic 
landscape in order to assist for the large banks (LaBaton, 2008, p. C10): 
Regulators at four agencies that oversee the nation’s banks and saving 
association on Monday and Tuesday proposed significant changes in 
accounting rules to bolster banks and encourage widespread industry 
consolidation by making them more attractive to prospective purchasers. 
The regulators and Bush Administration have decided to resort to further 
loosening of the accounting rules to try to get the industry through 
problems that some experts have attributed in large part to years of 
deregulation. The Federal Reserve announced that it had eased restrictions 
that had prevented regulated companies from transferring money to less 
regulated companies and more risky affiliates. That action would, for 
instance, enable one arm of a giant financial company, like the 
commercial banks of Bank of America or Citigroup, to move money to 
another arm, like their investment units. (LaBaton, 2008, p. C10) 
 
According to an interview on Moyers (2010) MIT economist, Simon Johnson weighed in 
on his thoughts regarding the outcome of the crisis: 
The big banks became stronger as a result of the bailout. That may seem 
extraordinary, but it’s really true. They’re turning that increased economic 
clout into more political power. And they’re using that political power to 
go out and take the same sort of risks that got us into disaster in September 
2008. (Moyers, 2010) 
 
Instead of downsizing the biggest investment banks in response to the financial crisis, the 
opposite effect of bank consolidations occurred involving the largest investment banks. 
On the contrary, the banks during the Great Depression were forced to downsize, as they 
appeared to be “too risky.” Instead of reinstating Glass-Steagall or a drafting a similar act 
that downsized the banking industry, these “too big to fail” banks became more 
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systemically risky. However, the banking sector was not the only industry susceptible to 
financial meltdowns as the housing institutions spiraled out of control involving AIG, 
Freddie Mac, and Fannie Mae. 
 The American International Group (AIG) is a U.S. based financial services 
company that was bailed out during the 2008 financial crisis, due to liquidity crisis when 
their credit rating was slashed from AAA to AA by Standards and Poor’s and Moody’s. 
These two credit rating agencies were concerned over the ongoing losses on mortgage-
backed securities. In total, it took the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve 
approximately $180 billion to bailout AIG’s liquidity crisis. 
 At the end of the 2007, The Wall Street Journal published an article titled, 
“Paulson Urges Congress to Act on Woes” (2007, p. A2), which encouraged the United 
States Congress to aid the troubled housing market due to subprime loans: 
After months of criticism that he hasn’t responded aggressively enough, 
Mr. Paulson implied that the administration was already doing all it could 
to stem the nation’s mortgage woes, which have rolled markets, threatened 
many homeowners and raised the risk of recession. The administration has 
repeatedly failed to use the tools at its disposal to protect home buyers 
from abusive lending, “ said Chris Dodd, who himself has been criticized 
for failing to act on a House-passed bill to expand eligibility for Federal 
Housing Administration mortgage insurance. Treasury officials are urging 
the mortgage industry including lenders, loan-servicing companies, and 
investors who own mortgage-backed securities to finalize a sweeping plan 
to freeze subprime interest rates. Interest rates on as much as $362 billion 
in subprime home mortgage are expected to rise in the coming year, 
according to Bank of American Securities. Fannie and Freddie said they 
need to charge extra to reflect higher default risks, caused partly by falling 
home prices. (Paulson urges congress to act on woes, 2007, p. A2) 
 
According to the reports, Hank Paulson was well aware of the destabilization of the U.S. 
housing market as he urged the U.S. Congress to immediately respond to the potential 
crisis. 
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 When Lehman Brother collapsed in 2008, it sent a global shockwave that 
originated in the United States. In response, the Bush Administration decided to propose 
an unprecedented $700 billion bailout package. The New York Times published an in-
depth article titled, “Administration is Seeking $700 Billion for Wall St.; Bailout Could 
Set Record” (Backer, 2008, p. 1), discussed how Ben Bernanke and Hank Paulson 
assembled the largest financial bailout in the history of the United States: 
The plan to buy $700 billion in troubled assets with taxpayer money was 
shaped by two men who did not know each other until two years ago and 
did not travel in the same circles, but now find themselves brought 
together by history. Mr. Bernanke told Mr. Paulson that it was time to 
adopt a comprehensive strategy that Congress would have to approve. The 
former Ivy League Professor, and Mr. Paulson, the hard-charging former 
Wall Street deal maker, launched what would be the government’s largest 
economic rescue operation in modern crisis, one that rivals Iraq war cost 
and at the time many redefined Washington’s role in the marketplace for 
years. The troubles were only deepening. Lehman Brothers had declared 
bankruptcy, Merrill Lynch had agreed to be bought by Bank of America 
and A.I.G. was on the verge of collapse. Mr. Bernanke and Paulson put 
together an $85 billion bailout of A.I.G. and presented it to Mr. Bush. 
(Backer, 2008, p. 1) 
 
Instead of promoting stringent regulations, the policymakers’ response to the financial 
implosion was to bailout the institutions that were on a verge of complete collapse. 
According to Paletta et al. (2008, p. A1), shares of AIG, tumbled more than 30%. The 
rating agency, Standard & Poor’s threatened to downgrade its credit ratings on AIG due 
to plummeting share prices and the increasing yield on its debt instruments (Paletta et al., 
2008, p. A1). 
 Roughly, two days after Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the 
U.S. government decided to initiate the first round of bailouts for AIG. An article written 
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by Karnitschnig et al., (2008, p. A1) titled, “U.S. To Take Over AIG in $85 Billion 
Bailout,” explained some of the details behind AIG’s bailout: 
This time, the government decided AIG truly was too big to fail. The U.S. 
government seized control of American International Group Inc. – one of 
the world’s biggest insurers – in an $85 billion deal that signaled the 
intensity of its concerns about the danger a collapse could pose to the 
financial system. The Fed will lend up to $85 billion to AIG, and the U.S. 
government will effectively get a 79.9% equity stake in the insurer in the 
form of warrants called equity participation notes. Two-year loan will 
carry an interest rate of Libor plus 8.5 percentage points. The federal 
government concluded it would be catastrophic to allow the insurer to fail. 
Banks and mutual funds are major holders of AIGs debt and could take a 
hit if the insurer were to default. AIG was a major seller of “credit-default 
swaps,” essentially insurance against default on assets tied to corporate 
debt and mortgage securities. As the housing market crumbled, the value 
of those contracts has dropped sharply, driving $18 billion in losses over 
the past three quarters and forcing AIG to put up billions of dollars in 
collateral. (Karnitschnig et al., 2008, p. A1) 
 
The sheer monstrosity of capital that took to bailout AIG using taxpayers’ money 
exposed the deep-rooted malinvestments and false promises AIG freely loaned out during 
the economic “boom” prior to the crisis.  
 With a controversial plan of bailing out these financial institutions like AIG, the 
opinions across the board were mixed. In an article by The Wall Street Journal written by 
Ng and Pleven (2008, p, c.1) titled, “New AIG Rescue is Bank Blessing,” provided 
details on the bailout of AIG internationally and domestically: 
Banks in the U.S. and abroad are among the biggest winners in the federal 
government’s revamped $150 billion bailout of American International 
Group Inc. Many banks that previously bought protection from the insurer 
on securities backed by now-troubled mortgage assets stand to recoup the 
bulk of their investments under a plan by AIG and the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York to buy around $70 billion of those securities via a new 
company. These securities are collateralized debt obligations backed by 
subprime-mortgage bonds, commercial-mortgage loans and other assets. 
Banks in the U.S., Europe, and Canada bought credit-default swaps on 
these securities from AIG, which in turn promised to compensate them if 
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the securities defaulted. That enabled the banks to pry roughly $35 billion 
in collateral from AIG as a result of those declines and downgrades in 
AIG’s own credit ratings. The banks that have sought and received 
collateral from AIG include Goldman Sachs, Group Inc., Merrill Lynch & 
Co., UBS AG, Deutsche Bank AG and others. (Ng & Pleven, 2008, p, c.1) 
 
There were plenty of financial transactions involving the bailout of AIG as the 
government became the driving force behind the bailouts to “circumvent substantial 
losses” that potentially “threatened the global financial system.” According to Carlos 
Mendez, a senior managing director at ICP Capital, “It’s like a home run for some of the 
banks. They bought insurance from a company that ran into trouble and still managed to 
get all, or most, of their money back” (Ng and Pleven, 2008, p. c.1). 
 Regardless of the bailouts, a few people were not afraid to condemn the 
consequences of governmental bailouts involving large institutions (The bailout of the 
bailout of 2008, p. A. 16):   
The government has put taxpayers at risk for a staggering $150 billion, the 
objective should be to see an AIG healthy enough to pay back its 
government loans without allowing government ownership to further 
distort the insurance market. This is where the latest version of the bailout 
needs work. There are two typical outcomes when the government owns a 
controlling stake in a private business. Either Uncle Sam runs it like a 
government agency, layers it with lawyers and other process facilitators, 
and slowly erodes whatever value exists. Or the government runs it like a 
business and uses its unfair advantage in cost of capital and its ability to 
regulate to defeat the private competition. (The bailout of the bailout of 
2008, p. A. 16) 
 
According to Langley et al. (2008), others have criticized the AIG bailout plan in a 
different context of too much government intervention: “It’s not the government’s role to 
buy private companies, said Martin Feldstein, an AIG director and former economic 
adviser to President Ronald Reagan.” However, the chief executive for AIG, Mr. 
Willumstead was only left with two options, file for chapter 11 bankruptcy or accept the 
 117 
 
Fed’s proposal (Langley et al., 2008). In response, Mr. Willumstead opted to take the 
Fed’s offer. Portrayed as heroes of rescuing the financial sector, particularly AIG, this 
article frames powerful individuals like Bernanke, Paulson, and Geithner as tireless group 
of individuals working vigorously to “save” AIG (Langley et al., 2008, p. A1): 
Mr. Willumstead placed an urgent call to Tim Geithner, president of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which was returned Friday morning. 
He warned the Fed official of the coming liquidity crunch. Mr. Geithner, 
was enmeshed in the Lehman crisis, urged Mr. Willumstead to keep him 
appraised. Paulson and Geithner that evening were in an austere 
conference room on the first floor of the New York Fed’s headquarters, 
having assembled a meeting of Wall Street’s top executives. AIG had a 
desperate need for fresh capital but no clear way of securing it. At AIG, 
Mr. Willumstead was working through the night with bankers from J.P. 
Morgan and private-equity firm Blackstone Group to determine how much 
money the company would need. By next day, the amount of capital 
needed had doubled to $40 billion because of the company’s fast-
deteriorating real-estate related securities. Mr. Willumstead persisted: 
“I’m proposing a transaction, not a bailout. If we just get the Fed’s 
backing in exchange for collateral, I give you my work I’ll sell every asset 
needed to pay you back.” AIG informed that it needed as $70 billion to 
avoid failing. Representatives from J.P. Morgan and Goldman Sachs met 
all day at the Fed’s office, Together with Morgan Stanley, they evaluated 
AIG’s liquidity needs and, separately, the viability of a private-sector 
solution. Their updated conclusion: AIG needed about $80 billion. After 
the AIG board approved the offer, Bernanke and Paulson attended a 
hastily arranged meeting Tuesday night with top lawmakers, many of 
whom were stunned by the magnitude of the problem and the response. 
Mr. Bernanke “spelled out what would happen if AIG failed” and that it 
would “be felt across America and around the world.” (Langley et al., 
2008, p. A1) 
 
The summarized exchange between the CEO of AIG and the Federal Reserve provides 
the audience a perspective of these men working persistently to “save” AIG, as they 
refused to allow this multinational insurance corporation to file for bankruptcy even at 
the expense of using enormous amounts of taxpayers’ money. 
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 Several months later, the original plan of costing $70 to $80 billion of taxpayers’ 
money to bailout AIG insurmountably increased to $150 billion according to 
Karnitschnig, Pleven, and Ng (2008, p. A.1): 
The U.S. government reached a deal Sunday night to scrap its original 
$123 billion bailout of American International Group Inc. and replace it 
with a new $150 billion package. It gives the government an 
unprecedented role as an actor in the financial markets. The government 
would give AIG more money, including $40 billion from the U.S. 
Treasury’s $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program. The $150 billion 
in government aid consists of a $60 billion loan, a $40 billion preferred-
stock investment, and $50 billion in capital largely to purchase distressed 
assets, which are to be placed into two separate financing entities. The 
new package is a tacit acknowledgement that the original $85 billion 
rescue in September, combined with an additional $37.5 billion made 
available to the company last month, together haven’t come close to 
stabilizing AIG. Under the new plan, the government is expected to inject 
about $20 billion in to the securities lending vehicle, with AIG providing 
an additional $1 billion. The entity would then buy the illiquid securities 
the AIG unit holds, known as residential mortgage-backed securities, for 
about 50 cents on the dollar. (Karnitschnig, Pleven, & Ng, 2008, p. A.1) 
 
The early reports indicated that AIG’s bailout plan will not consists of taxpayers’ money, 
but those reports were too good to be true as the U.S. government made an exception for 
AIG at unprecedented levels. The extraordinary efforts to save AIG proved to be costly. 
Since AIG is a global corporation with millions of clients on the hook, the U.S. 
government spent at least $150 billion of taxpayers’ money to save AIG from bankruptcy. 
However, AIG was not the only troubled mortgage institution, as Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac found themselves in deep financial crisis.  
 In addition to the bailout to save AIG, $700 billion of TARP bailout money was 
also allocated to two of the well-known housing institutions that were on the verge of 
collapse. According to Andrews  and LaBaton (2008, p. 1), the rescue package for the 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could potentially be one of the most expensive financial 
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bailouts in American history, though it will not involve any immediate taxpayer loans or 
investment: 
Treasury secretary, Henry Paulson, who engineered the plan, would not 
say how much capital the government might eventually have to provide, or 
what the ultimate cost to taxpayers might be. Mr. Paulson said it was 
important to rescue the mortgage giants because a failure of either 
company would cause turmoil in financial in the United States and around 
the world. (Andrews & LaBaton, 2008, p. 1) 
 
Notice how Paulson used the rhetoric of threatening the entire global economic system if 
the policymakers failed to assemble a bailout plan for Freddie and Fannie. Whether 
Paulson is hyperbolizing the situation or not, it is an attempt to gain a tremendous 
leverage to force an agenda thought the public sector.  
 The New York Times published an article written by Ross-Sorkin and LaBaton 
(2008, p. 1) titled, “U.S. Rescue Seen at Hand for Two Mortgage Giants,” regarding 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: 
The huge potential liabilities of the companies could cost taxpayers tens of 
billions of dollars and make any rescue among the largest in the nation’s 
history. Shares of Fannie and Freddie would be reduced to little or nothing, 
and taxpayers could pay any losses on mortgages they own or guaranteed. 
Shareholders have already lost billions of dollars as the stocks have 
plunged more than 80 percent this year. Mr. Paulson had hoped that 
merely having the authority to bail out the two companies, which 
Congress provided in its recent housing bill, would be enough to calm the 
markets. After stock markets closed on Friday, the shares of Fannie and 
Freddie plummeted. Fannie was trading around $5.50, down from $70 a 
year ago. Freddie was trading at about $4, down from about $65 a year 
ago. With Fannie and Freddie guaranteeing $5 trillion in mortgage-backed 
securities, and a big share of those held by central banks and investors 
around the world, Mr. Paulson appears to have decided that the stakes are 
too high to take chances. (Ross-Sorkin & LaBaton, 2008, p. 1) 
 
The drastic downturn in mortgages and financial markets ultimately forced the Bush 
administration’s hand. The Bush administration and the Fed essentially overtook the 
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mortgage giants, and it placed the two institutions under federal control. An article 
published by The New York Times titled, “A History of Public Aid during Crisis,” by 
Schwartz (2008, p. 27) briefly discussed past government interventions and compared 
these with bailouts of Fannie and Freddie:  
The effort to save Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is only the latest in a 
series of financial maneuvers by the government that stretch back to the 
rescue of the military contractor Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and the 
Penn Central Railroad under President Richard M. Nixon, the shoring up 
of Chrysler in the waning days of the Carter administration and the 
salvage of the saving and loan system in the late 1980s. The closest 
historical analogy to the Fannie-Freddie crisis is the rescue of the Farm 
Credit and saving and loan system in the late 1980s. The savings and loan 
bailout followed years of high interest rates and risky lending practices 
and ultimately cost taxpayers roughly $124 billion, with the banking 
industry kicking in another $30 billion. Even if the rescue of Fannie and 
Freddie ends up costing tens of billions of dollars, the savings and loan 
collapse is still likely to remain the costliest government bailout to date. 
The S&L debacle cost upward of $100 billion, and the economy is more 
than twice the size today than it was in the late 1980s. (Schwartz, 2008, p. 
27) 
 
The Federal government managed “rescue” Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and it appears 
that the subprime crisis forced the regulators and policymakers to shove economic 
ideology aside and indulge these firms and institutions into a business of bailouts. 
 With history repeating itself in the current state of financial crisis and the 
increasing rates of inequality, one must ask whether these financial institutions (from 
micro to macro) are “too big to fail.” An article written by Goodman (2008, p. 1) 
discussed the current state of our economic landscape: 
In the narrative that has governed American commercial life for the last 
quarter-century, saving companies from their own mistakes was not 
supposed to be part of the government’s job description. The Bush 
Administration, which does cast itself in the Reagan mold, hastily 
prepared a bailout package to offer the government-sponsored mortgage 
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companies, Fannie Mar and Freddie Mac. The mortgage giants were too 
big to be allowed to fail. (Goodman, 2008, p. 1) 
 
To justify why the legislators decided to push for a series of bailouts, Goodman (2008) 
explained the perpetual global consequences of the mortgage crisis: 
Fannie and Freddie own or guarantee nearly half of the nation’s $12 
trillion worth of home mortgages, so the whole system of finance for 
American housing, threatening a most unfortunate string of events: First, 
an already plummeting real estate market might crater. Then the banks that 
have sunk capital into American homes would slip deeper into trouble. 
And the virus might spread globally. The central banks of China and Japan 
are on the hook for hundreds of billions of dollars worth of Fannie’s and 
Freddie’s bonds – debts they took on assuming that the two companies 
enjoy the backing of the American government. Commercial banks from 
South Korea to Sweden hold investments linked to American mortgages. 
Their losses would mount if American homeowners suddenly couldn’t 
borrow. The global financial system could find itself short of capital and 
paralyzed by fear, hobbling economic growth in many lands. Treasury 
secretary, Henry Paulson, announced that he government was willing to 
use taxpayers funds to buy shares in Fannie and Freddie – one that could 
ultimately cost hundreds of billions of dollars. (Goodman, 2008, p. 1) 
 
In addition, Goodman (2008, p. 1) presented the hazardous act of bailing out these larger 
than life institutions and the long-term consequences that may prompt complications 
down the road for Americans: 
They are going to raise the cost of living for every American. The 
government is debasing the value of our money. Freddie and Fannie need 
to fail. They are too big to save. Using public money to spare Fannie and 
Freddie would increase the public debt. The United States has been 
financing itself by leaning heavily on foreigners, particularly China, Japan 
and the oil-rich nations of the Persian Gulf. Were they to become worried 
that the United States might not be able to pay up, forcing the Treasury to 
offer higher interest rates of interest for its next tranche of bonds. And that 
would increase the interest rates that Americans must pay for houses and 
cars, putting a drag on economic growth. (Goodman, 2008, p. 1) 
 
As long as the U.S. dollar is the world’s reserve currency, the U.S. government will 
continue to engage in bailouts of larger than life financial institutions such as AIG, 
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Freddie, Fannie, large banking sectors, etc. The United States financial structure will not 
be allowed to crumble, just as AIG, Fannie and Freddie were all saved from the recent 
financial crisis. The reality is that the system has too much riding on the survival of these 
financial institutions. The policymakers from the 1930s and today vastly differentiated 
themselves in their response to the economic crisis. The creation of regulatory acts 
headlined by the Glass-Steagall Act provided economic stability, while the current 
policymakers today essentially paved over the monetary crisis with bailouts. Some critics 
argue that this style of crisis management can only result in negative consequences down 
the road. Although the current set policymakers neglected to pass stringent macro 
regulations, one man decided to propose an effective solution that would regulate certain 
banking transactions. 
 In response to the crisis, former Chairman of the Fed, Paul Volcker created a new 
banking act that regulates banks proprietary trading, which consists of transaction in 
securities and other financial tools for the benefit of the bank, rather than on behalf of 
consumers. The Volcker Rule establishes extra capital requirements on shadow banks 
participating in proprietary trading, and it limits banks ownership stakes in hedge funds 
and private equity funds (Mitchell, 2010). Although the regulatory act was proposed in 
2009, the financial lobbyist managed to weaken the act by advocating against it. Similar 
to the Glass-Steagall proposal, the Volcker Rule is facing similar scrutiny of potentially 
“stunting” the growth of the financial sector.  
 In early parts of 2009, Joe Nocera of The New York Times published an article 
titled, “The Risk in Money Funds” (2009) advocated for Paul Volcker’s advice of 
regulating the money market funds similar to bank deposits: “When push came to shove, 
 123 
 
they got government support. If they are going to maintain ban like characteristics, they 
ought to be insured and regulated.” Supported by Senators Jeff Merkley and Carl Levine, 
the Volcker Rule was drafted to regulate the banking industry: “President Obama 
proposed the Volcker Rule as the administration sought new ways to crack down on risk 
and size at financial companies” (Johnson, 2010). 
 When President Obama officially took over in 2009, his economic staff did not 
carry the strongest reputation for overseeing the damaged economy with a strong 
regulatory mindset. A New York Times article titled, “Starting the Regulatory Work” 
(2009, p. A30), it discussed the former Fed chairman as the only trusted regulator: 
Will Mr. Obama deliver? Without a clear signal from the President-to-be, 
the early signs are not terribly encouraging. There are no prominent 
consumer or investor advocates among his top economic advisors. Except 
for Paul Volcker, the former Federal Reserve chairman, there are no 
officials or regulators, past or present, who have distinguished themselves 
by giving early earning warning of the impending catastrophe or taking 
strong action against the excesses that were fueling it. (Starting the 
regulatory work, 2009, p. A30) 
 
Although the jury is still out on Obama’s economic staff, the author forgot to mention the 
former Treasury Secretary, Tim Geithner who is essentially Larry Summers 2.0. During 
the Clinton Administration, Larry Summers heavily advocated for the deregulation of the 
financial industry and he was one of the main advocates of repealing the Glass-Steagall 
Act. Perhaps, it may indicate the direction of the U.S. economic policies. Throughout 
Geithner’s time in office, he never went out of his way to advocate for the Volcker Rule.  
 The Volcker Rule was an attempt to keep the banks honest from fraudulent 
dealings that took on too much risk. In an article written by Chan (2010, p. 1) titled, “Bill 
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Offered to Restrict Big Banks” explained the potential outcomes if the regulatory bill 
passed in U.S. Congress: 
The Legislation would ban banks that take federally insured deposits from 
investing in hedge funds or private equity funds and from making trades 
that are the benefit of the banks, not their customers, a practice known as 
proprietary trading. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley would probably 
be the Wall Street firms most affected by the ban, known as the Volcker 
Rule, but they might be able to shed their status as bank holding 
companies, to avoid some the restrictions. (Chan, 2010, p. 1) 
 
Paul Volcker advocated that the burden would be shifted away from the government, to 
the banks, using broad bans of classes of behavior: 
Implementing the so-called Volcker Rule, regulators should adopt 
something akin to antimony-laundering laws, where the federal 
government bans a particular behavior and then places the onus on banks 
to screen for red flags and comply with the rules. His suggestion: Bar 
banks from trading with their own funds if they benefit from any type of 
government guarantee, such as deposit insurance. Banks would have to 
police their own activities to make sure they are in compliance, with 
Federal Reserve examiners ensuring that is the case. Mr. Volcker’s 
concern is that narrow or prescriptive rules would invite gamesmanship on 
the part of banks and could allow firms to evade the rule’s intent. Already, 
some banks and their lobbyists are seeking to sway regulators and 
encourage them to narrowly define certain types of trading activities. 
(Volcker on his rule – keep it broad, 2010) 
 
Despite the financial lobbyists that strongly opposed the Volcker Rule, prominent 
financial figures such as John Reed, William Donaldson, George Soros, and five former 
treasury secretaries’ strongly support this regulation (Chan, 2010, p. 1). However, every 
regulatory act will leave a trail of blood for the detractors. Similar to the Glass-Steagall 
Act that experienced heavy fire for the advocacy efforts of downsizing the banking 
industry, the Volcker Rule has been subjected to similar scrutiny (Chan, 2010, p. 1): 
When Mr. Volcker and the deputy Treasury Secretary, Neal S. Wolin, 
presented the plan to the Senate last month, they were met with a frosty 
reception. Senators said, the rule would not have prevented the financial 
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crisis or saved companies like Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and the 
American International Group. They said the idea, as outlined by President 
Obama, was vague and difficult to enforce. And representatives of 
Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase testified that limits on risk-taking 
could be achieved by other means. (Chan, 2010, p. 1) 
 
Similar to the criticism of the Glass-Steagall Act, the financial lobbyists have trivialized 
the regulatory act as an insignificant regulation that fails to prevent catastrophic banking 
crisis and it would only serve as a barrier to U.S. financial system. Despite criticisms of 
the Volcker Rule, advocates continued to push for the regulation. One anonymous source 
called the regulatory act, “common sense” in an article titled, “The Volcker Rule is Just 
Common Sense” (2010, p. A.18): 
There is a direct correlation between the creation of exotic derivatives and 
the poor judgment that went with it, and allowing banks to trade. Those 
who complain that the Volcker rule will reach too far into every corner of 
the economy miss the point that the instability and Goldman-like 
dishonesty of proprietary trading has already gone there, so the fix must 
go there too. The Volcker rule simply reinstates time proven common 
sense to the system. (The Volcker rule is just common sense, 2010, p. 
A.18) 
 
However, the advocates appear to be irrelevant when Wall Street and large banks feel 
threatened by any sign of regulations. As several sources from The Wall Street Journal 
and The New York Times have reported that, the banks and individuals have persistently 
lobbied against the Volcker rule, according to Lucchetti and Rappaport (2010, p. C.1) 
from The Wall Street Journal: 
Dozens of career regulators at the Federal Reserve, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, and the Treasury Department are facing off 
against bankers, lawyers and other officials at financial firms that want to 
soften the impact of the rule named after former Fed Chairman Paul 
Volcker, which outlaws trades that are not designed to meet near-term 
client demand or as a hedge. Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Credit Suisse 
Group AG, and Morgan Stanley have argued in meetings with Treasury 
officials that they should have wide trading flexibility when clients are 
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involved or when the trades are meant to manage risk. (Lucchetti & 
Rappaport, 2010, p. C.1) 
 
Goldman Sachs officials and its lobbyists will do whatever it takes in their own power to 
weaken any financial reforms, even if they make a little impact on the economy 
(Lichtblau & Dash, 2010, p. 1): 
Goldman and its lobbyists have approached Senate Democrats directly on 
areas of particular concern, like the so-called Volcker Rule, which would 
bar institutions like Goldman from buying and selling for their own profit, 
rather than as a service to its clients. (Lichtblau & Dash, 2010, p. 1)  
 
Despite the conflict between the financial sector and Paul Volcker, some believe that the 
Volcker Rule will not be fully implemented due to the strenuous process of thoroughly 
reviewing the legality of the legislation (Why Wall Street May Love a Punishing Election, 
2010): “Some Volcker Rule provisions won’t be implemented for 12 years, and it could 
take 15 months before a study is completed and final rules are issued.” 
 Unlike Glass-Steagall that was approved on several occasion, the fate of the 
Volcker Rule seems to be turning its ugly head as the lobbyists completely trivialized the 
significance of its regulatory powers. 
 On February 10, 2010, Paul Volcker attended the Senate Banking Committee to 
discuss his regulatory act, but his ideas were quickly squandered (Weidner, 2010): 
It died Tuesday before the Senate Banking Committee from unnatural and 
illogical causes: the finance lobby, obstruction, fear-mongering and plain 
ignorance. Too bad for all of us, his prescription for reform will be 
discarded like loan underwriting standards for a multi-family home near 
Las Vegas. Mr. Volcker’s testimony was at once a brilliant articulation of 
the structural dangers of Wall Street as it stands and a forceful warning. 
He clarified the most controversial part of the rule, the ban on proprietary 
trading for commercial banks. But given the reaction of committee 
members, the Volcker Rule appears to be doomed. By the end of his 
testimony the dais was nearly empty, big bank stocks rallied. The only 
question now is whether the bill will be gutted or euthanized like failed 
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investment banks would have been under the Volcker plan. (Weidner, 
2010) 
 
Unlike the Great Depression, the half-hearted reaction from the committee truly reveals 
the lack of interest in passing any forms of financial regulations. Some of those who 
advocate for financial reform are in full support of implementing the Volcker Rule, while 
others that are old-fashioned are in support of reviving the Glass-Steagall Act. An article 
written by Thomas (2010) titled, “Bring Back Glass-Steagall; Banks that Behave Like 
Hedge Funds Don’t Deserve Guarantees” discussed his advocacy efforts of resurrecting 
the abolished act: 
Senators Maria Cantwell and John McCain proposed a measure that would 
revive parts of the old Glass-Steagall Act, the 1933 law that separated 
investment from commercial banking. After having been diluted many 
times over the years, Glass-Steagall was largely repealed in 1999, 
permitting a wave of consolidation in the financial industry. Nobel 
laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz has argued that the repeal of Glass-
Steagall had an “especial role” in making the financial calamity of 2008 
possible. Former Fed Chairman Paul Volcker, currently the head of the 
President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board, has called for a new 
separation between commercial banking and riskier financial activities. 
Today, we begin to debate Glass-Steagall all over again……to re-regulate 
the financial sector, the answer involves some version of the idea behind 
Glass-Steagall—drawing a line between banks that the government 
effectively guarantees and banks that behave like big hedge funds, 
experimenting with the latest financial toxins. (Thomas, 2010) 
 
However, others believe the current landscape of our financial woes has nothing to do 
with regulations and de-regulations as noted by Timiraos (2008): 
The problem may have more to do with management than regulation – 
indeed, top executives have been booted from the banks that posted the 
biggest losses. Banks have struggled to eliminate blind spots for risk, in 
part because banks have grown so large. It’s so big, the leadership has 
been finding it hard to keep all of the pieces working together. No matter 
what any regulator or legislator does, financial markets will create as 
much risk as they want. (Timiros, 2008) 
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Timiros presents a great argument that these larger than life banks must downsize as the 
banking executives have tough time “keeping all the pieces working together.” Others are 
reluctant to support the Volcker Rule or restoring Glass-Steagall Act due to skepticisms 
surrounding the current economic corruptions as noted by Dixon (2009, p. B2): 
Glass-Steagall would not have stopped the current crisis. For starters, 
many institutions that have had trouble were not commercial banks. 
Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, and Merrill Lynch were investment banks; 
American International Group is an insurance company. All four caused 
havoc when they teetered or, in Lehman’s case, collapsed, any institutions 
that is too big to fail, even if it is not in the utility end of banking, requires 
some of regulation. Of course, lots of commercial banks have also gotten 
into trouble. Think of Citigroup or, across the Atlantic, the Royal Bank of 
Scotland or Switzerland’s UBS. One reason was that they invested in 
troubled securities. So it is appealing to think that they would have been 
safe if only they had not mingled the casino with utility. The solution is 
not to pick on one particular banking activity – like proprietary trading – 
label it as risky and quarantine it in some half-regulated purgatory. The 
better approach is to improve risk management across the industry. Many 
changes are required to achieve this, including compensation systems that 
do not encourage bankers to take excessive risks, but an essential element 
must be a regulatory system – ideally, a simpler one than what the United 
States has now – that requires banks to increase their capital buffers as 
they increase the risk they take. Given that capital is expensive, it will 
discourage them from taking too many risks, and thus, keep them from 
collapsing. (Dixon, 2009, p. B2) 
 
Banks and financial firms must be closely monitored from engaging in fraudulent 
practices and they must be prohibited from taking excessive risks. One of the real dangers 
is that if one firm experiences termination, it has the potential to drag down the entire 
financial system. In order to avoid that ominous scenario, the U.S. Congress must devise 
a plan to end, “too big to fail.”   
 The economic landscape from the 1930s to 2008 has vastly changed, while other 
factors have stayed constant. First, we see a commonality of false admirations during 
both eras for people that are praised such as the bankers that destabilized the financial 
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system and government officials using taxpayers’ money to bailout financial institutions. 
Second, the legal proceedings during the Great Depression actually pursued the core 
problems as they confronted banking executives for financial fraud, but the prosecutors 
during the contemporary crisis failed to criminally prosecute those responsible for their 
role in the Great Recession. Lastly, the lawmakers during the Great Depression managed 
to pass financial reforms such the Glass-Steagall Act that downsized the banks; however, 
the leaders during the contemporary era responded by bailing out the financial institutions, 
consolidation of banks and lobbyists worked to persistently abolish any forms of financial 
regulations. The next chapter will discuss the post-recession problems through the 
analysis of alternative media discourses. These financial practices are deadly as the 
mainstream press refuse to acknowledge the truth behind these corrupt practices.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SUMMARY AND ALTERNATIVE DISCOURSE 
 
 Chapter Five concludes this thesis with a summary of the arguments developed in 
previous chapters and then concludes by providing an alternative approach to viewing the 
causes, and management of the contemporary financial crisis. Chapter Five starts by 
reviewing the conclusions and arguments made in previous chapters. This review 
emphasizes the three critical themes from Chapter Four: (1) High Praises, Heroes and 
Lies; (2) Financial Criminal Investigations during the Great Depression and the 
Contemporary Crisis; (3) Policy Responses. The second half of Chapter Five will address 
the post-recession economic problems and solutions through the analysis of alternative 
media discourses. This analysis will provide an alternative outlook on the current 
financial situation, which is readily ignored by the mainstream press. It will be argued 
that financial “arsenals” such as the unregulated high-frequency trading (HFT), the 
outstanding derivatives market, and “money printing” (i.e. quantitative easing) are 
destabilizing the current economic landscape. 
 
Summary of Thesis Arguments 
 
 Chapters Two and Three analyzed the historical economic landmarks in 
chronological order involving governmental regulations beginning with the rise of 
laissez-faire capitalism starting in the seventeenth century. Prior to the seventeenth 
century, the standard European economic model primarily operated by the monarchs that 
established domestic monopolies, while funding colonialism abroad to aggressively seize 
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precious commodities such as gold and silver. The costs of foreign wars and colonial 
voyages were not pressing issues as long as the expeditions brought back the maximum 
amount of wealth at the expense of exploited foreign nations. Considered as the father of 
economics, Adam Smith criticized the hegemonic system of mercantilism because it 
mainly benefited the merchant aspirations of extending international commerce. Smith 
delineated the high cost of tariffs, duties, regulations that restricted trading and prompted 
higher standard of living. “The Wealth of Nations” was not an ordinary book as it 
radically shifted economic thought. His eloquent advocacy of natural liberty galvanized 
the minds of a rising generation, arguing that if individuals are left to their own devices, 
pursuing their own self-interest will generate a self-regulating and highly prosperous 
society. 
 Adam Smith published a book titled, “The Wealth of Nations” that advocated for 
the upmost economic independence, and he influenced a series of classical economists in 
France and England: Jean-Baptiste Say, Frederic Bastiat, Thomas Malthus, David 
Ricardo, etc. However, these men did not carry on the message of Adam Smith as they 
developed their own economic perceptions and models. Ricardo’s wealth distribution 
model is divided amongst the landlords, workers and capitalists. If the capitalists and the 
landlords are projected to gain majority of the profits, then the workers instantly lose out 
on equal chance of gaining wealth. Smith, on the other hand, focused on the co-existence 
that eliminates class conflict between the landlords, capitalists and workers. If the pie 
expands, all social classes stood to gain. This became a serious problem because the 
contrasting differences between Ricardo and Smith provided ammunitions for the 
economists in the 1800s that rejected laissez-faire economic policies in favor of colonial 
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mercantilism. In the 1800s, European workers failed to unionize and colonialism ran 
rampant in regions that were rich in naturalized resources in the Middle East and Africa. 
As the powerful European nations embraced colonialism abroad, the United States took a 
domestic approach in expanding its vast nations thought the expansion of railroads.  
 During the nineteenth century, the United States experienced substantial 
economic and corporate expansions. The rise of corporations in the post-Civil War era 
was mainly modeled after the railroad industry. Although state governments chartered the 
railroads, they were initially subsidized by local towns to stimulate economic growth. For 
example, towns created lavish portraits of train stations to entice outsiders as an 
opportunity for a vacation destination. In 1886, in a case between Santa Clara V. 
Southern Pacific Railroads, the United States Supreme Court ruled corporations as 
“persons” under law protected by the fourteenth amendment. In addition, the U.S. 
government passed the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, which led numerous corporations to 
consume one another by undercutting competition. Originally, the law intended to sustain 
free market competition, but the act restructured corporate ownership, thus prompting 
market consolidations. The public often regarded the newly consolidated corporations 
during the early twentieth-century as unfavorable greedy monsters of society that 
hijacked the government and social institutions. To reverse the adverse public perceptions, 
corporations utilized a public relations (PR) strategy that commenced a new style of 
advertisement. It promoted the ideals of human understanding, sympathy, contacts, and 
relationships that convinced the public to immerse themselves in the modern company. 
The humanitarian public relations campaign efforts established the blueprint for the rest 
of the mega-corporations to renew their relationship with the public.  The rise of 
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corporations during the early twentieth century propelled the U.S. economic system 
toward new heights, especially during the era of “Roaring Twenties.” 
 The post WWI decade of the “Roaring Twenties” was characterized by economic 
prosperity that financially propelled the American business industry to all time highs. 
However, economic opulence dose not last forever, as prosperity often ends. Speedy 
financial growth and the rapid increase of consumption came to a screeching halt due to 
threats of overproduction and financial fraud, which inevitably led to the stock market 
crash of 1929. Presumably, the United States failed to comprehend the boom-bust 
business cycles of capitalism as the deregulated market and unsound governmental 
policies led to the outcome of substantial economic and social fragility. By 1932, the 
world manufacturing sharply plummeted by two-thirds (67%) and unemployment sharply 
escalated to over 13 million people in the United States (Chambers et al., 1983).  The 
situation became dire as quarter of the working population was unemployed and the 
banking system was facing utter collapse.  
 Although it is typical for markets to fluctuate, the Great Depression of 1929 did 
not occur by accident. The crisis was an accumulation of massive fraud that went 
unnoticed over the years, but there was one brave soul that volunteered to expose the 
individuals responsible by conducting an investigation of the financial industry. Known 
as the Pecora Commission, the inquiry commenced on March 4, 1932 by the United 
States Senate Committee on Banking and Currency to investigate the root causes of the 
Stock Market Crash. The Congressional hearings led by Ferdinand Pecora, a Manhattan 
prosecutor, famously interrogated Charles Mitchell, the CEO of National City Bank for 
promoting risky securities and fraudulent financial activities. In facing humiliation, the 
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financial sector squandered the public’s trust as their reputation imploded throughout the 
Pecora Commission. The Pecora hearings not only revealed the fraudulent financial 
practices, but the revelation of fraud forced the U.S. Congress to assemble strict financial 
restrictions. 
 In response, President Roosevelt and two members of Congress, Carter Glass and 
Henry Steagall, drafted the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933 that separated investment and 
commercial banking activities because commercial banks absorbed too much risk with 
depositors’ money. In addition, the act prohibited bank holding companies from owning 
financial companies. Glass-Steagall Act ended the inherent conflict of interest between 
the commercial banks (lending) and the investment banks (ownership) by separating the 
two entities; therefore, the law allows both investment banks and commercial banks as 
long as they are separated entirely. For instance, a stock brokerage firm could not own an 
insurance company or a bank and vice versa. Large financial firms, such as JP Morgan, 
were seen as part of the problem and were directly targeted and forced to cut their 
services. By allowing FDR’s New Deal program to integrate with the United States 
political and economic system, the era of regulated capitalism predicated on 
infrastructure boosted the U.S.’s global dominance at the forefront of the world.  
 However, capitalist productivity slowed as industry matured across the twentieth 
century. The United States experienced a stage of stagflation in the 1970s, which is 
defined as low economic growth and high inflation. In response, policymakers decided to 
abandon infrastructure-based economy in favor of a market-based economy. As a result, 
the United States experienced another round of deregulation. In order to repeal the Glass-
Steagall Act of 1933, the policymakers took several initiatives, such as reinterpretation of 
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the Glass-Steagall Act in 1998 when Citicorp and Travelers Insurance Company merged 
to form Citigroup. Under Glass-Steagall, this transaction was illegal, but the Federal 
Reserve’s reinterpretation of the banking regulation assisted the completion of the merger 
(PBS Frontline, 2003). 
 During the Clinton Administration (1993-2001), the Legislative Branch and the 
Federal Reserve gave the green light to banks to get deeply involved in investment 
banking, which welcomed the conflict of interest in these banks by pushing shady 
financial investments on investors who were oblivious to the consequences (Gupta, 2008). 
The final blow that completely abolished the Glass-Steagall Act occurred in 1999, when 
Congress decided to pass the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. By passing this bill, it gave 
control to bank’s securities firms and insurance companies under the common ownership. 
By abolishing the banking firewall that is the Glass-Steagall Act, the financial sector 
experienced a serious round of consolidation throughout the American economic system. 
The global economy grew at unprecedented rates, while the thought of an economic 
downturn seemed preposterous. However, this debt-fueled growth came to a crashing halt 
as the world experienced the second worst economic crisis in history on September 15, 
2008, when the fourth largest investment bank in the United States, Lehman Brothers 
filed for bankruptcy. This triggered a ripple effect on the system as Lehman acted as a 
financial anchor that dragged the entire system down into the abyss. 
 Prior to the crisis of 2008, the subsequent boom in the sub-prime mortgage market 
allowed numerous unqualified individuals to become homeowners saddled with 
outlandish loans made available by the aggressive financial institutions in order to line 
their own pockets. The government and the bankers created an illusion that housing 
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prices always rise. Meanwhile, consumer defaults on high interest loans seemed 
improbable because the loans could be forever refinanced (Galbraith, 2009). 
Unfortunately, numerous subprime borrowers defaulted when they were unable to pay 
higher rates required by re-sets on mortgage arms. Home prices began to fall with 
cascading foreclosures.  
Homeowner defaults threatened vast amounts of mortgage-backed securities. The 
collapse of mortgage-backed securities ultimately caused massive derivative defaults.  
AIG, a global insurance institution sold a kind of derivative called a credit default swap, 
which insured against defaults in mortgage back securities. AIG neglected to back these 
derivatives with adequate capital reserves. When the subprime meltdown occurred AIG 
was unable to pay out credit default swaps to their counterparties until the New York Fed 
lent AIG over $182 billion in bailout money (Nadesan, n.d.; Teitelbaum & Son, 2009).  
 Using taxpayers’ money, the United States government drafted and signed into 
law by President George W. Bush on October 3, 2008, a $700 billion bailout emergency 
package called Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) that bailed out multiple financial 
and housing institutions facing heavy liquidity crisis, such as AIG, Freddie Mac, Fannie 
Mae, and large banks. Unlike the Great Depression, the current crisis profoundly failed to 
discipline, let alone even attempt to prosecute, central figures involved in today’s 
financial crisis. Instead of prosecuting guilty individuals, the government created moral 
hazards for the financial institutions by using taxpayers’ money to bailout the financial 
sector. Despite the United States remarkably paving over the worst financial crisis since 
the Great Depression, our nation is still facing a daunting task of stabilizing the national 
economy. The state of our economy is highly volatile as post-recession problems still 
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linger today, from the flash crash in 2010 to the Libor scandal that manipulated the 
interest rates involving the mega banks around the world.  
 
Summary of Comparative Analysis of Press Coverage 
 
Chapter Four analyzed the discourses found in mainstream press covering two 
historic economic eras, the Great Depression (1929) and the Great Recession (2008). The 
articles from The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal were mainly derived from 
an academic database called ProQuest. The first major theme identified across the articles 
was titled, “High Praises, Heroes, and Lies.” This theme revealed media discourses that 
indicated a journalistic search for “heroes” during the dismal times of economic 
instability in the 1930s. Prior to the Pecora investigation, The New York Times provided 
headlines regarding the substantial losses around the time of “Black Tuesday.” To temper 
the negative press reports of the time, The New York Times framed the bankers as a voice 
of reason that encouraged audiences to remain optimistic. However, these headlines can 
also be construed as a discursive deception, which distracted the public from the 
hardships of the financial depression by encouraging them to believe that the system was 
being saved by prosecuting wrongdoers. The press has also manufactured heroes during 
the contemporary crisis. Three notorious bankers stood out in press accounts as the 
“saviors” of the financial system: Tim Geithner, Ben Bernanke, and Hank Paulson. 
According to mainstream media accounts, their persistence and expertise remedied the 
global economic crisis, thus avoiding an economic doomsday.  
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The media discourses of heroic figures saving the system may be propagandistic 
in that they offer reassurances to the public during tumultuous times, thereby facilitating 
audience disengagement. For instance, during the Great Depression, the stock market 
suffered a series of devastating blows, but the mainstream press greatly suppressed the 
scale of the economic impacts. During the 2008 crisis, the media discourses designated 
Ben Bernanke, Tim Geithner, and Hank Paulson as the individuals capable of stabilizing 
the economic crisis. Public accolades for Geithner and Bernanke’s “heroic” efforts 
extended their financial careers within the new Obama presidential administration. Yet, 
these so-called heroes may have actually undermined the scale of response required to re-
regulate capitalism.  
 The second theme identified in media accounts contrasted the nature of 
criminality involving the Great Depression (1929) and the contemporary crisis (2008). 
During the 1930s, the U.S. Senate Banking Committee assembled a legal team led by 
Ferdinand Pecora to investigate criminal transactions involving the financiers. During the 
investigations the media discourse shifted in an unfavorable manner for the bankers.  The 
New York Times extensively covered the case of Charles Mitchell of National City Bank 
for financial fraud, speculation, and reckless securities. The publication’s extensive 
coverage made an example out of Charles Mitchell for committing financial fraud. 
During the Great Depression, the press called for and documented prosecutions. For 
example, the press covered banking titan in Charles Mitchell of National City Bank 
public interrogation for financial fraud; thereby, triggering a compelling message stating, 
‘no individual is above the law.’ 
 139 
 
In contrast, the newspaper publications during the current 2007-2009 crisis were 
reluctant to mention the high-level banking executives that may have been responsible for 
the crisis. No calls were made for assembly of a team of federal prosecutors similar to the 
Pecora Commission. Rather, it can be argued that contemporary articles communicated a 
series of stories that rationalized the lack of systemic investigation and prosecution by 
federal authorities. Stories focused on the lack of resources and employees to properly 
investigate and prosecute the individuals believed responsible for the crisis. It was 
demonstrated that the culture and the discourse of criminal prosecutions shifted during 
the crisis of 2008 when the CEO of late Lehman Brothers, Rich Fuld was able to escape 
criminal charges for financial fraud. High-level bank officials escaped unscathed, rather 
than serving as examples of the universality of justice. Only lesser- known individuals, 
who were often women or minorities, were prosecuted and sent to prison.  
 The last theme detected in the media and examined in this project compared the 
policy responses during the Great Depression and the present crisis.  The Pecora 
commission led to a series of regulatory acts in reaction to the rapid bank failures and 
corruptions. By drafting and advocating for regulations in the banking sector, individuals 
like Carter Glass and Henry Steagall faced intense backlash from Wall Street and their 
colleagues. The heavy criticisms did not deter them from regulatory actions; instead, 
President Roosevelt signed the legislation and their efforts were rewarded once the 
banking sector stabilized. In contrast, during the current crisis, policymakers heavily 
lobbied for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which bailed out the large 
financial institutions, such as banking and insurance for sub-prime loans and investments. 
The current group of lawmakers abandoned the philosophy of universal justice and 
 140 
 
advocated for something completely different. This thesis suggests legislators have failed 
to address the core issues pertaining to financial frauds, deregulation, mismanagement of 
corporations, and accountability for the mishandlings large sums of capital.  
Although little has been done, many critics of the crisis have proposed solutions. 
Some have advocated reviving the Glass-Steagall Act, while others disapprove of the 
idea because the financial landscape has vastly changed since 1933. In 2009, the former 
Chairman of the Fed, Paul Volcker attempted to install a new regulatory act that bans 
proprietary (‘prop’) trading. Prior to Paul Volcker’s regulatory proposal on proprietary 
trading, mega banks such as JP Morgan Chase and Goldman Sachs utilized “trading 
desks” to engage in financial transactions for buying and selling securities with their own 
capital to generate profits.  The key element for the trader is to generate the most amount 
of profit by buying low and selling high. Whether the trader trades for commodities, 
options, shares, currencies, derivatives or bonds, they have the option to cover right away 
or later (Das, 2010, p. 60). Proprietary trading may lead to gambling on property, 
complex derivatives, or any trade assets (Stewart, 2010). On a broad level, the “trader 
desk” sold collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) based in debt-bonds to the customer 
desk; yet, the banks placed bets against their own clients with credit default swaps (CDS), 
predicting that these clients would default on their loans. In the critically claimed 
documentary, Inside Job (2010), Allan Sloan of Fortune Magazine described how he first 
experienced the world of subprime mortgages through a trading desk that revealed 
horrendous number of securities issued by Goldman Sachs: 
Borrowers had borrowed, on average, 99.3 percent of the prices of the 
house. Which means they have no money in the house. If anything goes 
wrong, they’re gonna walk away from the mortgage. Two-thirds of the 
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loans were rated AAA, which meant they were rated as safe as 
government securities. (Ferguson et al., 2010) 
 
During the peak of the economic “boom,” during the first half of 2006, Goldman Sachs 
sold over $3.1 billion of these toxic CDOs (Ferguson et al., 2010). This is one of the 
major reasons why the United States government decided to ban ‘prop’ trading. Under 
the Volcker Rule, banks are prohibited from trading their own accounts, but they are still 
allowed to hold securities on a short-term basis in relation to risk-mitigating hedging 
activities. In addition, banks are not prohibited from trading on behalf of the customer 
and government obligations (Volcker Rule as of July 10, 2012, 2012). In 2010, JP 
Morgan Chase and Goldman Sachs announced their decisions to shut down proprietary 
trading desks in compliance with the Volcker Rule. The elimination of proprietary 
trading comes at a heavy price as these two mega banks estimated losses of billions of 
dollars in annual profits (Kopecki & Chanjaroen, 2010). The original intent for the 
Volcker Rule was to prevent the mega banks from undertaking excessive funds with 
firms’ own capital, but Paul Volcker underestimated the power of financial lobbyists that 
weakened the integrity of the regulatory act. 
 Despite the attempts to limit the power of “too big to fail” banks, the financial 
lobbyists persistently diminished the integrity of the proposed Volcker Rule. Paul 
Volcker even advocated the benefits of the act in front of the Senate Banking Committee 
in 2010, but the committee did not budge. Several articles framed the Volcker Rule as an 
enemy to the banks because the rule sought to limit banking powers. In an attempt to 
water down the regulatory act, large banks such as Goldman Sachs and individual 
lobbyists, persistently visited the policymakers in D.C. to weaken the Volcker Rule. The 
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current state of the Volcker Rule fails to possess its original regulatory powers as it has 
been redrafted numerous times since its original proposal back in early 2010. The Great 
Depression (1929) and the Great Recession (2008) made it critical to implement a system 
of regulatory acts in order to protect the populace from financial frauds and blind 
speculative bets. Despite getting over the last recession from 2007 to 2009, the system is 
still impacted by high rates of volatility and fragility as regulators and policymakers 
continue to neglect the complex, risk-based financial transactions that are running 
rampant at Wall Street.  
 Chapter Four briefly analyzed the discourses of historic economic events using 
two of the most mainstream newspapers: The New York Times and The Wall Street 
Journal. The next section will shift focus toward the discussion of post-recession 
problems through the lens of alternative media discourses. Mainly derived from the 
World Wide Web, the rise of Internet amongst the populace provides nuanced 
information to individuals all over the globe. The alternative press offers additional news 
frames, shaping in alternative ways how audiences view and analyze information about 
the economy and government policy, among other issues. This next section will shortly 
examine the popular phenomenon of alternative media in relation to their coverage of the 
current financial crisis. 
 
Alternative Views and the Alternative Media 
 
 The concept of the alternative press is not merely a contemporary phenomenon 
amongst our society. It can be argued that the alternative presses have existed as long as 
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the mainstream press, due to dissenting views on social hegemony. For example, Johann 
Gutenberg’s famous printing press in the fifteenth century radically changed how the 
commonwealth practiced Christianity, as prior to his printing press the Bible was only 
available to the clergy (Karat, no date). The printing press was able to break the 
institutional hegemonic rule over the populace deriving from the priests’ exclusive access 
to information. Therefore, the alternative media enabled by the print press and more 
recently by the Internet help to empower people by providing information previously 
available to a selected few. 
 Alternative media outlets perform similar duties of disseminating information 
through the internet, magazines, newspaper, radio, television, etc. However, in 
comparison to the mainstream press, the alternative media do not command the same 
amount of prestige and reputation in the eyes of the populace. Unlike the mainstream 
press, alternative media are less likely to be owned by large corporations and agencies, 
such as GE and Comcast. Currently, the multinational mega corporations owning the 
mainstream media are perceived as the main drivers for biased and/or selective reporting. 
Let’s take a look at the past and present corporate affiliations of one of the most “revered” 
publications, The New York Times.  Corporate affiliations include Schering-Plough 
International (pharmaceuticals), the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, 
Chevron Corporation, Wesco Financial Corporation, Kohlberg & Company, The Charles 
Schwab Corporation, eBay Inc., Xerox, IBM, Ford Motor Company, Eli Lilly & 
Company, etc. (Global Research, 2012). It is critical for the audience to understand the 
strong alliance between mega corporations and the mainstream press. Corporate 
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ownership of major mass media organizations can shape journalist discourses, especially 
when economics are concerned.  
 The alternative press is heterogeneous in viewpoints and typically is not owned by 
a mega corporation. One of the biggest alternative news sites, Global Research Centre 
for Research on Globalization has been actively informing the audience on a wide range 
of issues ranging from geopolitics, foreign wars, and global economic calamities without 
accepting private foundations (Global Research, 2013). 
 One of the critical functions of the alternative press is to shed more light on dire 
situations that are neglected from the mainstream press. The people of the United States 
and other nations with free speech rights possess the luxury and the freedom to advocate 
for social change through alternative media. In contrast, some countries have 
implemented censorship that prevents certain types of media from being available for 
public viewing. Although under-utilized, the alternative media promote free exchange of 
ideas and viewpoints. 
According to Lee (2007), alternative media can be interpreted from the viewpoint 
of Marxism to “serve the public interest of the working class.” Lee (2007) goes further by 
stating, “It is media that play a central role in production, and distribution of a ruling 
class’s hegemony and that is this way the media become primary center of capitalist 
values, primary weapons of social control.” Instead of promoting a one-way 
communication discourse, the concept of a global public sphere utilizing alternative 
media enables individuals across the globe to communicate without the burden of 
censorship and corporate and commercial interest (Ramirez Pinzon, Sanchez de Sales & 
Winzer Ruiz, no date).  
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 The digital revolution in the last 25 years has increased the popularity of 
alternative media discourses, which are mainly driven by the expansion of Internet 
technology. Over the years, the mainstream press became more concentrated than ever 
(Waltz, 2006). Some have claimed that governments, special interest groups, and 
corporations have compromised the integrity of journalism to the extent that the 
mainstream press is now associated with the term, “propaganda machine.” In response, 
people are increasing turning to alternative media as a default option for news coverage. 
The main source of alternative press lies in the World Wide Web, where it is easy, 
affordable, and accessible for people to produce in an uncontrolled nature, without the 
constraints of the government or corporate interests. Importantly, the internet’s capability 
to contact vast amount of people all over the globe makes online sources of alternative 
media extraordinarily popular (Karat, no date). The next section examines the post-
recession problem using alternative discourses from various sources. Some alternative 
media sites were clear in revealing their authors’ identities, while others like 
Zerohedge.com opted to cover their identities by substituting their real identities with 
pseudonyms (a fictitious name), such as Tyler Durden from the film Fight Club. 
 
Post-Recession Problems: HFT and Dark Pools 
 
 Although, a large portion of the populace relies on the mainstream press for news, 
the alternative framework provides the readers with a detailed and investigative outlook 
on particular cases. The mainstream press has the most readers and publications such as 
The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal are viewed as highly reputable. In 
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contrast, the alternative press is growing rapidly, but still has relatively few readers and 
its heterogeneous constituent writers rarely have the same status as the mainstream 
publications. The alternative press often appears more willing than mainstream media to 
value transparency and to interrogate critical details. In addition, whistleblowers that 
expose critical information are often interviewed by alternative media sources for 
valuable insights. Unlike the mainstream press that commands a powerful reputation, the 
alternative press does not possess much social standing. However, the alternative press 
has built an incredible momentum over the years, mainly derived from the expansion of 
the Internet. Generally, alternative discourses found in the alternative media provide new 
viewpoints on the global economic crisis by giving voice to marginalized experts and by 
critically addressing issues mainstream media may have incentives for evading. 
  This section will draw on the alternative media to address some of the 
disregarded consequences of financial practices that contributed to the 2007 financial 
crisis, such as high frequency trading, the unregulated derivatives market, and the 
negative consequences of Large-Scale Asset Purchase (LSAP) or Quantitative Easing 
(QE). These issues are addressed in the alternative press in great detail, but not typically 
examined beyond a few token stories in the mainstream news accounts.  
 Technological innovations have opened new opportunities for investors and 
financial firms using automated trading systems based on algorithms that are physically 
situated close (co-location) to the stock exchanges (NYSE, NASDEQ, etc.). As the U.S. 
economy transitioned from industrial production to a market-based economy, financial 
profits became the cornerstone of the global economy. The introduction of the digital age 
in the 1970s and its rapid development since the 1980s sparked the financial sector to 
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another level of growth. The utilization of computers at the exchanges allows for more 
capital accumulation across cities, nations, and continents. Over the decades, the 
sophisticated development of processors and communication links have enhanced the 
traders’ abilities to outwit the financial capitals around the world, from Wall-Street titans 
to London, and other well-known trading destinations (Essential Intelligence, 2012).   
 According to Brown (2010), high-frequency trading (HFT) operates automatically 
using high-speed processors that are controlled by intricate algorithms that process orders, 
analyze stocks, and accumulate large sums of profit at an unimaginable speed. The two 
key factors of speed and proximity executed in HFT generate considerable advantages to 
the sellers and buyers. To give the audience a better understanding of HFT and its 
advantages, Brown (2010) states: 
Like the poker player peeking in a mirror to see his opponent’s cards, HFT 
allows the program trader to peek at major income orders and jump in 
front of them to skim profits off the top. And these large institutional 
orders are our money – our pension funds, mutual funds, and 401Ks. 
(Brown, 2010). 
 
In the recent years, the mechanization of HFT is dominating the stock exchanges: “As of 
2010, 50 to 70% of all stock trades were done by high frequency trading computer 
algorithms. Morgan Stanley has shown that the percentage of HFT in the stock market 
has skyrocketed to 84%” (Washington’s Blog, 2012b). Thus, the new culture of 
computerized trading system is part of the process of eliminating flesh-and-blood on the 
exchange floors.  
Paul Wilmott’s describes HFT as a dangerous tool in today’s market:  
The problem with the sudden popularity of high-frequency trading is that 
it many increasingly destabilize the market. Hedge funds won’t 
necessarily care whether the increased volatility causes stocks to rise or 
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fall, as long as they can get in and out quickly with a profit. But the rest of 
the economy will care. (Durden, 2009b). 
 
In an interview with Joe Saluzzi, Wilmott explains that computer-trading programs 
dominate the stock markets and also make large sums of capital, regardless of whether 
the stocks shift up or down (Washington’s Blog, 2009): 
Specifically, the program traders collect an average of quarter of a penny 
per share every time they buy. Even if they sell it at same price of fraction 
of a second later, they make another quarter of a penny when they sell… 
Program traders claim that they are providing liquidity for the markets. 
But they aren’t. They’re simply providing volume (remember 70% of the 
volume in the stock markets are from computer program trading). This 
distorts basic information about the markets, and confuses real investors’ 
view of what is going on. (Washington’s Blog, 2009a). 
 
The manipulation and distortion of market numbers through high-frequency trading 
illustrate the illegality of routine market operations.  
 Considered one of the prominent participants in the world of high-frequency 
trading, Goldman Sachs went on a financial accumulative rampage in 2009 by earning 
over $100 million per day on 116 out of 194 trading days by utilizing the method of HFT 
at the Alternative Trading System (ATS) (Brown, 2010). Over the years, high- frequency 
trading has arguably become the largest source of income for Wall Street banks. 
According to Zero Hedge’s Durden (2009b), Goldman Sachs accumulated $11.6 billion 
in revenue and they are continuing the tradition of obtaining large wins and minimal 
losses. Although Goldman is making lucrative profits from HFT, Durden (2009b) begs 
the question, is this Ponzi scheme?  
HFT’s merely perpetuate the same Ponzi market mythology last seen in 
the Madoff case, but on a massively larger scale. When it all blows up, the 
question is whether the SEC will go after the perpetrators of this pyramid 
with the same zeal that it pursued Madoff himself. We think not. (Durden, 
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2009c) 
 
Since there is very little faith in the SEC’s ability to regulate high-frequency trading, 
some have offered potential regulatory suggestions to prevent the distorting of market 
prices: 
Saluzzi says that one way to curb this manipulation and distortion of the 
markets is to force program traders to wait 1 second between buying and 
selling a stock. In their make-believe world, a second is an eternity….so 
forcing a 1-second delay would reduce the attraction and profitability of 
program trading. (Washington’s Blog, 2009b). 
     Another proposed check on HFT is a Tobin tax – a very small tax on 
every financial trade. Proposals for the tax range from .005% to 1%, so 
small that it would hardly be felt by legitimate “buy and hold” investors, 
but high enough to kill HFT, which skims a very tiny profit from huge 
number of trades. (Brown, 2010) 
 
There is very little faith in the United States government willingness to propose those 
solutions listed above to remedy the dangers of high-frequency trading because Wall 
Street banks and firms will heavily lobby to nullify any forms of regulatory acts, similar 
to what transpired with the Volcker Rule.  
Recently, two government regulatory agencies, the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTX), have 
investigated the hazards of the high-frequency trading market: 
The Securities and Exchange Commission and Commodity Futures trading 
Commission have sharpened their focus on high-frequency and 
algorithmic trading since May 6, 2010, when about $862 billion was 
erased from stock values in 20 minutes before share prices recovered from 
the plunge.   
     The CFTC has been considering issuing a so-called concept release, a 
step prior to formal rulemaking, which could lead to new testing, 
supervision and oversight requirements for high frequency and automated 
trading. (Krieger, 2010) 
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Two major themes stand out in this passage: “sharpening their focus” and “considering a 
concept release.” It sounds as if these two financial regulatory agencies are always late to 
the step or ten behind. Monitoring HFT is already considered a daunting task for the 
regulators because many of the financial transactions occur in “dark pools” away from 
the traditional exchanges, such as the NYSE. ‘Stealth Trading,’ as it is known, enables 
high-frequency traders to perform financial transactions unmonitored in secrecy.  
In an interview, Scott Patterson shared his thoughts on the lack of regulatory 
actions by the SEC concerning high-frequency trading and dark pools: 
Mary Schapiro as much as admitted to Congress last year that she and her 
agency can’t surveille the market. That really is worrisome for obvious 
reasons. So what are they waiting for? It’s true that recently the SEC 
approved the so-called consolidation audit trail, or the CAT, which is 
billed as a giant eye in the sky for the market. But it’s still in the planning 
stages and who knows when it will actually be implemented-or whether it 
will actually be able to capture what’s going on. (Smith, 2012) 
 
This is just a small sample of the regulatory incompetence and the lack of control, which 
allow Wall Street traders the freedom to accumulate profits in the most corrupt ways. 
Recently, the flash crash (see chapter 2) that occurred on May 2010 prompted the SEC to 
“sharpen their focus” as Dow Jones nearly lost 1000 point within a matter of minutes, but 
no regulatory acts concerning HFT has been passed since. If these regulatory agencies 
fail to take charge in regulating the HFT market, constant flash crashes may become 
prevalent in the near future, thereby devastating the global stock markets. Now, 
discussion turns to briefly discuss the unregulated market of financial derivatives, which 
acts very similar to options and futures.  
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Unregulated Market of Financial Derivatives 
 
 Financial derivatives pose major systemic risks to the global economy, yet the US 
government and the policymakers have failed to develop new derivatives rules. 
According to Charles Morris, derivatives “derive their value from other instruments. An 
option is the right, but not the obligation to buy or sell a stock at a specific price within a 
specific time” (Morris, 2008). When describing the world of financial derivatives, 
Warren Buffet coined the term, “financial weapons of mass destruction” (Das, 2010). 
When we hear the word “derivatives,” it may resurrect cruel memories of calculus, but a 
financial derivative is a legal contract that derives its value from another asset, such as 
current or future valuation of commodities, government bonds, stocks, currencies or 
change of interest rates (Phillips, 2009). In addition, derivatives are used as insurance, 
hedging a bet that a loan may or may not default prior to its expiration date 
(Demonocracy.info, 2012). Essentially, the unregulated derivatives market operates 
similar to a gigantic casino, but with future values; therefore, a trader is not prohibited 
from purchasing a derivative on an existing derivative (Demonocracy.info, 2012).  
 Janet Tavakoli, an expert on derivatives, stated in an interview conducted by 
Chris Martenson that the derivatives market played a critical role during the financial 
crisis in 2008. Tavakoli claims the main problem is controlled fraud by the Wall Street 
Bankers (Taggart, 2012): 
The root causes is control fraud – people in the financial system being able 
to do whatever they want and remain unchecked. Where you have a group 
of individuals who are well rewarded for this kind of behavior and yet 
there is no punishment for fraud. As long as we keep that in place, you 
will see more of the same. The way the Fed and regulators have chosen to 
deal with it is to pretend it’s not happening and just continue to print 
money. And, as I say, it acts as a neurotoxin in the financial system. 
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(Taggart, 2012) 
 
Tavakoli’s description of derivatives as neurotoxins highlights the danger they pose to the 
American financial system. 
Tarpley argues in the alternative media that the lack of management and 
regulations of financial derivatives have caused a pivotal downturn in the contemporary 
crisis (Tarpley, 2010): 
Financial derivatives have come to represent the principal business of the 
financier oligarchy in Wall Street, the City of London, Frankfurt, and 
other money centers. Politicians and the news media to hide and 
camouflage the central role played by derivative speculation in the 
economic disasters of recent years have made a concerted effort. 
Journalists and public relations types have done everything possible to 
avoid even mentioning derivatives, coining phrases like “toxic assets, 
“exotic instruments,” and – most notably- “troubled assets,” as in TARP. 
(Tarpley, 2010) 
 
This is an interesting observation by Tarpley because the mainstream media failed to 
focus in great detail the risk posed by the overblown derivatives market. During the 
1990s, Clinton’s financial advisors, Greenspan, Summers, and Rubin deliberately ignored 
and shutout Brooksley Born of the CFTC in her attempt to warn the Clinton 
administration of the systemic risks involving over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives. The 
mainstream media failed to give voice to Born’s concerns. Had Greenspan, Summers, 
and Rubin decided to act upon her warnings regarding the OTC derivatives market, the 
severity of the 2008 financial crisis may have been subdued. Instead, the consequences of 
ignoring the monstrosity of the outstanding derivatives market will continue to be at the 
heart of the next financial crisis. 
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 The derivative market has triggered a downfall involving the large banking 
institutions worldwide. An article written by Actindependent.org (2009), decodes some 
of the communication messages during the time when Bear Stearns filed for bankruptcy:  
Bernanke warned against ‘chaotic unwinding.’ All these code words are 
signals that derivatives are being talked about including speculative 
instruments as options and futures. Derivatives also include the credit 
default swaps so prominent in the fall of AIG, collateralized debt 
obligations, structured investment vehicles, asset-backed securities, 
mortgage backed securities, auction rate securities, and a myriad of other 
toxic variations. (Actindependent.org, 2009) 
 
The mainstream press’s mystification of financial “terms” such as credit default swaps 
and collaterized debt obligations impedes the dissemination and public understanding of 
vital information about the causes, consequences, and continued risks posed to the global 
economy by the unregulated and largely dark derivatives markets. 
 Since the implementation of the Commodities Future Modernization Act (2000), 
America’s top banks have spiraled out of control with respect to the value of outstanding 
derivatives. The accounting valuation of derivatives has increased the size and riskiness 
of America’s largest banks. Back in the early 2000s, the 10 largest banks authorized 
about 55% of all U.S. banking assets; however, the top 10 banks today control about 77% 
of all U.S. banking assets (Snyder, 2011). As explained by Zero Hedge, four U.S. banks 
now account for 95.9% of total derivative exposures: JP Morgan Chase with $78.1 
trillion, Citi with $56 trillion, Bank of America with $53 trillion and Goldman Sachs with 
$48 trillion (Durden, 2011). Unfortunately, many of the biggest banks primary assets are 
composed of derivatives. These large banks are not only growing, but also their risk 
exposure hit an all-time high. The “too big to fail” banks in the United States have 
accumulated more than 200 trillion dollars of exposure to derivatives, which is equivalent 
 154 
 
to three times the size of the entire global economic system (Snyder, 2012). Unlike 
previous times, if the derivative bubble pops in the near future, there is no government or 
a central bank in this world possessing enough bailout money to save the financial sector 
without wildly inflating money supply by rapid and massive money printing. One 
essential point people must understand is that a sovereign nation such as the United States 
possesses the luxury to always ‘print’ money from its central bank; therefore, it can never 
become insolvent as long as the debts and liabilities are denominated in U.S. dollars. 
However, rapid money printing can cause massive inflationary pressure and de-stabilize 
domestic and international trade and financial transactions.  
 According to Michael Snyder, the derivative market was formed to hedge risks, 
but the market spiraled out of control with speculative bets, drastically increasing the 
market size from $600 trillion to roughly $1.5 quadrillion (Snyder, 2011). To help the 
readers understand the notional figures, Graham Summers of Capital Research provided 
the readers with a better understanding of outstanding derivatives: 
If you add up the value of every stock on the plant, the entire market 
capitalization would be about $36 trillion. If you do the same process for 
bonds, you’d get a market capitalization of roughly $72 trillion. The 
notional value of the derivative market is roughly $1.4 quadrillion. I 
realize that number sounds like something out of Looney tunes, so I’ll try 
to put it into perspective. 
 
$1.4 Quadrillion is roughly: 
- 40 TIMES THE WORLD’S STOCK MARKET 
- 10 TIMES the value of EVERY STOCK & EVERY BOND ON THE 
PLANT. 
- 23 TIMES WORLD GDP  
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It is nearly impossible to conceive a trillion dollars, but to break thought the threshold of 
“quadrillion” points to the madness that is associated with Wall Street. Even though the 
Great Recession (2007-2009) concluded, it is only a matter of time before the global 
economy experiences another reckoning crash of the derivatives market. There is not 
enough money to go around without unprecedented money printing for a series of global 
bailouts as the central banks around the world will be forced to swallow the bitter pill 
they avoided back in 2008. The sheer size of the derivatives market is a critical threat to 
the world’s economy. Since the system has become more intricate over the past several 
decades, some believe that the derivative contracts are nearly impossible to comprehend 
and as long as they stay unregulated, the assessment of financial risks will be tough to 
gauge (Washington’s Blog, 2012). The next theme found in the alternative media is the 
Federal Reserve’s actions of purchasing United States treasury bonds and mortgage-
backed securities by printing obscene amounts of money from the United States Treasury.   
 
Quantitative Easing (QE) 
 
 To escape from the financial agony of debt at unprecedented levels, there are 
three different methods:  
1. Create GDP growth to grow out of debt  
2. Increase taxes  
3. Inflate out of debt.  
The method adopted by the Federal Reserve to keep the interest rates capped at extremely 
low levels attacks the value of the U.S. dollar. After the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
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2008 and the TARP bailouts, the United States Treasury and the Federal Reserve have 
engaged in historic levels of purchasing treasury bonds and mortgage-backed securities 
known as “money printing,” “Quantitative Easing (QE), or Large-Scale Asset Purchases” 
(LSAP). These actions have been covered most extensively in the alternative press, 
particularly by alternative financial news sites, such as Zerohedge. 
 In this process of “quantitative easing,” the Fed purchases financial assets (usually 
treasury securities) from banks and other financial institutions (FI). This adds capital to 
the FI balance sheets (hence the term money printing). When the Fed purchases the 
securities, the security asset is transferred to the Fed’s balance sheet, and the FI gets 
“virtual” money on its balance sheet (Swann, 2012). Many experts and financial 
observers covered by the alternative press are opposed to this method of monetary 
stimulus due to its inflationary tendencies and consider the policy to be the “last resort.” 
Previously, QE method was utilized by the Japanese Central Bank in the 1990s, but was 
ineffectively as they have engaged in nine more QE’s.  
 Going back to the Keynesian theory of government intervention, one method of 
stimulating a stagnant economy is to suppress interest rates for money that banks lend to 
one another. The Federal Reserve slashed interest rates from 5.25 percent to 0.00 percent 
and initiated large sums of printing money (Das, 2011, p. 340). In a simple scenario, if 
Well Fargo has excess capital (cash) and they decide to lend that extra money to JP 
Morgan Chase at a suppressed interest rate then everyone begins to borrow and spend, 
resulting in a stimulated economy. However, this method has not worked and it is not 
presently working to stabilize the current state of the U.S. economy as will be explained 
below.   
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 To give the audience a brief background there has been three separate instance of 
LSAP in the past. The Federal Reserve’s first round of LSAP commenced in 2008 with 
the aim of devaluing the strength of the U.S. Dollar on foreign exchange markets 
(Rickards, 2011, p. 33). In 2008, the Fed initiated a mass purchase of $500 billion in 
mortgage-backed securities or toxic mortgages that destroyed the system under President 
George W. Bush. A year later, the Fed announced it would purchase another $750 billion 
in mortgage-backed securities (Swann, 2012). However, the monetary easing did not end 
with LSAP from 2008-2009. A year later, the Fed decided to proceed with another round 
of LSAP. This second round of LSAP amplified the cost structure of the majority of the 
exporting countries and of the rapidly growing economies around the globe (Rickards, 
2011). From November 2010 to June 2011, the Fed purchased approximately $600-$800 
billion in U.S. Treasury Bonds by printing nearly $75 billion per month. It also had 
another effect as it deposited additional cash reserves in the European Central Bank (ECB) 
(Swann, 2012). To continue, during this phase of LSAP 2 funding period, cash reserve of 
foreign banks increased from $308 billion to $940 billion (Swann, 2012). However, is the 
third time the charm?  
 The Fed is set to significantly purchase two of the most historic investments in the 
United States, mortgage-backed securities, and treasury bonds for an unlimited duration. 
By implementing QE, the Fed is forcing investors money into risky Wall Street 
investments because of the suppressed interest rates (0%) available to savers and 
investors. The Fed purchases the safe bets, which would lower their return making 
corporate bonds and dividend paying stocks more appealing (Swann, 2012). Projected to 
print 85 billion dollars a month starting in January 2013, the Fed is set to purchase $40 
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billion a month in mortgage-backed securities and $45 billion in 10 to 30 year U.S. 
treasury bonds (Zero Hedge, 2012; Miller, 2013). By the end of 2013, the Federal 
Reserve’s balance sheet will be roughly four trillion dollars. The practice of “money 
printing” produces inflation, which even venture into hyperinflation; however, one major 
reason why the U.S. economy is not experiencing dangerous levels of hot inflation is due 
to the Shadow Banking System. The shadow banking is essentially a system of non-
financial establishments that borrow capital in the short-run to invest in long-term assets. 
According to Das (2011), as the shadow banking system expands, risks are transferred 
from unregulated banks to unregulated vehicles, making the risks difficult to represent 
and calculate. This particular system generates credit-money designed by the banks and 
does not participate in the real economy (Demonocracy.info, 2012). Since the crisis of 
2008, The Shadow Banking System has been deleveraged and it must sell assets to 
acquire new capital, which is derived from the Fed in order to pay back others 
(Demonocracy.info, 2012). Overall, the Federal Reserve must pump at the minimum of 
$3.9 trillion to stabilize the Shadow Banking System.  
 In an interview with The Real News Network, economist Michael Hudson stated 
LSAP or QE has never proven to work. He stated this latest round of QE3 is a program 
for the Fed to supply money to the Wall Street banks until Beethoven writes his 10th 
Symphony. There has never been a correlation between QE and employment whatsoever 
(Jay, 2012). Hudson further added, “The crooks have taken over the economy and are 
trying to bail themselves out of the mess that they are in, so that they can somehow re-bid 
up real estate prices to restore the happy bubble economy that led to all these problems to 
begin with. Of course, the end of this will be yet another bailout in QE4 and QE5” (Jay, 
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2012).  
 Unfortunately, this is the state of the global economy moving forward. The 
unregulated derivatives market significantly exceeds the global GDP. The dangerous 
cyber game of high-frequency trading (HFT), which is capable of severely destabilizing 
the market, escalates. The Federal Reserve and Treasury’s engagement in unlimited 
rounds of LSAP/QE to “maintain” price stability and “lower unemployment” exacerbates 
instability and does not stimulate the real economy. Five years after the Lehman crisis, 
volatility in the market remains high despite the Dow Jones Industrial hitting record 
levels by surpassing over 14,000 points in March 2013 because high unemployment and 
underemployment persist, causing further debt defaults and putting downward pressure 
on corporate profits. Uncertainty and angst among the populace remain as society 
progresses into the future. There is a clear distinction between the mainstream and 
alternative press’ style of framing news. While, both remain factual in their reports, 
alternative press digs a bit deeper by revealing information that the mainstream press 
dares not to touch such as the Shadow Banking System, the sheer amount of unregulated 
derivatives, and the dangerous world of high-frequency trading (HFT). As long as the 
mainstream press prolongs dishonesty and trivialization of economic fraud in this “Alice 
in Wonderland” economy, the advocacy movement within the alternative media will 
continue to increase amongst the populace. 
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Conclusion 
 
  Although the alternative media outlets tend to carry a smaller group of followers 
in comparison to the mainstream press, the alternative media discourses framed the 
severity of the global economic crisis in a grim manner. Unlike the mainstream media’s 
tactic of ignoring or trivializing the core issues such as high frequency trading and the 
derivatives market, the mainstream press offers a narrow range of analysis and 
perspectives on the magnitude of fraud. In contrast, the alternative discourses found 
across the Internet often provided in-depth analysis from a range of perspectives not 
widely represented in the mainstream news outlets. Zero Hedge, for example, specifically 
targeted Goldman Sachs by unraveling some of their fraudulent strategic trading tactics to 
the readers (Zero Hedge, 2009b). By sharing data on the staggering earnings, profits, and 
manipulative schemes, the alternative press is able to foster a critical look at those 
corporations and individuals involved in questionable or outright corrupt financial 
practices. The audience is able to gain further insight by stories that unpack the culture of 
afterhours trading and the mysterious world of dark pools where the atmosphere is 
unregulated and manipulated for profiteering. In some instances, these alternative 
websites operate like whistle blowers because they are sharing sensitive information 
regarding the financial firms. 
 Other alternative sites utilized the discourse of sarcasm and mockery to 
communicate to the readers. Financial blogger named, Michael Krieger facetiously states:  
Wow, that makes me feel a lot better. Two years sharpening their focus. 
They are considering a concept release! Must be busy working on the Jon 
Corzine case right? Which beach is he laying out on this week? (Krieger, 
2012)  
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Krieger is mocking these soft regulatory agencies for failing to supervise properly. In 
another account, Webster Tarpley slammed the mainstream press for misinforming the 
public by failing to associate derivatives with credit default swaps, collateralized debt 
obligations, etc. Tarpley states the mainstream media refuse to associate the term, 
“derivatives” in relation to the collapse of 2008. Janet Tavakoli claims derivatives were at 
the center of the crash. Overall, the bluntness, transparency, in-depth analysis, and humor 
of the alternative press facilitate a view of the crisis from more critical perspectives. 
 In times of economic turbulence, financial transactions involving high-frequency 
trading and derivatives will most likely cause the next economic collapse. Thriving under 
an unregulated market system, high-frequency trading is capable of triggering flash 
crashes similar to the May 2010 fiasco that devastated the NYSE. An implosion of the 
derivatives bubble will make the Great Depression look like child’s play. The central 
banks around the world cannot continuously bailout the financial institutions, such as the 
banking industry, auto industry, and insurance firms, in the aftermaths of repeated 
economic recessions without eventually sparking destabilizing inflation. How will the 
policymakers respond when the $1.4 quadrillion derivative bubble burst? The regulatory 
agencies are always a step, or ten, behind as they fail to adjust, giving Wall Street the 
freedom to set their own rules. As each crash is more severe than the previous, it is only a 
matter of time until our society faces another economic meltdown. The consequences of 
ignoring the actual problems, such as outstanding derivatives, high-frequency trading and 
continuous creation of financial bubbles that distorts the market such as education and 
mortgages, will be at the heart of the next crisis. 
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 On July 26, 2012, in a shocking statement, Sanford Weill expressed a change of 
heart stating the banks have grown too large and to counter this problem, downsizing the 
banks is a necessary process. The New York Times published an article covering a story 
on Sanford Weill, who led the advocacy movement in repealing the Glass-Steagall Act of 
1933. During the late 90s, Sanford Weill of Citigroup benefited from the repeal of the 
banking act by consolidating commercial lending and investment banks under one entity. 
This initiated the rise of mega banks and monetary transactions, thus ushering in a new 
era of deregulated finance (de la Merced, 2012). Driven by extreme accumulations of 
capital, risks, bets, and bonuses, the financial opulence was short-lived when Lehman 
Brothers filed for bankruptcy in 2008. Although he does not regret his advocacy efforts 
during the late 90s, Weill is currently advocating for a sensible banking regulation. I 
commend Sanford Weill’s for his encouragement for a sensible regulatory act that 
downsizes the banks in the first place. 
  However, is reviving the Glass-Steagall Act still relevant for fixing the current 
financial crisis? We must understand that the Glass-Steagall Act was drafted in 1933. The 
United States financial system has evolved tremendously, especially since the 1980s. 
Downsizing the banking industry is one of the issues at the center of the table, but why go 
through all that effort if the banking regulation is incapable of monitoring the 
contemporary problems, such as high frequency trading and dark pools? Carter Glass and 
Henry Steagall did not account for technological advancements and computerized 
banking transactions at the stock exchanges. It would be meaningless to reinstate the 
Glass-Steagall in its original form. Instead, Sanford Weill should have advocated for a 
new and improved version of the Glass-Steagall Act that oversees the current landscape 
 163 
 
of the market system, such as high-frequency trading, the derivatives market, naked short 
selling, re-hypothecation, and other contemporary practices that heavily distort the 
market. 
 It is easy for Sanford Weill to appear on national TV and repair his public image 
by atoning for his financial sins, so the public can embrace him once more. However, 
why can’t our society embrace a figure like Brooksley Born? She warned Clinton’s 
financial advisors and Alan Greenspan of the OTC derivatives posed the ability to 
demolish the entire global economy. What about Byron Dorgan? During the repeal 
process of the Glass-Steagall Act, he warned the United States Congress of financial 
repercussions (Crawford, 2011, p. 129):  
I think we will look back in 10 years’ time and say we shouldn’t have 
done this, but we did because we forgot the lessons of the past and that 
what was true in the 1930’s is true in 2010. I wasn’t around during the 
1930’s or the debate over Glass-Steagall…We has now decided in the 
name of modernization to forget the lessons of the past of safety and 
soundness. (p. 129) 
 
 In a similar stance with Byron Dorgan, Senator Paul Wellstone advocated against 
the repeal of Glass-Steagall (Crawford, 2011, p. 130): 
I rise in strong opposition to S. 900, the Financial Services Modernization 
Act of 1999. S. 900 would aggravate a trend toward economic 
concentration that endangers not only our economy, but also our 
democracy. S. 900 would make it easier for banks, securities firms and 
insurance companies to merge into gigantic new conglomerates that would 
dominate the U.S. financial industry and the U.S. economy. This is the 
wrong kind of modernization because it fails to put in place adequate 
regulatory safeguards for these new financial giants, the failure of which 
could jeopardize the entire economy. It’s the wrong kind of modernization 
because taxpayers could be stuck with the bill if these conglomerates 
become too big to fail. (p. 130) 
 
Wellstone’s concerns were not widely publicized. 
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 The three individuals listed above accurately predicted the crisis of 2008 during 
the late 1990s; yet, their advocacy efforts went up in flames because our policymakers in 
Washington ignored their warnings and the public failed to encourage action because 
they lacked adequate knowledge about the real risks posed by de-regulation. The 
prosecutors during the Great Depression made a decision to prosecute the high-level 
banking executives that abused the stock market. It was a bold move to prosecute the 
high level banking officials during a time when bankers were embraced as celebrities, but 
Pecora took a stance by advocating for the greater good of the public. As well as 
hammering economic corruption, Pecora paved a path for a series of regulations starting 
with the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933. In contrast, our society is now stuck in the eye of a 
financial F5 hurricane. Our methods of paving over problems using bailouts, deregulation, 
quantitative easing (QE), and the lack of prosecutions will eventually backfire. With the 
derivatives market exceeding over a quadrillion and the unregulated high frequency 
trading running rampant in many parts of this world, something must give. No one knows 
exactly when that day will arrive, but I promise, this next financial crisis will have 
everyone trembling for their financial security. 
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